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Cover
The Navy’s unmanned X-47B flies near
the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) in the Atlantic Ocean
in August 2014. The aircraft completed
a series of tests demonstrating its ability
to operate safely and seamlessly with
manned aircraft. In “Lifting the Fog of
Targeting: ‘Autonomous Weapons’ and
Human Control through the Lens of
Military Targeting,” Merel A. C. Ekelhof
addresses the current context of increasingly autonomous weapons, making the
case that military targeting practices
should be the core of any analysis that
seeks a better understanding of the
concept of meaningful human control.
Credit: USN photo by Liz Wolter
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FROM THE EDITORS
The post–Cold War era has been hard on the navies of the United States and its
allies. This is so for two reasons: the disappearance of a great-power maritime
threat, and the urgent needs of land-centric combat in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
beyond. In “Into the Abyss? European Naval Power in the Post–Cold War Era,”
Jeremy Stöhs provides a succinct overview of how our NATO allies have coped
with this situation. Emphasizing the negative impact of the financial crisis of the
last decade and ongoing problems with manning and training, he is cautiously
optimistic that a modest recovery is currently under way in the acquisition of
modern naval capabilities, as well as a renewed appreciation of their utility, particularly in the face of a reemergent Russian threat. Jeremy Stöhs is an analyst at
the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University.
In “Japan’s Defense Readiness: Prospects and Issues in Operationalizing Air
and Maritime Supremacy,” Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi provides a similarly comprehensive survey of maritime defense–related developments in Japan over the last
decade or so. Of particular interest is his focus on recent legislation designed to
improve the readiness of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and ensure their ability
to react to Chinese “gray-area” provocations. Also important is his discussion of
recent improvements in the jointness of the Japanese military and in the development of doctrine for operating in the air and maritime domains. Ryo HinataYamaguchi, a former noncommissioned officer in the Japan Ground Self-Defense
Force (Reserve), is currently a visiting professor at Pusan National University.
Questions relating to the autonomous operation of advanced weapon systems
continue to attract a great deal of attention, for reasons that are understandable;
but the resulting debates too often have generated more heat than light. In “Lifting the Fog of Targeting: ‘Autonomous Weapons’ and Human Control through
the Lens of Military Targeting,” Merel A. C. Ekelhof offers a detailed and authoritative discussion of the targeting process as NATO countries currently practice it
as a way to better inform these debates. She argues that military targeting often
is identified simplistically with putting ordinance on specific targets, as distinguished from the “software” central to contemporary targeting practices. Such
software is likely to be of increasing importance, given the inability of human beings to process volumes of data on the scale we will see in the future (and indeed
are seeing already). She suggests that human control of the targeting process is a
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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manageable problem if this more holistic perspective is kept in view. Merel A. C.
Ekelhof is currently a visiting researcher at the Harvard Law School Program on
International Law and Armed Conflict.
In “The Role of the Human Operator in the Third Offset Strategy,” Adam
Biggs and Rees Lee address another facet of the man-machine relationship. They
argue that the ongoing efforts within the American military establishment to
identify cutting-edge technologies that will enable the United States to preserve
(or recover) its strategic advantage in the contemporary security environment
(the so-called Third Offset Strategy) need to refocus on the ways in which human
performance on the battlefield of the future can be enhanced through technology,
as well as new approaches to talent management. Lieutenant Adam Biggs and
Captain Rees Lee, USN, currently are serving with the Naval Medical Research
Unit Dayton on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.
It is fair to say that the primary mission of the Naval War College is to enhance
the human performance of future military leaders through education. As David
Kohnen shows us in “Charting a New Course: The Knox-Pye-King Board and
Naval Professional Education, 1919–23,” it never was preordained that the Navy
would accept the College’s mission so understood—or, indeed, the existence of
the College itself. A small cohort of naval officers—inspired above all by Admiral
William Sims—had to fight the civilian and military leadership of the Navy of
the day, as well as the weight of Navy culture and tradition, to make that happen. David Kohnen is a retired USN commander and the director of the newly
established John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research at the
Naval War College.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309,
332). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236).
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is responsible for educating future leaders, developing their
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and enhancing their capability to advise senior leaders and
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer
whose sea-duty assignments have included command
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minnesota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political
science, and received master of arts degrees from the
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Breaking the Mold

we foresee for the Navy and
the nation in the decades ahead has resulted in a series of organizational changes and realignments at the Naval War College since the summer
of 2016. As one approach to understanding better the myriad futures that may
arise, we recently conducted the “Breaking the Mold: Strategy and War in the 21st
Century” workshop. This event was conceived as a way to bring together a diverse
set of critical thinkers, futurists, and seasoned operators to “break the mold” of
conventional thinking and develop a series of recommendations for senior leaders within the Navy and the Department of Defense.
The workshop, held in Newport in early March 2018, was sponsored by the
Under Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Thomas B. Modly, who provided
the broad outlines of the task and identified his desire to see innovative recommendations put forward to address a host of future challenges. Sixty scholars,
researchers, and proven maritime and joint-warfare operators were invited to
gather at the College to spend two days engaged in free-flowing and unconstrained thinking and debate.
In this exercise, the “mold breakers” were empowered to consider options that
some considered radical, controversial, and revolutionary. Such ideas deserved
to compete in the intellectual arena—and could help shape the way ahead for
America’s national security forces.
Under Secretary Modly traveled to Newport to kick off the event and to participate in the working-group discussions personally. In his keynote remarks he
stated, in part:
THE NATURE OF THE CHALLENGES

Whether on active duty, as a Navy civilian, or even in the private sector, we have all
witnessed profound changes together during the past four decades. These changes

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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will impact the U.S. Navy and our nation for years to come. The changes are coming
at us fast—so we need to be prepared to break free of the organizational paradigms,
behaviors, and biases that suited us in the last century. They are not well suited for
today, and certainly not for the future.
Our National Defense Strategy . . . cannot be executed without a significant commitment of national resources and, perhaps more importantly, a significant application of national resolve and urgency—and an approach to maritime supremacy that
“breaks the mold” of conventional thinking. Our maritime advantage is, and will
continue to be, almost entirely dependent upon the quality of our people. It follows,
therefore, that the agility of our future force will be almost entirely dependent upon
the agility of the people we identify now to lead it. Therefore, I encourage you to
think about breaking the mold in a way that allows us to recruit, train, equip, and
educate the most quick-minded, flexible, collaborative, innovative, and transparent
people we can find. If we do this, we will set the Navy on the course for maritime
superiority well into this century.

Among the outcomes of this unique workshop was the development of a
series of strategic and operational concepts that focused on four broad areas: a
“porcupine strategy” of defense in Europe; a mobile maritime barrier in Asia; an
increased reliance on special forces, unmanned systems, and cyber; and a possible reorganization of portions of the U.S. government to promote enhanced national security. Each of the ideas generated during this workshop will provide the
Naval War College’s superb faculty with topics to research and refine, applying a
bottom-up analysis to the group’s top-down formulations. The College is planning to conduct a larger, follow-on conference on these topics in October 2018.
In a related initiative, the College is taking another important step in preparing our national security professionals—at the College and throughout the
Navy—for the future. In early April 2018, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
John Richardson, USN, visited the College to announce the establishment of the
College of Leadership and Ethics (CLE) under the Naval War College’s academic
umbrella. This effort is an expansion of the Leadership and Ethics Department
that has been operating under Dean Peg Klein’s direction since late last year. The
mission of the new college is to imbue Naval War College students with a desire
for continuous learning and development as leaders of character. In addition, the
new college will supplement and support each Navy community in its community leader development and maintain a strategy for leader development beyond
major command.
In establishing the new CLE, Admiral Richardson noted that “[w]orld-class
leadership is our Navy’s decisive advantage over our adversaries. Our operational
and war-fighting success depends on developing leaders who learn and adapt to
achieve maximum possible performance. Opening a College of Leadership and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
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Ethics (and providing a fleet-centered development framework) will create opportunities for us to become better leaders, build winning teams, and maintain
America’s maritime superiority.”
The workshop and the new college are just two examples of the ways in which
your Naval War College is having significant impact on the Navy and the larger
national security community. Watch this forum for discussion of other significant initiatives as the calendar year progresses.

JEFFREY A. HARLEY

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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Jeremy Stöhs is an Austrian American defense analyst at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University and its adjunct Center for Maritime Strategy
& Security. He is also a nonresident fellow of the
Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and
Security Studies. He has studied in Austria, Germany, and the United States, holds a master’s degree
in history and English, and has taught in both fields.
He has contributed articles and chapters on various
defense and security matters, and has authored the
book The Decline of European Naval Forces: Challenges to Sea Power in an Age of Financial Austerity and Political Uncertainty (Naval Institute Press,
2018). Prior to his studies, he worked in law enforcement with the Austrian Federal Police.
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INTO THE ABYSS?
European Naval Power in the Post–Cold War Era
Jeremy Stöhs

S

ince the end of the Cold War, European sea power—particularly its naval
element—has undergone drastic change.1 The dissolution of the Soviet Union
not only heralded a period of Western unilateralism but also put an end to previous levels of military investment. In fact, once the perceived threat that Soviet
forces posed had disappeared, many Western governments believed that the era
of great-power rivalry and major-power wars finally had come to an end.2 Rather
than necessitating preparation for war, the security environment now ostensibly
allowed states to allocate their funds to other areas, such as housing, education,
and health care. As a result, for more than two decades, the majority of naval
forces across Europe have been subject to declining budgets and far-reaching
downscaling measures.
Although the post–Cold War era proved to be anything but peaceful, all
military engagements throughout the 1990s involving Western states took place
either at the lower end of the intensity spectrum or against enemies that posed
a relatively limited threat to the overwhelming superiority of the NATO allies. Combined-arms warfare, effects-based operations, and coercive air strikes
against a series of state and nonstate actors underscored the West’s ability to apply
military force with near impunity.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, effectively put an end
to this period of largely unchecked Western military interventions. The attacks
not only marked the beginning of an ongoing struggle between the United States
and its allies and radical Islamic terrorism; they also drew attention away from
traditional concepts of the utility of naval forces, such as providing credible deterrence, buttressing collective defense, and maintaining sea control. Over the following decade, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, as well as constabulary
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operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the greater Middle East, took center stage.
Concomitantly, the land and air forces involved in these theaters received the
lion’s share of funding, while naval power (again) was considered a mere supporting element of twenty-first-century warfare. In Europe, these developments
heightened the already-existing lack of appreciation for the significance of the
maritime environment and the value of naval forces for a state’s security and
prosperity—a political and cultural myopia often referred to as “sea blindness.”3
As defense spending continued to decline, so did the size of most Western
fleets.4 By the end of the first decade of the new century, Europe’s naval forces
were heading into the proverbial abyss. Smaller than at any time in recent history,
naval forces across Europe had lost important proficiencies and capabilities. The
shortfall in naval platforms had substantial bearing on the ability to deal effectively with the growing range of naval tasks. The modernization of many navies
has been hampered not only by shrinking budgets but by cost overruns, lengthy
procurement processes, and major technical deficiencies. These problems were
compounded by the fact that many armed forces across the continent have found
it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain young men and women, while the
overhead costs for personnel consume large parts of defense budgets.5 Consequently, significant shortfalls in training and readiness—and hence the ability to
use naval forces to pursue and achieve political ends—have arisen.
This article will outline the development of Europe’s naval forces since the end
of the Cold War. It will address the challenges European naval forces have faced
in an evolving security environment, and will argue that more than two decades
of fiscal austerity measures have jeopardized Europe’s ability both to ensure good
order at sea and to provide credible deterrence, and have limited its ability to
promote common interests and shape events abroad.
This proposition is supported by Europe’s most recent efforts to strengthen
its defense capabilities. Russia’s military actions along Europe’s flanks and mass
migrations to Europe and the associated threat of terrorism, as well as the uncertainty pertaining to America’s foreign policy objectives, have elicited responses
from European states to shoulder greater responsibility for their own security.
The extent to which these developments can lead to a lasting revitalization of
European naval power will be discussed in the final section.
AFTER THE FALL OF THE WALL (1989–2001)
To many observers in the West, the quick and relatively peaceful demise of the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact came as a great surprise.6 Consequently, until
the end, the naval forces of the European NATO partners were considered the
fulcrum on which rested the West’s ability to deter—and, in the case of war, to
defeat—Soviet forces.
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From Sea Control to Out-of-Area Operations
With the confrontation between the two superpowers relegated to the pages of
history, most of Europe’s leaders were quick to interpret these events as nothing
less than the end of great-power rivalry. No longer bound to the parochial contingency plans postulated by the United States and NATO, the majority of Europe’s
navies began shifting toward a peacetime posture.
The United Kingdom: Shifting of Priorities. For the British Royal Navy (RN), the
most distinguished and most powerful among Europe’s naval forces, the Cold
War by and large ended on a high note—followed almost immediately by a shifting of priorities. Apart from the U.S. Navy, only the Russian navy—slowly rusting
away in what used to be credible sea bastions—exceeded the fleet carrying the
white ensign in size and capabilities. The Falklands War a decade earlier had
provided the RN with painful yet invaluable insights, and substantial improvements had been made to existing platforms and operational procedures to address the apparent shortcomings.7 Furthermore, a number of large-scale navalprocurement projects were under way. These included replacement of the navy’s
ballistic-missile submarines (with four of the new Vanguard class), introduction
of the capable Type 23 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) frigates, and development
of a common air-defense destroyer among France, Italy, and the United Kingdom
(the Horizon project, later the Type 45 for the RN).
On the other hand, the RN also faced some serious challenges. First and
foremost, defense spending plummeted from nearly 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1991 to 2.5 percent in 1998. In other words, the military
budget was cut by more than 20 percent in real terms.8 Second, the new strategic
environment no longer required a fleet of nearly fifty surface combatants and
twenty-two submarines (both nuclear and conventionally powered). “[Britain’s]
Cold War mission of hunting Soviet submarines had vanished, and along with it
the chief justification for large chunks of the Fleet.”9
Throughout the 1990s, the RN had to accept incremental reductions to its
force structure, as well as curtailment of acquisition programs. To save money,
the number of personnel was decreased from 69,000 to 50,000 within ten years.
Still, the RN fared somewhat better than its sister services. One reason was the
RN’s importance as a key enabler of Britain’s effort to “prevent or shape crises
further away [from home] and [its ability] to deploy military forces rapidly before
they get out of hand,” as the Strategic Defence Review published in 1998 emphasized.10 The procurement of two larger aircraft carriers to replace the three existing smaller ships underscored the continued relevance of the RN as an effective
tool of foreign policy.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 15

21

5/1/18 11:10 AM

16

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1

Like other European navies, the RN increasingly shifted its focus from openocean, sea-control operations along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
in the North Atlantic and homeland defense (in particular, ASW near the approaches to Britain’s ports) to power projection over great distances and into the
littoral regions of the world. Projecting military force from the sea onto land (e.g.,
carrier aviation and long-range cruise missiles) had proved expedient during
military operations in the Balkans and the Middle East.11
Britain’s close relationship with the United States allowed the RN to acquire
new systems and technologies, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, providing
the navy with an important capability to fulfill these new roles. Yet while the
Anglo-American defense partnership flourished, Britain’s collaboration with its
European neighbors initially yielded rather mixed results.
France, Italy, and Spain: Consolidation of Forces. France and Britain share a rich
history of both competition and cooperation. Over the centuries, the two great
powers waged countless wars against each other, culminating in the battle of Trafalgar, the later defeat of Napoleon, and the provisions of the Congress of Vienna
in 1815. Strategic competition and deep-seated suspicions persisted between the
two countries. Neither fighting side by side in two world wars nor the looming
threat of a Soviet invasion could obscure the fact that, during large parts of the
twentieth century, Paris and London did not see eye to eye.
What is more, conflicting views on France’s status within NATO persuaded
President Charles de Gaulle to withdraw from the alliance in 1966.12 As a direct
consequence of that decision, the French military’s raison d’être to this day is
based on providing France with capabilities with which to respond to crises that
run the gamut of the intensity spectrum. Moreover, the state’s geographic location, as well as its numerous overseas territories (remnants of its former colonial
empire), has shaped the French fleet to a considerable degree.
By the time the Cold War drew to a close, the French and British had fashioned
navies of similar size. However, the respective fleets were based on somewhat
different strategic and operational concepts. Unlike the RN, which was designed
principally for sea control (ASW) and the deployment of carrier strike groups in
the North Atlantic, the Marine Nationale (MN), as the French navy officially is
called, operated a mix of some “first-rate” warships and a significant number of
“second-rate” surface combatants and patrol vessels. The latter are required to
conduct constabulary duties, such as fisheries protection in the French exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). In fact, France possesses the world’s second-largest EEZ
(more than 4.2 million square miles) and has naval forces continuously deployed
to the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans.13 Furthermore, while the British
submarine-based nuclear deterrent had to rely heavily on U.S. technological
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assistance, all critical components of France’s force océanique stratégique (its seabased nuclear forces) were of domestic design.14
To this day, such diverging operational requirements represent a major
stumbling block to establishing common European security frameworks and
pursuing joint procurement projects. The aforementioned attempt to develop a
new air-defense destroyer trilaterally for the British, French, and Italian navies
failed largely over differences regarding the specific capabilities each stakeholder
deemed necessary.15 Fortunately, France and Italy continued to pursue the project, ultimately receiving two vessels each. Britain would go on to build six ships
of similar design, the Type 45 Daring-class destroyers.
Throughout the 1990s,
In Europe, these developments heightened the the MN held a decisive advantage over the RN (and all
already-existing lack of appreciation for the
significance of the maritime environment and other navies of the time, save
the U.S. Navy), despite its
the value of naval forces for a state’s security
and prosperity—a political and cultural myo- somewhat less capable surface
component. In contrast to the
pia often referred to as “sea blindness.”
British, Italians, and Spanish,
all of whom operated relatively small short-takeoff/vertical-landing (STOVL)
carriers, France had two flat-deck carriers fitted with steam catapults. This allowed the French navy to deploy a well-balanced naval air wing more effectively
and over greater distances. The naval air arms of the other navies had to content
themselves with Harrier jump jets and helicopters, all of which had inherent
limitations with regard to range / loiter time and capability.
Not being able to rely on NATO’s security guarantees, France remained somewhat more cautious in the early years of the post–Cold War era. Rather than
implementing rash defense cuts or canceling construction programs outright,
France put its navy’s organizational structure through a comprehensive streamlining effort.16 As part of the Optimar 95 program, large parts of naval command
structures were disbanded and the fleet was divided between the naval bases
in Toulon (carriers, expeditionary forces) and Brest (ASW, mine warfare, and
strategic submarines).17 In addition, major construction processes of warships
were stretched to alleviate strain on the shrinking budget. Most noticeably, only
a single carrier remained in service.
Meanwhile, both of France’s Mediterranean neighbors, Italy and Spain, found
themselves in relatively comfortable situations in the early 1990s.
With the Italian Peninsula occupying a critical geographic position along
Europe’s southern shores, Italy’s sphere of interest largely was confined to two
main lines stretching across the Mediterranean Sea: starting from Gibraltar, “one
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reaching the Black Sea and the Middle East through the Balkans and the Aegean
Sea; the [other] moving southward through the Red Sea down to the Indian
Ocean, the Gulf, and including the Horn of Africa.”18
While the Italian navy (the Marina Militare, or MM) had remained relatively
hamstrung throughout the first decades of the Cold War, owing to political and
doctrinal limitations, the Soviet naval buildup during the late 1970s and early
1980s required the MM to establish a greater presence along NATO’s southern
flank. Many new warships were built during this period, while existing platforms
underwent modernization and refit. By the end of the Cold War, Italy was operating a well-balanced fleet of ships and submarines, most of which had been built
domestically.
At the same time, the country’s military strategy transitioned from sea control
and static defense against Soviet forces to power projection into regions farther
from home.19 Italy’s military engagements in Iraq (1991), Yugoslavia (1993–97),
Mozambique (1993), Somalia (1991–95), and Eritrea (1998) and against Serbia
(1999) highlight the MM’s set of capabilities, as well as the country’s willingness
to take action within its designated sphere of influence. Although the percentage of military expenditure slightly decreased between 1990 and 2000, the defense budget as a whole remained relatively constant, owing to Italy’s economic
growth.20
Compared with the strategic ambitions of Italy (which was a founding member of both NATO and the Group of Seven), Spain’s aims were somewhat more
limited. In its official statements, the country often refers to itself as a “medium
power,” with its sphere of influence stretching from the western Mediterranean to
the waters of the Atlantic between the Iberian Peninsula and the Canary Islands.21
Even under the regime of General Francisco Franco, Spain received U.S. military
assistance (mostly in the form of second-rate ships) to provide sea control vis-àvis the Soviet navy.
Franco’s death in 1975 sparked a period of increased naval spending that laid
the foundation for today’s fleet. While Italy and France were adamant about
using their respective shipbuilding capabilities and maintaining their militaryindustrial prowess, Spain initially relied on American ship designs and combat
systems. By the early 1990s, the Armada Española had evolved into a small yet
modern multipurpose fleet, designed around a small STOVL aircraft carrier
(based on the U.S. vision of a sea-control ship), nineteen other large surface
combatants, and a flotilla of eight submarines.22
As did most other Western states, Spain experienced considerable economic
prosperity during the 1990s. At the same time, it reduced defense spending
steadily, to 1.2 percent of GDP by early in the first decade of the twenty-first
century. Although the booming economy could compensate for the shrinking
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defense apportionment, a number of large-scale shipbuilding programs were
coming on line, consuming large chunks of the navy’s budget. Amphibious forces
were at the top of the procurement list. As was the general trend among European defense planners, Spain’s considered expeditionary capabilities essential in
the post–Cold War security environment. In line with this paradigmatic shift
in the country’s naval strategy, two Galicia-class amphibious assault ships were
procured, together with a pair of tank landing ships and a replenishment oiler.23
The funding for five new escort vessels—the F-100 or Álvaro de Bazán class—
was granted in 1997. This air-defense frigate benefited from the fact that, unlike
some of its foreign counterparts, it incorporated the American-designed Aegis
combat system, based on the SPY-1D radar and the Standard Missile 2 (referred
to as the SM-2). Combining these powerful yet off-the-shelf capabilities with a
relatively attractive price tag would pay dividends nearly ten years later, when
Australia chose the Spanish design over the more capable but more expensive
American Arleigh Burke–class destroyer.24
Germany: From the Littorals to Blue Waters. Nominally the fifth-largest navy in
Europe, the German navy has pursued a somewhat different course over the past
decades. Over the centuries, Germany has remained a land power, only occasionally showing greater naval aspirations.25 Given the geographic as well as historic
realities (access merely to the Baltic and North Seas, and under constant suspicion of militarist tendencies from its own population), the country has found it
difficult to take a leading role in European defense and security matters. With
the dismantling of large parts of the former East German navy after German
reunification in 1989, the nation’s underlying strategic aims and needs had to be
revisited.
Throughout the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Navy had
been tasked with defending West Germany’s shores from amphibious assault and
(together with the Danish navy) preventing Warsaw Pact forces from exiting the
Baltic Sea via the Danish straits. Hence, the FRG Navy was designed primarily
to conduct ASW and antisurface warfare (ASuW) in the confined and relatively
shallow waters of the Baltic Sea, with a secondary escort role along the SLOCs in
the North Sea and toward the English Channel.26 But by the end of the Cold War
the German navy already had begun transitioning from a brown-water force that
operated within its littorals to a blue-water fleet that was capable of sustained
deployments on the high seas.27
Like most of its NATO partners, Germany cut defense expenditures over the
following decade: the military budget shrank from U.S.$73 billion to $50 billion.
Meanwhile, the navy decommissioned large parts of its aging fleet. Unlike its
neighbors, the German navy refrained from acquiring any vessels specifically
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designed for amphibious operations (for both doctrinal and political reasons).
Rather, a number of new surface combatants—still largely influenced by Cold
War requirements—were accepted into service (the K-130 corvette and F-123
ASW frigate).
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Germany remained reluctant to deploy military force outside NATO’s primary area of interest. Notwithstanding the young
German state’s participation in so-called out-of-area operations in the Persian
Gulf (mine clearing, 1990–91) and the Adriatic (embargo against Serbia, 1992–
96), a Federal Constitutional Court ruling was necessary to decide whether such
deployments were in fact in accordance with German law.28 Still, irrespective of
legal questions, the navy’s activities throughout the following decades remained
limited to peacetime deployments as part of NATO’s standing naval groups and
focused on relatively small operations in low-threat environments.
The Netherlands and Denmark: The Defense Industry as a Deciding Factor. The
dramatic shift within the global security environment affected the remaining,
smaller European navies to varying degrees.
The Royal Netherlands Navy, for example, tried to adapt to the new situation
by promoting technological and operational defense cooperation with its European partners. Examples of this effort are the Belgian-Dutch Naval Cooperation (BENESAM); the U.K./Dutch amphibious force; the Dutch iteration of the
Galicia-class amphibious warfare ship (HNLMS Rotterdam, which joined the
fleet in 1997); and the class of air-defense frigates, based on a trilateral frigate
project among the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain.29 Similarly to the Royal
Navy, large parts of the Dutch escort fleet had become superfluous in the absence
of a traditional naval threat. At the same time, significant investments had become necessary to replace the increasingly obsolescent subsurface fleet.
The Dutch navy also can be commended for investing in local ship designs
and combat systems rather than acquiring foreign designs. A case can be made
that if all European navies at the time had opted, for political or financial reasons,
for American hardware (which in some cases was more advanced technologically,
more readily available, or both), many industrial capabilities and proficiencies
would have been lost outright. Clearly, the Netherlands was particularly keen on
remaining competitive in the international defense market, given its large investments and expertise in the field of naval defense systems. For example, the active
phased-array radars fitted on German, Dutch, and Danish frigates and the radars
on French, Italian, and British destroyers (designated SMART-L) all are produced
by the Dutch company Thales Nederland.
Also located in the North Sea, the Søværnet (Royal Danish Navy) provides a
useful example for how smaller navies have dealt with shrinking defense budgets and a widening scope of operational requirements. Faced with the difficult
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question of how best to deal with these two diverging trends, Danish shipbuilders came up with an ingenious solution: the Standard Flex (StanFlex) modular
mission-payload system. Warships no longer would have to be designed for one
specific task, but rather could swap standardized modules in and out, depending
on the mission requirement. Considerable costs could be saved simply by fitting
a platform with various guns and antiship and antiair missile-launching systems
when operating in a contested environment, then swapping them for mine-warfare
systems, sonars, or equipment for pollution control and hydrographic surveys
once the threat had passed. Owing to the growing obsolescence of the Danish
fleet, policy makers decided that the Danish navy, over time, would replace its
seventeen surface combatants with six vessels based on the StanFlex system.30
Significantly larger than previous frigates, the Royal Danish Navy’s Absalonclass command-and-support vessel (still in an early design stage during the late
1990s) reflected the navy’s slow doctrinal shift toward power-projection and
expeditionary capabilities. Like many of its European neighbors, Denmark increasingly focused on deploying naval power over greater distances, alongside
its NATO allies.
Opposing the General Trend: Navies and Territorial Defense
The majority of Europe’s naval forces underwent a strategic shift toward power
projection, stability operations, expeditionary capabilities, and out-of-area
deployments. But a handful of navies continued to adhere to the principles of
territorial defense, control of SLOCs close to home, and sea-denial capabilities
within the approaches to their shores.
The Nordic Countries. Finland, Sweden, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Norway are examples of smaller European navies that placed a premium on defending their territories from invasion throughout the first decade of the post–Cold
War period.
Recognizing Scandinavia’s inherent geographic vulnerabilities (in particular, a
lack of strategic depth), political and military leaders alike stressed the fact that,
despite fundamental changes in the international security order, caution was
well-advised. “Europe is still resolving many areas of conflict [and] all nations do
indeed value military strength. . . . Therefore we cannot, within the foreseeable
future, neglect the risks of war and that Sweden could be subject to an armed
aggression,” Admiral Peter Nordbeck of Sweden reminded others.31 Therefore,
these navies’ principal functions were to deny the aggressor use of SLOCs, gain
sea control in territorial waters, and defend ports and naval bases.32
Aegean Rivals. For much of the past century, Turkish and Greek naval thinking has been based on similar principles. With their territories located on a political, cultural, and religious fault line, these two major antagonists have made
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significant investments in their military forces. Many of these investments have
been justified by the ostensible threat the two states pose to one another, despite
the fact that they are NATO allies. Consequently, Greece and Turkey spent more
than 3.5 percent of their GDPs on defense throughout the 1990s.
The bulk of both navies consisted of platforms capable of conducting sea
control / sea denial and protecting SLOCs. This included a sizable element of
surface combatants (either surplus U.S. ships or vessels of other foreign design),
as well as numerous fast-attack craft. Furthermore, both navies commanded a
powerful subsurface element, of German origin. While the Turkish fleet enjoyed
a numerical advantage over the Hellenic Navy throughout the Cold War, it also
faced the threat of a possible Soviet attack aimed at securing the exit to the Mediterranean via the Turkish Straits. Therefore, Turkey had to maintain a credible
mine-warfare capability not only to control the straits but also to act as a counterweight to the Soviet (later the Russian) Black Sea Fleet.33
Unlike many other European states, these two did not consider the ability to
project power over great distances to conduct peacekeeping missions and stability operations to be primary concerns. Although both Greece and Turkey participated in naval operations outside their principal spheres of interest alongside
their NATO allies, the basic tenets promulgated in both countries’ defense strategies remained unchanged.34 Throughout the last years of the twentieth century,
both navies were well financed and maintained a high level of readiness.
AFTER THE FALL OF THE TOWERS (2001–14)
Throughout the 1990s, many naval forces in Europe still were able to adapt readily to the evolving security environment. For the most part, a sufficient number
of trained personnel (many states retained conscription) and a sufficient amount
of matériel allowed the Europeans to address the various security challenges
with relative ease. Moreover, the overwhelming superiority of the U.S. armed
forces compensated for the shortcomings and capability gaps that slowly emerged
among European militaries. What is more, throughout the 1980s many navies
had undergone comprehensive modernization efforts, receiving state-of-the-art
aircraft, ships, and submarines. Therefore, most navies were in a good condition
to fulfill the missions of a so-called postmodern navy, which include sea control,
expeditionary operations, stability operations / humanitarian assistance, good
order at sea, and cooperative naval diplomacy.35
Land Wars and Economic Woes
The twenty-first century barely had begun when the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, sent shock waves rippling across the globe. Although sea
power played an important role during the opening phases of both the U.S.-led
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and that of Iraq two years later, the subsequent
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counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns had long-lasting consequences for Europe’s sea services. As in previous military campaigns, American
carrier strike groups took station in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea,
from where they conducted air strikes against enemy forces and provided air support for allied troops on the ground. Other elements of the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps provided sea- and airlift capabilities and contributed elite ground forces to
the fight (Marines and USN SEALs).
Although some of the European navies (in particular the British and French)
participated effectively in these campaigns, the evolving struggle against globally networked radical jihadi
The . . . reemergence of great-power rivalry . . . , terrorism seemed to vindicate
the theory that traditional
one of the largest refugee crises since the end
of the Cold War . . . , terrorist attacks by radi- concepts of high-intensity
cal jihadists . . . , the U.S. rebalancing toward conflict and maneuver warthe Indo-Pacific region, and President Donald fare against peer competitors
largely had lost their releTrump’s “America First” policy have heightvance.36 Following the general
ened the sense of uncertainty.
trend toward peacekeeping
and stability operations in distant theaters, Europe’s armed forces progressively
calibrated their capabilities accordingly. However, the necessary financial resources were increasingly difficult to secure.
As the security situations in Afghanistan and Iraq deteriorated, many states
involved in the conflicts felt compelled to make greater investment in protecting
their troops on the ground and toward bringing the wars to a quick and satisfactory conclusion. However, simply increasing the defense budget to buttress national
military commitments was in many cases politically unfeasible. The money for
these contingencies had to come from either the existing defense budget or supplementary and emergency funding. With army and air force components receiving a
larger share of funding, many navies had to make do with even less money.
The global financial crisis of 2007, the subsequent eurozone crisis, and the
economic downturn that ensued combined into a perfect storm buffeting armed
forces across Europe. After the end of the Cold War, many states had been able to
consolidate their militaries, despite fiscal restrictions; but against the backdrop of
tanking economies, a failing financial sector, and soaring national debt, even the
previous levels of defense spending and the corresponding force structures were
considered unsustainable in many cases.
Doing More with Less: Austerity Measures and Growing Capability Gaps
The United Kingdom: Truncating a Fleet. The repercussions for Europe’s naval
forces were arguably most noticeable in the case of the Royal Navy. Early in the
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first decade of the twenty-first century—still a time of relative plenty—the RN
introduced two Albion-class assault landing ships and three Bay-class dock landing ships, bringing the number of large amphibious-warfare ships up to seven.
The Invincible-class carriers, although reduced to two ships in 2005, added a substantial power-projection capability and reinforced the concept of expeditionary
warfare outside NATO’s previous area of operations.37 At the same time, a class
of up to twelve new Type 45 air-defense destroyers was under construction and
the first unit of the highly capable Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarine
was launched in 2007—just months before the economic crisis hit.
With that crisis taking full effect and the British government being pressed
to reduce its budget deficit, the military became subject to draconian austerity
measures. The Strategic Defence and Security Review, hastily published in 2010,
called for the RN’s Harrier naval air arm to be disbanded and the flagship, Ark
Royal, to be scrapped. The other ship of this class, Illustrious, was retained as a
temporary amphibious transport helicopter carrier until the amphibious assault
ship HMS Ocean was refitted.
The remaining legacy frigates were decommissioned, and because production
of Type 45 destroyers had been cut off after six units and numerous cost overruns,
the RN’s escort fleet shrank to only nineteen vessels. The replacement program
for Britain’s maritime patrol aircraft was terminated, leaving a significant capability gap to this day. Finally, only one of the two new Queen Elizabeth–class carriers
was to become operational; the second would be sold or held in reserve.38
It would not take long for these measures to take their toll on Britain’s ability
to shape events abroad. During the air campaign against the regime of Mu‘ammar
Gadhafi in the summer of 2011, French, Italian, and American fixed- and rotarywing combat aircraft were launched from carriers stationed off the coast of
Libya. Britain having axed its carrier capability, its Tornados and Typhoons had
to deploy from land bases in England and Italy. Smaller and less capable than at
any time in recent memory, the Royal Navy arguably had reached the nadir in
its history.
France: Willing but Stretched. Although the Marine Nationale was able to deploy
highly capable carrier-based combat aircraft against targets from Afghanistan
to Libya, the first decade of the twenty-first century proved to be anything but
smooth sailing for the French navy.
Already in the late 1970s the idea for the replacement of France’s existing
flattops was floated. Consequently, the keel of the MN’s first nuclear-powered
carrier, Charles de Gaulle, was laid down in 1989. However, the program ran into
major difficulties. Key components had severe design flaws, and a lack of funding
meant the ship became operational only after more than a decade of construction
and retrofitting. To this day, Europe’s most powerful conventional naval asset has
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FIGURE 1
UNITED KINGDOM DEFENSE SPENDING AND MAJOR VESSELS, 1990–2016
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been plagued with technical problems. Moreover, the absence of a comparable
asset among the other European navies left the ship in high demand, causing substantial wear and tear. In light of the technical hurdles and increasing financial
restrictions, a second carrier never was built. Moreover, although some progress
was made circa 2005–10, the joint venture between France and Britain to build a
class of carriers with similar layout did not materialize.39 Consequently, the MN’s
strike capabilities become substantially limited during the recurring maintenance
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 25

31

5/1/18 11:10 AM

26

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1

cycles of Charles de Gaulle. At the time of this writing, the ship was undergoing
its midlife refit and upgrade and will not return to the fleet much before 2020.40
Over the years, military-to-military relations progressively matured between
France and NATO, notwithstanding the political fallout with the United States
over the invasion of Iraq. More importantly, in 2009 President Nicolas Sarkozy
put an end to the “French exemption” and the country officially rejoined NATO.
As a RAND study noted, “France today is much more integrated in NATO planning and operation than at any time since the mid-1960s.”41
In terms of naval capabilities, France’s expeditionary-driven foreign policy
during the 1990s resulted in the construction of three Mistral-class amphibious
assault ships / helicopter carriers, which not only act as a stopgap when the single
carrier is unavailable but have provided the MN with credible power-projection
capabilities since being introduced in the middle of the first decade of the new
century.
Meanwhile, on the basis of their experience on their joint Horizon project,
France and Italy set out to build a new multipurpose frigate, known as the
FREMM.42 Both navies intended the class to replace their existing conglomerations of older surface combatants; the French navy hoped to procure nineteen
units. Although the program can be considered a success story, France had to
limit its ambitions in the light of economic woes following the economic crisis.
Ultimately the MN will receive only eight FREMMs, bringing the escort fleet
down to fifteen vessels, five of which (of the La Fayette class) already were not
intended to be principal surface combatants at the time of their commissioning
in the 1990s.43
Italy: Within a Basin of Turmoil. The Italian navy has remained a powerful tool
for Italian foreign policy throughout the twenty-first century. In fact, the country’s strategic goals have remained largely unchanged since their articulation in
the late 1970s. In accordance with Italy’s strategic interests, the navy continued to
enhance its expeditionary capabilities (the goal was to be able to deploy a brigadelevel force); strengthen its naval airpower; acquire multirole platforms to counter
all forms of threat; and promote national defense, maritime awareness, and maritime security.44
Throughout the last decade, the Marina Militare has maintained a very high
operational tempo and has conducted a plethora of naval tasks. In doing so it has
relied on a capable and well-balanced fleet and highly trained crews. The domestically built aircraft carrier Cavour was brought into service in 2008, and will be
capable of deploying the Lockheed Martin F-35B STOVL fighter in the future.
Its predecessor, Giuseppe Garibaldi, meanwhile functions as a helicopter carrier.
The demand for an Italian carrier air wing results from the shrinkage of the U.S.
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Navy’s footprint in the Mediterranean over the last two decades. “[It] seems to
be a reasonable assumption [that] the Cavour and the Italian fleet are effectively
going to be a substitute [for the] American carrier battle group in the larger Mediterranean as the reduced US Navy carrier line-up is increasingly concentrated on
the Pacific and Indian Oceans.”45
The escort fleet comprises two destroyers of the Horizon, or Andrea Doria,
class, and a growing number of new FREMM frigates. In contrast to France’s
curtailment policies, the Italian Ministry of Defense has decided to procure all
ten frigates it initially planned. Italy’s submarine fleet has profited from close cooperation with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and has received four
Type 212A submarines with
[W]hile most navies have excelled at conduct- air-independent propulsion.46
Most importantly, both
ing operations at the lower end of the intensity
Italy’s navy and its coast
spectrum and within largely permissive enviguard have been burdened
ronments, traditional war-fighting capabiliheavily with operations on
ties . . . against near-peer competitors have
atrophied severely in the quarter-century since the lower end of the intensity
the end of the Cold War. The shortage of plat- scale. Apart from everyday
duties, such as making port
forms, as well as the lack of mission-specific
calls, conducting search-andtraining and exercises, . . . finds its origin in
rescue operations, and mainstrategic shortsightedness, political myopia,
taining good order at sea, adand the attendant fiscal austerity measures.
ditional challenges for Italy’s
sea services have resulted from political developments along Europe’s southern
and eastern shores over the past decade. Faced with thousands of refugees trying
to escape poverty and war throughout Africa and the greater Middle East, both
services have been engaged actively in countering human trafficking, as well as
delivering humanitarian assistance across vast areas of the Mediterranean basin.
Accordingly, the MM also has maintained a large contingent of offshore patrol
vessels that are better suited for constabulary duties than their heavily armed sisters. As one observer notes, “[t]he Marina Militare’s activities in this regard make
it stand out in terms of its compliance with the duties imposed by treaty—and by
humanity—in respect of the safeguarding of lives at sea.”47
In combination with Italy’s numerous other military commitments, these
developments have left a smaller number of platforms dealing with a greater
number of tasks. With dwindling resources and fewer platforms, the MM hardly
can maintain its tempo of deployment across a host of areas without risking fatigue and accident. Perhaps even more importantly, since transitioning to an allvolunteer force, personnel costs have placed a substantial burden on the defense
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budget, thereby limiting funding for maintenance and procurement.48 Italian
naval leaders remain adamant that the MM will be able to “fulfill its national and
international commitments.”49 But despite these protestations, the country may
have to limit its ambitions: “For the navy, the longer-term consequence will likely
be some re-orientation towards regional intervention capabilities at the expense
of its current enthusiasm for extra-regional expeditionary deployments.”50
Spain: Creating a Balanced Fleet. Over the years, most European navies have
streamlined their respective naval command structures while trying to modernize their fleets. As new and more-capable platforms were introduced over time,
older systems were phased out. Given the complexity and cost of many of these
platforms, ships and aircraft rarely were replaced on a one-for-one basis. Rather,
since the turn of the century, European naval forces have experienced what is
arguably the most drastic decline of platforms in recent history.51 The eurozone
crisis only exacerbated the strained situation in which many armed forces found
themselves, which was particularly pronounced in states with relatively weak
economies.
Spain’s economy, for example, was affected gravely by the crisis, and hence its
armed forces were as well. Consequently, the Spanish navy has faced severe financial pressure in recent years. Fortunately, the core of its current fleet was procured prior to Spain’s financial woes. This includes the 28,000-ton Juan Carlos, a
“strategic projection ship”; a class of five Álvaro de Bazán Aegis frigates; and the
Cantabria replenishment tanker. These projects also have had a positive effect on
Spain’s domestic shipbuilding industry, which is building for foreign customers
both the aforementioned frigates and the assault ship. However, while Navantia
has made a name for itself as one of the leading shipbuilders of surface vessels on
the continent, it did not cover itself in glory in providing Spain’s future underwater flotilla. Major technical difficulties led to cost overruns and the postponement
of the introduction of the new S-80 Isaac Peral class, resulting in bad publicity.52
While from a purely platform-centric view the navy’s situation might have
seemed quite satisfactory, the lack of funding had a negative impact on training
and readiness. The number of military personnel continued to decline throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, adding to the shortage of trained
officers and sailors. “[O]ne of the ways the Spanish . . . ensured continuity of
capabilities in the face of spending constraints has been to reduce overall training levels,” a study points out.53 “Manning problems have hurt the Spanish Navy’s
ability to deploy multiple units at a short notice,” the study adds.54
Overall, Spain is likely to find it increasingly painful to support its wide range
of capabilities at current spending levels. It therefore remains to be seen whether
the navy will be able to retain the well-balanced fleet it currently operates.
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Capabilities Lost—Some for Good
Other states that also had shifted toward more-comprehensive expeditionary
capabilities during the 1990s, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, largely
accepted the loss of specific naval capabilities while retaining smaller, still proficiently skilled forces.55
The Netherlands. The Dutch, for example, went from having one of the largest
and most capable Cold War fleets to what some observers believe to be a secondrate navy, arguably too small to deal effectively with tasks across a wide portion
of the intensity spectrum at the same time.56
Although in 2000, Dutch defense white papers had outlined the various functions of the Royal Netherlands Navy, such as deploying a brigade-size element
into high-intensity operations, one can concur with the assessment that by the
end of the decade the “Dutch military [had] fallen well short of the 2000 white
paper’s goals.” This comes as no surprise, given that over the course of ten years
seventeen surface combatants were decommissioned, replaced by only four De
Zeven Provinciën–class frigates. In contrast to these highly capable air-defense
frigates, the four Holland-class large oceangoing patrol vessels that also were
added to the fleet are designed with low-intensity operations in Dutch overseas
territories specifically in mind. Despite their sophisticated sensor suite, they lack
hitting power for force-on-force engagements. Moreover, by 2005 the remaining
Dutch P-3C Orion maritime patrol planes were sold to Germany, leaving a void
in the country’s maritime awareness capability.57
On a more positive note, the navy’s amphibious forces have benefited from the
commissioning of two Rotterdam-class LPDs and the 28,000-ton joint support
ship Karel Doorman over the last decade, and the submarines of the country’s
small flotilla have demonstrated their proficiencies, both during exercises with
NATO allies and while recently shadowing a Russian carrier group as it deployed
to the Mediterranean.58
Denmark. Denmark was able to secure funding for two Absalon-class flexible
support ships and three Iver Huitfeldt–class multipurpose frigates. Danish military activities over the last decade ranged from deployments to Afghanistan and
contributions to antipiracy operations, such as the European Union’s Operation
ATALANTA and NATO’s Operation OCEAN SHIELD, to providing naval elements
to NATO’s standing maritime groups and participating recently in NATO’s ballistic missile–defense effort.
However, Denmark’s newly won blue-water capabilities came at the expense of
more-traditional elements of sea power; most prominently, all four of the navy’s
submarines were phased out by 2004, leaving it without one of the most useful
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FIGURE 2
GERMAN SUBMARINE PROCUREMENT, 1960–2040
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naval assets.59 “Today the fleet has no submarines, no fast attack craft and no
dedicated minelayers.”60
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Germany. Unsurprisingly, Germany, given its status as a world leader in conventional submarine technology, retained its submarine force throughout the post–
Cold War period. Notwithstanding the addition of state-of-the-art platforms, the
size of the German navy shrank in lockstep with the reductions to the defense
budget. As an example, while twenty-three submarines were in service in 1990,
the number had fallen to fourteen by 2000. Another fifteen years later, only six
vessels were left. The surface fleet received capable F-124 Sachsen-class guidedmissile frigates, which could provide fleet air defense for anything up to carrier
strike groups; a new class of so-called stabilization frigates also was procured. Despite being larger in size, these F-125 stabilization frigates are less heavily armed
than their predecessors. Therefore, a new crewing concept and modular design
are intended to allow for longer periods of deployment over greater distances.
These ships—as well as the next class of very large surface combatants, the MKS180s—are the navy’s answer to the requirements postulated in the defense white
paper of 2006.61 The recent decommissioning of its last patrol boats (guidedmissile craft) largely concluded the shift from a brown-water force to a blue-water
navy. However, growing concerns over Russia’s military activities in the Baltic Sea
have called this transition into question, and Germany again is looking to expand
its naval capabilities in littoral waters closer to home.62
Over the last decades, Germany also has remained relatively reluctant to commit greater resources to Europe’s common defense. Except for its contribution
to the security mission in Afghanistan, Germany often has been unwilling to
provide any form of hard power to recent NATO- or U.S.-led military operations,
such as in Libya and Syria. Rather, its involvement abroad has been focused on
peacekeeping missions and stability operations (such as with the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon [known as UNIFIL] from 2006 to the present) and deployments as part of NATO’s standing maritime groups, as well as providing good
order at sea more generally.63 With fewer vessels; the absence of large, amphibiouscapable platforms; and the above-mentioned political caveats, “[Germany’s]
cruising navy provides little in the way of power projection,” as one analyst has
noted.64 Much less can it claim to command sufficient and readily available antisurface and antisubmarine capabilities for high-threat environments. News of
the entire German submarine fleet recently being out of action simultaneously
is a case in point.65
Smart Solutions in the High North
Norway. Farther north, Norway gained public attention for making some clever
choices when it came to modernizing its naval forces. Although the defense budget plummeted from 3 percent of GDP in the early 1990s to 1.4 percent in 2014,
the Royal Norwegian Navy has kept its force at a high level of readiness.
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As its Cold War–era frigates reached the end of their service lives, a class of
larger and more capable surface combatants, based on the Spanish frigate design,
took shape. The first ship and namesake of the class, Fridtjof Nansen, was introduced into the navy in 2006. It is particularly well suited to perform a range of
missions in Arctic conditions along Norway’s SLOCs. Noticeably, the frigate is
the smallest warship to feature the Aegis combat system, while it can deploy the
new NH-90 helicopter for ASW operations. Closer to shore, Norway relies on
its Skjold class of stealthy, high-speed corvettes to counter symmetric and asymmetric threats from the sea.
Sweden. Sweden showed similar technical ingenuity in commissioning five corvettes of its own, of the Visby class, showcasing effective signature-reduction
measures. Both Norway and Sweden disbanded their network of coastal-defense
capacities during the first decade of the twenty-first century as the two countries
continued to forge close ties with their Western partners; however, Sweden reactivated its land-based, mobile, antiship missile systems in 2016.66
While territorial defense was not forgotten, participation within the framework of multilateral peacekeeping operations under the aegis of NATO and the
UN was promoted. “Our security cannot be maintained through a one-sided focus on the conventional defense of Norwegian territory,” Norway’s defense white
paper of 2004 stated.67 The close defense cooperation among the Scandinavian
states (such as Northern Defense Cooperation [known as NORDEFCO] and
Swedish‑Finnish naval cooperation), as well as with other NATO members, not
only has strengthened European and transatlantic ties; it has enhanced interoperability and proficiencies among the respective navies.68
Divergences along the Southern Flank
Greece. Arguably, the Hellenic Navy has seen the fewest doctrinal changes over
the past two decades. Even during a period when the majority of Europe’s armed
forces sought more-comprehensive expeditionary capabilities, the Hellenic Navy
remained focused on defending its adjacent waters and fulfilling its NATO obligations. The relatively constant strategic framework in which the navy operated
allowed it to strengthen its traditional naval elements (e.g., ASW and ASuW).
Despite the defense budget spiking at 3.3 percent of GDP in 2010, Greece’s financial collapse during the eurozone crisis had far-reaching consequences for the
country’s military. Coinciding with an important period of naval modernization,
it caused “existing domestic construction . . . to be paralyzed whilst longstanding
plans of new orders [were] stalled.”69 Although more recently there have been
signs of improvement, the Hellenic Navy quite likely will be facing some difficult
choices in the future. This is compounded by the fact that the balance of naval
power in the region already has shifted, and continues to shift, toward its traditional regional competitor, Turkey.
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Turkey. Turkey has been able to create a powerful navy that continues to expand
its capabilities—an exception among European naval forces. More importantly,
it has built a domestic defense industry proficient in developing and fielding everything from main battle tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles to patrol craft and
frigates.70
As the country tries to establish itself as a regional power, it also seeks to deploy its military effectively beyond its borders. Its naval forces act as an important
tool for gaining greater influence in the region. In the recent past, Turkish naval
forces have shown an increasing level of ambition in contributing to international
operations both within and beyond the Mediterranean (e.g., Turkish ships have
acted as the flagship of the counterpiracy Combined Task Force 151). Yet, in light
of the country’s recent coup d’état attempt and the subsequent purge within Turkey’s military, the navy, while a highly capable mix of foreign and domestic naval
platforms, probably will not reach its full potential.
The Turkish navy provides an insightful example of how domestic turmoil can
hamstring an expanding naval force. Since the turn of the century, the Turkish
ministry of defense has set out on an ambitious procurement plan for the navy.
This includes a number of highly sophisticated systems, ranging from domestically built Milgem- and Ada-class surface combatants to an amphibious assault ship
based on the Spanish carrier Juan Carlos. Because of the complexity of modern
warships, submarines, and aircraft, learning to operate them often involves very
steep learning curves. Therefore, such systems require highly professional crews
and astute commanders, as well as skilled engineers and other engineering personnel. Low morale, as well as widespread insecurities and suspicions within the
armed forces, will leave some considerable doubt regarding Turkey’s more assertive naval goals, such as the development of a carrier-based fixed-wing capability.71
AFTER THE FALL OF CRIMEA (2014 ONWARD)
In 2015, for the first time in more than two decades, Europe as a whole increased
its defense spending.72 This reversal of trends can be attributed directly to a
range of security-related concerns with which the European states see themselves
confronted.
The most worrying is the reemergence of great-power rivalry. After a “honeymoon period” of more than twenty years, Russia’s military intervention in
eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have reminded Europe that it
cannot take its security for granted. What is more, Russia’s irredentism and its
increasingly assertive behavior along Europe’s northern, eastern, and southern
borders coincided with one of the largest refugee crises since the end of the Cold
War. Meanwhile, terrorist attacks by radical jihadists across the continent have
caused a growing sense of insecurity within Europe. As if these challenges were
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not daunting enough, the U.S. rebalancing toward the Indo-Pacific region and
President Donald Trump’s “America First” policy have heightened the sense of
uncertainty.
Growing Pains
Against this backdrop of intersecting security challenges, European countries’
respective military strategies and defense postures (both national and NATO)
are being revisited. It appears that, for the first time since the end of the Cold
War, governments across Europe no longer can afford to reduce their own
defense spending while readily investing large sums of money in their welfare
states, all the while remaining utterly dependent on U.S. security guarantees.
Consequently, all twenty-nine NATO member states have pledged to increase
their financial contributions toward common security and defense.73 Meanwhile,
neutral Sweden and Finland also have made concerted efforts to forge closer ties
with their Western partners and strengthen their armed forces, not least in the
maritime domain.74
Financial considerations notwithstanding, new concepts for closer cooperation between Europe’s armed forces have been developed. Establishing bi- and
trilateral defense agreements has proved expedient in compensating for and
bridging the capability gaps created by years of austerity measures. The 2010
defense agreement between the United Kingdom and France (the “Lancaster
House treaties”) “provide[s] a road-map to more effective European defence
cooperation, based on deeper capability planning and mutual dependency.”75
For example, after more than half a decade of preparation, the Anglo-French
Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (a multiservice, scalable, power-projection
force capable of high-intensity warfare) became operational in April 2016, and
the force arguably has “set a new ‘gold standard’ for defence cooperation [in
Europe].”76 The German-Dutch Integrated Sea Battalion and the Spanish-Italian
Amphibious Battlegroup mandated by the European Union are further examples
of the efforts currently under way.77 It is safe to state that much of the cooperation over the past decades has enhanced operational experience among European
naval forces, and many naval officers have gained proficiencies in a broader range
of naval operations than their Cold War predecessors.
However, there are caveats that merit close attention. First, while most navies
have excelled at conducting operations at the lower end of the intensity spectrum
and within largely permissive environments, traditional war-fighting capabilities
(e.g., ASW and ASuW) against near-peer competitors have atrophied severely
in the quarter century since the end of the Cold War. The shortage of platforms,
as well as the lack of mission-specific training and exercises, is the chief cause of
this dangerous development, which finds its origin in strategic shortsightedness,
political myopia, and the attendant fiscal austerity measures. In many instances,
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navies find themselves unable to provide sufficient means to conduct their daily
tasks, as “demonstrated by the ‘gapping’ of certain standing commitments to
allow warships to be released for increasingly important NATO taskings.” Consequently, oceangoing patrol vessels and auxiliaries fulfill missions traditionally
conducted by potent frigates and destroyers.78
Second, at the end of the Cold War, European powers were able to field, deploy, and sustain division-size units in operations such as DESERT STORM. In
contrast, today such an effort would be largely futile.79 Although they constitute
the most-credible amphibious forces in Europe, French and British troops are
“unlikely to be deployed in
a high-threat environment
[D]efense cooperation among the European
without
considerable U.S.
partners will need to encompass new common
force protection.”80 The milistrategic guidelines, shared operational and
doctrinal procedures, better training for mili- taries have been “hollowed
tary personnel, and a much-improved mainte- out to such an extent that the
deployment of a brigade, let
nance and readiness level of naval platforms,
as well as greater industrial and technological alone a division, at credible
readiness would be a major
collaboration.
challenge.” 81 Ultimately, the
European states barely manage to conduct basic peacetime (naval) duties at the
desired rate, and have little to no surge capacity for emergencies.
Striking a Balance
For the above-mentioned reasons, each state must strike a balance between deploying low-end military capabilities for daily tasks, on the one hand, and highend war-fighting capabilities for worst-case scenarios, on the other. With regard
to naval power, the question remains to what extent “navies [should] invest their
resources in high-intensity capabilities aimed at deterring or, if necessary, prosecuting conflict with other navies, rather than in low-intensity capabilities best
suited to the maintenance of good order at sea.”82
Arguably, the soundest solution to this problem is for European governments
once again to provide sufficient funding for the naval branches to maintain
relatively well-balanced fleets and operate them in a joint and combined fashion
(i.e., with land, air, and other sea forces). These fleets need to be designed, first
and foremost, to fight in contested environments, but, at the same time, must be
configured to conduct many years of peacetime duties. If designed with sufficient
room to grow, such naval forces would remain flexible enough to react to the
ever-evolving security environment. Multipurpose surface combatants (ranging
from two to seven thousand tons in displacement), amphibious-capable assets
with substantial redundancies, small flotillas of modern submarines, and airborne maritime-surveillance platforms, in combination with the vital associated
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replenishment and sealift capabilities, are best suited to adapt to and conduct the
various missions expected in the future. At the same time, defense cooperation
among the European partners will need to encompass new common strategic
guidelines, shared operational and doctrinal procedures, better training for military personnel, and a much-improved maintenance and readiness level of naval
platforms, as well as greater industrial and technological collaboration.
To list the multitude of measures European states are undertaking currently
to strengthen their militaries is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is
apparent that many have put a tentative end to the truncation of naval power and
are reinvesting in capabilities at the upper end of the intensity spectrum. Norway, Poland, the Netherlands, and Germany all are modernizing or enhancing
their underwater forces. Great Britain and Greece have decided to revive their
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities by reactivating and
procuring maritime patrol aircraft. Italy and France will receive new, capable
surface combatants over the coming years. The British government has recommitted itself to operating two carriers, the first of which should be in service by
2020—probably, initially, with a combined U.K./U.S. F-35B air group. And over
the next decade, Spain, Italy, and Turkey also probably will acquire this aircraft
for their flattops.
If this trend continues over the coming years and the ties within the transatlantic community remain robust, there is a good chance that Europe’s naval forces
will be better prepared and better equipped to perform the duties and fulfill the
many functions with which they are charged. They will have arisen from the abyss.

NOTES

1.	In a broad sense, the term Europe is understood to signify a relatively unified body of
like-minded states with similar domestic
interests and common foreign policy goals.
In theory, the concept of European sea power
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encompass all European states and their assets actively invested in the maritime domain.
However, this article focuses on the study of
naval power among selected European states
that have direct access to the sea and make
rather sizable investments in operating naval
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Union; many are members of both.
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conventional deterrence, ensuring sea control, and projecting power globally represent
basic tenets of American sea power. Sebastian
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Power (New York: Routledge, 2017).
5.	A case in point is the overhead costs for personnel of the Italian navy. As a RAND study
pointed out, “The Italian defense budget is
divided into three major areas: (1) investment
(what the U.S. calls research and development, plus procurement), (2) personnel, and
(3) training, maintenance, and operations.
Since switching to an all-volunteer military
in 2006, the Italian goal was to spend roughly
50 percent of their budget on personnel, 25
percent on investment, and 25 percent on
training, maintenance, and operations. In reality, personnel costs have consumed roughly
70 percent of Italian military spending.” F.
Stephen Larrabee et al., NATO and the Challenges of Austerity (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2012), p. 36.
6.	Many observers in the late 1980s believed
that the confrontation between East and West
would continue well into the twenty-first century. See Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990),
p. 153ff.
7.	The most obvious feature was the installation
of close-in weapons systems on many surface
vessels. For more information, see Anthony
H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The
Lessons of Modern War, vol. 3, The Afghan
and Falklands Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991). Also see U.S. Navy Dept., Lessons
of the Falklands: Summary Report (Washington, DC: Office of Program Appraisal, 1983).
8.	Sixty-five billion dollars in 1991, as opposed
to fifty-one billion in 1998 (in constant 2014
U.S. dollars). See SIPRI Military Expenditure
Database 1988–2016, SIPRI, www.sipri.org/.
9.	Childs, Britain’s Future Navy, p. 9. For an interesting discussion on future British security
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JAPAN’S DEFENSE READINESS
Prospects and Issues in Operationalizing Air and
Maritime Supremacy
Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

F

acing a fluid regional security environment and the need to strengthen its
alliance role, Japan has worked to increase the capabilities of the Japan SelfDefense Forces (JSDF). It has adjusted the relevant bureaucratic, political, and
operational frameworks and has made key investments in new force structures.
In December 2017, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced a budget bill
for fiscal year (FY) 2018 of 5.19 trillion Japanese yen (JPY) (U.S.$45.76 billion),
marking an increase for the sixth straight year. The new budget includes requests
to make some key acquisitions and upgrades to the JSDF while also improving
the management of the defense industry. The developments are taking place
under the auspices of National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPGs), which
identify air-sea supremacy, defense of remote islands, ballistic-missile defense,
outer space and cyberspace, and large-scale disasters as the focal areas in which
to strengthen the JSDF’s “effective deterrence and response to various situations.”1
Furthermore, the Legislation for Peace and Security that came into effect in
March 2016, combined with updated “Guidelines
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posture buildup in Japan’s southwestern region.”2 Yet those developments also
raise many questions concerning the actual readiness of the JSDF. This article
assesses the state of Japan’s defense planning and JSDF readiness, focusing on
air and maritime capabilities. Specifically, it will highlight the many gaps among
policy, force structure, and operational readiness. It also argues that the JSDF
lacks the operational and tactical doctrines essential to enhancing its readiness
in the air and maritime domains.
DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN’S DEFENSE PLANNING
Since its inauguration in 1954, the JSDF—a special institution, constitutionally and politically—has served to defend Japan. Initially, despite the Cold War
threats looming in the region, actual developments in the JSDF were incremental.
The defense white paper (now issued annually) and the NDPGs that outlined
the concept of basic defense capability did not make their debuts until 1970 and
1976, respectively. Improvements in indigenous defense capabilities and strategies came slowly, largely owing to the low-profile treatment of defense matters
under Japan’s post–World War II Yoshida Doctrine, which emphasized economic
development while relying on the U.S. security umbrella.3 Even with the demise
of the post–Cold War order in the 1990s, developments in Japan’s defense planning remained minimal; the second NDPG, issued in 1995, barely changed the
JSDF’s focus on homeland defense under the basic defense capability concept.
However, beginning in the late 1990s security challenges became more
pressing for Japan, particularly with regard to North Korea’s weapons-of-massdestruction adventurism; growing concerns about China’s military buildup; and
transnational terrorism, as epitomized by the September 11, 2001, attacks. The
new threats served as catalysts for Tokyo to reconfigure its defense posture, leading to the establishment of the Defense Posture Review Board in September 2001
and the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in April 2004. Discussions
led to the formulation of the new NDPG unveiled in December 2004, which
focused on “defending Japan” and “preventing threats by improving the international security environment” through “i) Japan’s own efforts, ii) cooperation with
the allies, and iii) cooperation with the international community.”4 The new focus
called for a shift from the basic defense capability concept to response-oriented,
“multifunctional, flexible, and effective defense forces.”5 The 2004 NDPG essentially has served as the fundamental template for Japan’s defense planning since
that time, not only by providing the basis for building the nation’s indigenous
defense capabilities, but also by promoting its role with regard to alliance commitments and international security.
The reconfiguration of the JSDF further accelerated in the 2010s. Cumulative
developments in the regional security environment, combined with a landslide
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
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victory by the Democratic Party in September 2009, led to the issuance of the
2010 NDPG, which promised enhancement of “readiness, mobility, flexibility,
sustainability, and versatility” to create a “dynamic defense force.”6 A notable element of the 2010 NDPG was its focus on acquiring amphibious capabilities that
were deemed pivotal to defending the Southwest Island Chain.7
The return of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to power in December
2012 led to further upgrades to Japan’s defense planning, particularly the establishment of the National Security Council and issuance of the National Security
Strategy (NSS). Under this new framework, the Japanese government issued the
2013 NDPG and the MTDP in December 2013; they called for a “dynamic joint
defense force” that would emphasize air and maritime supremacy, as well as joint
readiness, as the key imperatives for the JSDF. In essence, the NDPG issued in
2013 is an upgraded version of its predecessor, yet its greater significance lies in
the fact that thenceforward Japan’s defense planning took place under the auspices of the NSS.8 Then, in September 2015, the Diet passed the Legislation for
Peace and Security. Its provisions included a statement of Japan’s right to exercise
collective self-defense and a legal basis for the JSDF to respond more effectively
to so-called gray-zone situations.9
While the JSDF certainly has undergone significant changes since the 2004
NDPG, it is important to note that these developments did not represent a series
of overhauls or 180-degree turns. Rather, they constituted a long-term, stepby-step embodiment of key agendas and desired capabilities in Japan’s defense
planning.
INCREASING JSDF READINESS
Japan remains in the midst of enhancing its force structure and capabilities and
its operations readiness. While the JSDF’s force structure enjoys many comparative advantages owing to its advanced technologies, important operational readiness weaknesses and shortfalls remain, creating a classic example of the force
structure–versus–operational readiness dilemma that Richard Betts outlined in
a 1995 book.10 Japan will need to remedy these weaknesses by ensuring the costeffective use of current assets and the development of future capabilities to ensure
both optimal force structure and operational readiness.
Force Structure Shortfalls
Enabled by Japan’s robust industrial capacity and advanced technology, the JSDF
force structure incorporates a high concentration of cutting-edge platforms and
equipment. This has enabled Japan to improve the JSDF’s capabilities in the
areas prioritized in recent NDPGs by reducing significantly the country’s land
warfare–based firepower, instead strengthening its capabilities in the air and
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maritime domains, as well as in joint operations; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); and
ballistic-missile defense (BMD).
Notably, implementing the NDPGs over the past two decades has not required
significant increases in personnel. Rather, improvements are taking place via efficiencies, such as streamlining the order of battle, making upgrades to enhance
the longevity of existing platforms, and creating a networked system of assets.
The Maritime Domain. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) possesses powerful blue-water capabilities, including sea-based missile defense.
The new provisional budget set reflects the 2013 NDPG’s proposal to increase
the number of destroyers and submarines as part of the effort to form fourteen escort divisions and six submarine divisions. The JMSDF already has six
Aegis-equipped destroyers (of the Atago and Kongo classes) and is expected to
introduce a new class in coming years. The existing Abukuma, Akizuki, Asagiri,
Hatakaze, Hatsuyuki, Murasame, Shirane, and Takanami classes, with the new
Asahi-class destroyers, will provide the core of JMSDF surface-warfare capabilities, while the Hayabusa-class patrol boats complement Japan Coast Guard assets
in dealing with spy vessels. The JMSDF submarine force comprises the Oyashio
class and the air-independent-propulsion Soryu class (with the newer boats of the
Soryu class being powered by improved lithium-ion-propulsion batteries), as well
as investments in a new class of three-thousand-ton submarines for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.11
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is another major JMSDF strength, centered
on the employment of SH-60K, P-3C, and P-1 aircraft. Japan’s ASW capabilities
have been enhanced significantly in recent years with the commissioning of the
Hyuga-class and Izumo-class helicopter destroyers.12 Furthermore, the MOD is
pushing for the construction of 3,900-ton “compact-type hull” destroyers with
characteristics close to the modularity concept of the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat
Ship, but with greater firepower and installable equipment for minesweeping and
ASW capabilities.13
These various platforms and future acquisitions certainly will strengthen the
JMSDF’s capabilities. However, while Japan’s maritime platforms have technological superiority, it remains debatable whether they are sufficient to deal with
the changes the regional military balance is experiencing, both quantitatively
and qualitatively. Such questions are likely to become increasingly pressing as
the JMSDF expands its operational range beyond territorial waters to defend the
country’s critical sea lines of communication.
The Air Domain. Key developments are anticipated in the Japan Air Self-Defense
Force (JASDF). In recent years, the F-15J’s warning-and-surveillance equipment
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
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and the air-to-air combat capabilities of the F-2 have been upgraded to enhance
further the JASDF’s airpower. The acquisition of additional aerial-refueling aircraft—such as the KC-767J equipped with the flying-boom system and potential
investments in KC-46As to increase the endurance of combat air patrol operations and expand fighter-coverage areas—is a key development. In September
2016, Lockheed Martin rolled out the first of the JASDF’s F-35A Lightning IIs.
The first domestically assembled version, by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, was
unveiled in June 2017; it will replace the F-4J and the older fleet of F-15Js.14 The
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) and Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries also currently are testing Japan’s first indigenous stealth jet technology
demonstrator, known as the X-2. While many find the project exciting, it remains
unclear whether the X-2 actually will become a successful fifth-generation JASDF
fighter, given the high costs for research and development (R&D), as well as uncertainties over the potential for exports to attract revenue.15 Moreover, the X-2
project is reported to be delayed owing to defense-planning issues, raising further
questions about the development and deployment of the aircraft.16 Despite the
challenges, the acquisition of next-generation platforms is an essential step forward in enhancing the JASDF’s air-superiority capabilities, particularly given that
existing units are overburdened by operational demands.
The JASDF also has made substantive organizational improvements. In January 2016, the MOD established in Naha, Okinawa, the 9th Air Wing, which includes two F-15 fighter squadrons. The establishment of the new wing was driven
by the exponential increase in scrambles (fighter intercepts) since 2010, peaking
at 1,168 interceptions in 2016, 74 percent against Chinese aircraft and 26 percent
against Russian aircraft.17 While the staging of the forward-deployed air units
certainly enhances Japan’s air capabilities, the rapidly increasing quality of adversary aircraft raises important questions about whether the transition into higher
levels of readiness can be sustained against the growing burdens.
The JSDF’s ISR capabilities have improved significantly. Previously, this area
was viewed as a major vulnerability in light of the numerous ballistic-missile
provocations and territorial waters incursions occurring since the late 1990s.
In maritime reconnaissance, the P-1 and the SH-60J/K continue to serve as the
main maritime patrol aircraft, while some P-3Cs will be upgraded to extend their
operational life spans. For airborne early warning capability, the JASDF currently
operates the airborne warning and control system E-767 and the E-2C, and soon
will introduce the E-2D. With respect to unmanned aerial systems (UASs), under
the current MTDP Japan is due to acquire three RQ-4 Global Hawks to enhance
the JASDF’s ISR capabilities. Important upgrades of ISR equipment installed
in aircraft, destroyers, submarines, and radar systems, such as the FPS-7 fixed
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warning-and-control radar system, also are being accomplished. These developments are essential to enhancing not only the JSDF’s communications and
precision navigation but also its ability to detect, track, and target enemy assets.
Further improvements are being enabled by strong investments in the enhancement of outer space technologies for C4ISR and X-band communication.18
However, the issue with advancements in C4ISR capabilities is vulnerability to
attacks from within the same domain, such as cyber and electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) attacks. Moreover, there is uncertainty over whether the acquisition of
and upgrades to ISR assets will be sufficient to keep pace with regional developments. In particular, Chinese and Russian modernization programs that incorporate stealth capabilities, as well as North Korea’s diversification of its military
capabilities (including a new class of submarines capable of launching ballistic
missiles), pose new challenges for the JSDF. These diversifying challenges and the
increased operational tempo will make it ever more vital for the JSDF to collect,
process, and deliver decision-quality information in minimal time to enable it to
take the right action.
The JSDF’s BMD capabilities also are improving steadily. North Korea’s launch
of a Taepodong missile over Japan in August 1998 served as the primary catalyst
for installing a joint Japan-U.S. BMD system in Japan. The JSDF has Aegisequipped destroyers and Patriot missile batteries. However, North Korea’s continuous developments and test launches of ballistic missiles have provoked anxieties
over whether the current BMD systems are effective and sufficient. The FY2018
budget will make significant investments in further development of the JSDF’s
BMD capabilities, including joint Japan-U.S. development of the SM-3 Block IIA,
to be carried by the Aegis-equipped destroyers, thereby expanding their coverage from three hundred to one thousand kilometers, and upgrades to the Patriot
batteries by installing the PAC-3 missile segment engagement that boasts a range
of over thirty kilometers. Japan also is moving forward with installation of the
Aegis Ashore system to add another layer to its BMD capabilities and coverage.19
The Air and Maritime Domains. An important element of Japan’s air and maritime defense is the JSDF’s area-denial capabilities in the Southwest Island Chain.
Currently, the JSDF is armed with Type 03 and Type 11 surface-to-air and Type 88
and Type 12 surface-to-surface missiles. More importantly, recent realignments
have deployed antiship and antiaircraft missile batteries along the Southwest Island Chain to provide coverage for Japanese airspace and maritime territories in
the East China Sea. The antiaircraft and antiship missiles are important not only
to protect the offshore islands; they also should support and supplement JASDF
and JMSDF units by easing their burden in dealing with intruders into Japanese
territorial waters or onto Japanese islands, including the Senkakus. Certainly,
the shore-based antiair and antiship missile batteries will be instrumental to
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improving Japan’s area-denial capabilities.20 Realistically, however, the real effectiveness of the shore-based area-denial arrangements will depend heavily on how
well they are able to integrate with the JSDF’s air and maritime capabilities.
With regard to amphibious operations, steady improvements are being
achieved in joint-operations capabilities for rapid deployment. In particular, the
Osumi-class amphibious transport docks that accommodate air-cushion landing
craft, as well as the Hyuga- and Izumo-class helicopter destroyers, with their ability to operate CH-47J transport helicopters and tilt-rotor V-22 aircraft, constitute
a key component of the JSDF’s amphibious capability. In fixed-wing airborne
operations, the new C-2 transport aircraft boasts greater size, speed, and range
than the current C-1. Taking advantage of such air and maritime transport assets,
the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) increasingly is focusing on mobile
platforms such as the maneuver combat vehicle, the assault amphibious vehicle,
and the light armored vehicle, as well as the upgraded Type 96 armored personnel
carrier. Moreover, the MOD in March 2016 signed ten-year contracts with civilian charter vessels such as Hakuou and the high-speed catamaran Nacchan World
to enhance the JSDF’s logistical capabilities.21
While the modernization of the JSDF is making steady progress, questions
remain regarding how far it will go. The next MTDP, for FY2019–23, is due in
2018, and the next NDPG is on the horizon. On December 15, 2017, Prime Minister Abe stated that the next NDPG will feature major changes while continuing
to conform exclusively to defense-oriented principles; however, he provided no
specific details.22 Naturally, there are strong demands for further capability improvements to meet the diversifying and increasing mission requirements and
to offset the existing burdens. Future considerations could include whether to
acquire not only next-generation models of existing assets but also land-attack
cruise missiles (LACMs) and light aircraft carriers, and to revamp the Izumo
class to accommodate vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing (i.e., V/STOL) aircraft.
However, careful consideration needs to go into pursuit of force structure investments; they should not be made merely for the sake of building a larger force
armed with superior power-projection capabilities and firepower, particularly
given the capital-intensive nature of air and maritime platforms. Poorly planned
hardware acquisitions not only would have massive fiscal implications, but would
create imbalances and potential negative path dependencies in the JSDF’s overall
force posture.
Instead, a significant part of the JSDF’s force structure developments consists of the installation and upgrading of C4ISR equipment; command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C3I) equipment; navigation equipment; automated systems; propulsion systems and engines; and precision armaments to
strengthen the performance of existing platforms. The Medium- to Long-Term
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Technology Outlook issued in August 2016 focuses on “unmanned technology,”
“smart network technology,” “high-power energy technology,” and “improvement of functional performance of existing equipment.”23 The FY2017 budget
devotes JPY 24.5 billion (U.S.$230 million) for R&D of “autonomous surveillance technology and sensor systems for unmanned underwater surveillance
vehicles,” “cyber resilience technology,” and “future amphibious technology,” as
well as new antiair and antiship missiles.24 Much of the R&D focus is on missiles
and munitions. The third supplementary budget of FY2016 also included one
billion yen for research on rail guns.25 The FY2018 budget includes JPY 8.7 billion (U.S.$81.5 million) for next-generation warning-and-control radars, JPY 4.6
billion (U.S.$43.1 million) for high-speed glide bombs, JPY 5.4 billion (U.S.$50.6
million) for antiship guided missiles with longer range and stealth capabilities,
JPY 8.7 billion (U.S.$81.6 million) for research on high-power laser systems
to be used against mortar rounds, JPY 6.9 billion (U.S.$64.7 million) for nextgeneration medium-range air-to-air missiles, and JPY 700 million (U.S.$6.6
million) for research on EMP weapons.26 Advancements in these technologies
could be significant game changers in the JSDF’s capabilities over the long term,
particularly if they are enhanced further with the capacity to deal with heavier
targets in the air and maritime domains.
More-sensitive questions arise regarding whether Japan will require offensive
platforms to ensure effective defense and deterrence in the air and maritime
domains. To date, the JSDF has focused on deterrence by denial rather than by
punishment. Yet the absence of the ability to inflict strategic damage on aggressors raises questions regarding the effectiveness of Japan’s deterrence capabilities.
In particular, North Korea’s continuous launching of ballistic missiles and its
nuclear weapons tests have triggered debates over whether Japan needs to acquire capabilities for deterrence by punishment as well as denial. In March 2017,
the ruling LDP recommended using assets such as cruise missiles to provide
counterattack capabilities.27 Discussions over acquiring LACMs have surfaced
on occasion since the early years of the twenty-first century, particularly with the
Tomahawk land-attack missile available as a means of attacking ballistic-missile
launch sites (and vehicles). While the acquisition of LACMs still is being debated,
in December 2017 Japan announced its decision to acquire the Joint Air-toSurface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER), the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile
(LRASM) for the F-15J, and the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) for the F-35A.28
Yet while the acquisition of LACMs may make sense from a deterrence point
of view, the possibility poses dilemmas. On the one hand, whether counterstrike
capabilities provide a sufficient deterrent is open to question. On the other hand,
under the current legal framework, the whole concept of employing preemptive
and preventive measures would spark intense debates regarding whether such
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measures are too strategically offensive in nature and go beyond a “minimum
self-defense capability.”29
Mobilization and Operational Constraints
While the JSDF boasts many cutting-edge platforms, capabilities count only if
they are truly operational. And there have been significant improvements to the
JSDF’s operational readiness in recent years, not only because of better logistics,
exercises, and training, but also owing to the increasing number of Chinese and
Russian incursions into Japan’s airspace and territorial waters and North Korean
missile launches. Still, the JSDF’s operational readiness remains constrained,
largely by legal and institutional factors rather than technical issues.
First, mobilization of the JSDF is constrained significantly by the positive-list
bureaucratic and legal framework derived from the post–World War II constitution.30 Under this framework, rules of engagement have been very tight,
limiting the JSDF’s ability to respond to contingencies in a timely manner. These
constraints have been raised as a major issue over the years, but developments
have been piecemeal. The enactment of the Armed Attack Situation Response
Act in June 2003 focused on “invasions,” “ballistic missile attacks,” “guerrilla/
special forces,” and “air attacks.” The legislation exempted the JSDF from civilian
laws during contingencies to permit smoother mobilization. Measures issued in
June 2004, based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Act, addressed factors
ranging from civil protection to amending the Self-Defense Forces Act.31 The
2015 umbrella Legislation for Peace and Security introduced new measures as
follows:32
• Self-Defense Forces Act
• International Peace Cooperation Act
• Act Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations That Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security
• Ship Inspection Operations Act
• Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations
• U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act
• Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities
• Maritime Transportation Restriction Act
• Prisoners of War Act
• Act for Establishment of the National Security Council
• International Peace Support Act
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Yet many of the revisions largely embodied versions of the 2003 Armed Attack
Situation Response Act, which Jeffrey Hornung and Mike Mochizuki correctly
describe as an “expansion of the existing defense-oriented mandate rather than a
mandate to exercise the right of collective self-defense.”33
There were further adjustments to the MOD’s decision-making, intended to
smooth bureaucratic pathways within the MOD by allowing the JSDF chiefs of
staff to work on an equal footing with the directors general of the MOD bureaus
and the secretariat in serving the minister of defense. Overall, significant improvements are evident. Yet, given the short-notice nature of contingencies that
Japan faces, whether the current legal and structural framework can manage
adequately the JSDF’s ability to respond effectively remains in question.
Indeed, the JSDF faces a central dilemma: How can it act effectively when deterrence fails? The “newly determined three conditions for the ‘use of force’” state
that force may be used (1) “[w]hen an armed attack against Japan has occurred,
or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship
with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear
danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of
happiness”; (2) “when there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack
and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people”; and (3) the “use of force [is
limited] to the minimum extent necessary.”34 Dealing with aggression effectively
yet with the minimum force necessary would be challenging, not only because
of Japan’s highly constrained rules of engagement but also given its geographic
proximity to other states in the region. For example, the JSDF must calculate
whether the aggressor’s actions are hostile (or not), as well as the appropriate
response measures against the aggressor, all within a tight time frame. Granted,
the increasing number of incursions and other gray-zone situations has given the
JSDF substantial experience with “hot” situations; however, to date these encounters have fallen short of actual combat situations. Hence, although Japan now
is authorized to take a more proactive part in collective self-defense and other
international security operations, the JSDF’s combat effectiveness after the first
shot is fired remains untested—raising concerns about how well the JSDF would
perform in actual armed conflict.
Second, further enhancing interbranch coordination and integration is essential.35 While joint operations have been discussed since the formative years
of the JSDF, actual developments did not take place until the 2004 NDPG.36 The
JSDF long has suffered from chronic stovepiping, to a level that obstructed coordination among the three branches. A key bureaucratic development took place
in March 2006 with the reorganization of the Joint Staff Council into the Joint
Staff, which now integrates and facilitates greater coordination among the chiefs
of staff of the three JSDF services. But major readiness and experience deficits
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within the JSDF remain. The lagging operational developments, combined with
the nature of the security challenges, have resulted in imbalances in levels of
combat readiness. For instance, the JASDF and JMSDF have conducted far more
actual contingency operations than the JGSDF.37
To address such issues and promote greater effectiveness and efficiency
through coordination, the three branches of the JSDF have been working on
upgrading their doctrines, to sharpen their roles in joint maneuvers, and on
improving C3I systems, such as introducing cloud technology and tactical datalink capabilities.38 Furthermore, under the current NDPG, some improvements
are being seen in personnel aspects, such as the stationing of liaison officers in
the headquarters of each branch.39 Yet the development of true joint capabilities is still nascent, and requires not only the integration of key capabilities but
improvements in the quality and frequency of joint training and exercises to
operationalize genuine coordinated readiness.
Formulation of Operational and Tactical Doctrines
The series of legal and strategic documents in recent years, such as the NDPG,
MTDP, “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” and Legislation for
Peace and Security, all have served as key ingredients to improve the JSDF’s
effectiveness and efficiency. Still, much practical work remains to be done to
operationalize these developments so as to improve the JSDF’s actual readiness.
Essentially, the recent changes have taken Japan’s defense planning to a higher
level, forcing the JSDF to develop further its operational and tactical doctrines to
operationalize the capabilities enabled to date. The fluid security environment,
the developments in Japan’s defense policies, and the improvements in the JSDF’s
capabilities inevitably lead to diversification of scenarios and operations. For
the JSDF to execute its tasks effectively and efficiently, it is critical to formulate
its concept of operations and tactical doctrines, particularly given the relevant
specific legal conditions and constraints relating to the rules of engagement,
use of force, and actions permitted when using force. Hence the development of
operational and tactical doctrines is essential to adding sharpness to and functional authority within the JSDF’s defense planning, so as to improve operational
readiness.
However, this task is easier said than done, as operationalizing capabilities
is seldom a short-term challenge, nor is any given situation a static one. Rather,
the process is a long-term, sophisticated one, replete with recurring adjustments
that produce, operationalize, update, and maintain the myriad developments in
the armed forces. The U.S. Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) is a classic
example of how an operational concept involves three components: institutional
commitment, conceptual alignment, and managerial initiatives. 40 While the
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Japanese defense organization faces far fewer complexities than its U.S. counterpart, there is little doubt that Japan also will face long-haul, complex realities in
systemizing doctrines to enhance the JSDF’s readiness and capabilities. As Japan
moves further toward ensuring air and maritime supremacy, new questions are
bound to arise concerning the force generation, development, and employment
necessary to improve JSDF readiness further.
Given the nature of recent JSDF doctrines as well as the major reconfigurations in Japan’s defense planning, much remains to be done in improving the
JSDF’s operational and tactical doctrines. Apart from ballistic-missile defense
and cybersecurity, the defense of Japan relies heavily on ensuring air and maritime supremacy. Granted, amphibious capabilities are a crucial deterrent in the
defense of remote islands; however, one should not become overcaptivated by
the JSDF’s amphibious capabilities, as they essentially are emergency measures.
As one defense official noted to the author, “A goalkeeper cannot be the only
defense component.”41 A scenario in which an aggressor already has encroached
on Japan’s shores, leading to mobilization of the JGSDF, would indicate the failure
not only of Japan’s deterrence but also of the first line of defense in the air and
maritime domains. Given the nation’s archipelagic nature and its other circumstances, supremacy in the air and maritime domains, through persistent denial
and resilient response vis-à-vis threats, is essential to dealing with aggressors
before they penetrate Japanese territory.
The air and maritime domains are intimately related. However, detailed discussions on an indigenous air-sea battle concept in Japan have not been conducted until recently.42 For instance, the basic JASDF doctrine was not issued until
2001. Considering the new emphasis on air and maritime supremacy, devising
an air-sea battle concept would be pivotal to enhancing not only the operational
readiness of the JASDF and the JMSDF but also the efficiency and effectiveness
of maneuvers during major contingencies.
The doctrinal culture in the JSDF also needs further development, with particular emphasis on interoperability, both technically and procedurally. To sharpen
further the JSDF’s readiness to establish air and naval supremacy, the JSDF will
need to work on shaping and maturing its air-sea battle culture and concept of
operations.43 Promotion of an indigenous air-sea battle mind-set would sharpen
the JSDF’s operational proficiency and readiness to meet various contingencies
in the air and maritime domains. However, doctrines need tactical context, and
building such aspects would be no easy task. While the JSDF is characterized
by a high level of professionalism and expertise, those qualities are limited to
the scope of existing assets and procedures. Thus, developing and applying new
doctrines within the JSDF inevitably would take time.
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The task of systemizing doctrines also faces challenges owing to the array
of new technologies expected to join the JASDF and JMSDF inventories.44 Formulating the concept of operations for the new technologies will require not
only further studies but also the nurturing of expertise. The JMSDF Command
and Staff College Strategic Study Group and the recently established JASDF Air
Power Studies Center of Excellence in the Air Staff College play pivotal roles
in conducting studies on developing and applying concepts such as sea basing,
combat clouding, space situational awareness, and reconnaissance strike complex
to enhance further the JSDF’s air and maritime superiority. Furthermore, recruitment is experiencing innovative developments; the JSDF has begun employing
direct-commission and noncommissioned officers with specialist backgrounds.
The next step would be to bridge among the three branches by developing an
integrated doctrine that emphasizes interoperability, connecting the capabilities
of the three branches to maintain optimal joint readiness.
Admittedly, efforts to enable establishment of air and naval supremacy face
their share of challenges, given that Japan is within China’s antiaccess range—
which could expand farther, considering developments in Chinese powerprojection capabilities. While expansions to China’s area-denial coverage would
press Japan to adopt sharper policies, here too there are dilemmas. Several experts have noted that an area-denial approach could lead to “trench warfare in
the sea”—a disadvantageous situation for Japan, which has limited quantitative
and logistical capacity to withstand attrition, especially considering the high-tech
nature of the JSDF.45
Such problems have fueled discussions on the JSDF’s tactical options, in
pursuit of more-responsive, resilient ways to deal with threats. In particular,
gray-zone situations create challenges to crisis management.46 Given that Japan
has treated crisis management as a domestic law-and-order problem rather than
one of national defense, how can the JSDF respond to gray-zone situations?
Moreover, the rules of engagement for armed action remain an open question.47
While the Legislation for Peace and Security does grant the JSDF authority to
mobilize against gray-zone challenges, Aihito Yamashita correctly argues that the
occurrence of such scenarios is a clear indication that deterrence has failed—the
aggressor has defied the status quo.48 Owing not only to laws and capabilities but
also to general regional discomfort from neighboring states, the JSDF remains
self-limited to exercising deterrence by denial, as opposed to deterrence by
punishment. The challenges indicate that the key agenda for Japan must be to
work on more proactive deterrence and crisis-management measures, consistent
with current laws and capabilities. Such a task, however, would involve not only
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conducting debates within the government but also addressing the dilemmas
inherent in the formulation of JSDF doctrines.
Political and Bureaucratic Facilitators
While further strategic and operational alignments are expected to improve JSDF
readiness, these developments will face the sorts of strategic, political, economic,
and bureaucratic questions that create defense-planning dilemmas for the Japanese government.
First, despite the growing awareness of mounting national security concerns, Japan’s defense planning often becomes embroiled in domestic political
intrigues. While it was Japan’s recognition of increasing threats that instigated
recent changes, it was the growing recognition by Japanese citizens of national
security issues and the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance that provided the
government with sufficient political cover to implement the developments. Still,
the tense political debates over the Legislation for Peace and Security passed in
2015 were yet another example of how defense developments in Japan often are
hamstrung by overpoliticization, poor conceptualization, and poor “marketing”
of security matters. The contents of the security bills are logical and essential
to improving Japan’s defense capabilities, yet arguably they were a significantly
watered-down alternative to amending article 9 of the constitution.49 The heated
political conflicts over the passing of the security bills not only highlighted the
political fault lines affecting defense matters but also depleted Prime Minister
Abe’s political capital.50 Such problems often exhaust the Japanese government’s
political-bureaucratic capital and its bandwidth for coming up with innovative
and pragmatic solutions to pressing national security developments. The political
environment in Japan needs to move beyond yes-or-no partisan debates to proper discussions of the means needed to achieve and sustain national security.51
Abe’s latest proposal regarding constitutional amendment—keeping article 9 but
adding a paragraph identifying the JSDF as the nation’s defense organization—is
quite moderate, yet debates over national security remain controversial.52
Second, there are budgetary constraints on the financing of future major
force and capability enhancements. Even though Japan has increased its defense
outlays steadily to meet its readiness needs, issues remain. The current budget
devotes 43.5 percent to “personnel and provisions expenses,” while 41.1 percent
is allocated to “base measures, etc.,” which includes items such as community
grants and host-nation support, as well as rent and compensation costs.53 While
high operational and maintenance costs are no surprise, Japan’s defense budget
remains highly constrained, the legacy of a previous, self-imposed 1-percent-ofGDP limit for defense expenditures. As Yuki Tatsumi argues, the recent budget
increases mostly constitute an effort by the Japanese government to make up
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for the impact of defense budget cuts imposed between FY2003 and FY2012.54
Prime Minister Abe has stated that (at least under the current administration) the
1-percent-of-GDP cap no longer applies, owing to the imperative to strengthen
the JSDF, and that capability demands will call for increases beyond that threshold.55 Yet even so, realistically it will be challenging for the defense budget to
experience major increases, particularly given Japan’s current political-economic
climate, with its other crucial agendas, such as “Abenomics” and social security
programs. As long as Japan’s defense budget maintains these current constraints,
and particularly given the high costs of currently programmed equipment and
munitions and domestic investments in R&D, future developments will need to
take place through adoption of the most cost-efficient measures. Otherwise, it
would be necessary to refine and, in some cases, to divest current assets to make
budgetary space for high-priority investments.
Third, there are questions about future developments in Japan’s militaryindustrial complex. The recently established ATLA will oversee key organs,
such as the Technical Research and Development Institute and the Equipment
Procurement and Construction Office, to ensure centralized management and
processing of defense-related investments.56 As part of the ATLA’s Japan Defense
Technology Strategy to “promote strategic initiatives to ensure technological
superiority,” the budget has highlighted projects such as a funding program
named the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security, as well as
improvements in project-management programs and cooperation regarding
defense equipment and technology.57 The new measures purport to streamline
and enhance the management of procurements and defense-related R&D. Yet,
despite the progress, questions remain regarding whether actual production from
the domestic defense industry will keep pace with the JSDF’s growing capability
demands, and whether the goods produced will be affordable within the tight
budget constraints.58 The easing of statutory arms-export restrictions will provide greater rationales for developing Japan’s defense industry as a means of earning foreign revenue; however, while Japan’s technologically advanced platforms
may attract interest, its arms exports are hampered by their high price tags and
the country’s relatively recent entry into the defense market.59
The Regional Dimensions
The impact of JSDF developments will depend on the nature of those developments and the various responses thereto of countries in the region. China and
North Korea will tend to view any improvement in JSDF capabilities as a threat,
leading to various response measures, which in turn will raise new questions
for Japan’s defense planning. Yet the largest question concerns Japan’s role in the
alliance with the United States and Japanese participation in other international
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security initiatives. JSDF developments certainly will allow the Japan-U.S. partnership to operationalize better the contents of the 2015 “Guidelines for JapanU.S. Defense Cooperation.” For example, the alliance continues to conduct
complex missile-defense and ASW operations. Going forward, improvements in
JSDF readiness would enhance significantly the alliance’s combined and coordinated capabilities and operations in the air and maritime domains.60
Still, there is much to do, particularly in further enhancing ISR capabilities,
interoperability, and the planning and conducting of combined maneuvers.61
Moreover, developments also are needed in the formation of “Japan+U.S.+X”
trilateral (or larger) partnerships, with each arrangement having specific value
in its own context; trilateral cooperation with the Republic of Korea is the most
important and urgent to be considered. While political sensitivities long have
undermined the prospects for partnership between Seoul and Tokyo, capabilitybased trilateral cooperation is essential for regional security and stability.62 Cooperation with select Southeast Asian states in the form of maritime security and
capacity-building efforts also has shown signs of promise in recent years and
should be enhanced. Japan owes its success in enhancing cooperation with its
Southeast Asian partners to its contributions to the region through noncombat
military operations.63 Such efforts constitute evidence of the significant development of Japan’s international security role and reflect major progress in Tokyo’s
relations in the Asia-Pacific.
Of course, as in other areas, there are dilemmas here. While growing challenges in regional security press Tokyo to adopt more-proactive defense postures and roles, developments toward an overtly offensive posture may trigger
hesitation among Asia-Pacific states to work with Japan, particularly given the
historical animosities that persist. And the larger issue is that developments in
Japan’s defense posture could be perceived as changing the status quo—a factor
that would impact the partner governments’ relations with China, including by
weakening their claims of participating in strictly defensive-oriented cooperation
for the sake of regional stability.
The issues at stake warrant that Japan should engage in additional constructive
initiatives with regional stakeholders to provide assurances and ensure sustainable reconciliation. For much of its history, the “Asia component” has been a
weakness in Japan’s diplomacy.64 One important prerequisite for improving this
area would be for Japan to minimize the profile of politicized and nationalistic historical issues to prevent critics from associating them with the essential
present-day developments in the JSDF. Furthermore, Japan must continue to
strengthen and promote the role it plays in regional dialogues (e.g., on arms control, export controls, codes of conduct, nontraditional security) and multilateral
efforts to institutionalize cooperation and practice preventive diplomacy. Thus,
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to prevent further deterioration in regional security, Japan’s developments in
defense readiness must be combined with continued efforts to expand opportunities for regional cooperation.
Regardless of whether the Japanese constitution is revised, the JSDF’s essentially
defensive orientation toward ensuring Japan’s security will remain unchanged.
Developments to date have not altered Japan’s defense-oriented posture, and certainly have not revived the militaristic policies of the imperial years. Rather, recent improvements have focused on smoothing the operation of the mechanism
that allows Japan to exercise the necessary capabilities for self-defense within the
nation’s strategic, political, and legal frameworks. Moreover, the developments
further confirm that the JSDF is strong when measured within a context of close
coordination with the United States and other like-minded states.
Still, Japan’s defense planning is at a crossroads. While significant progress
has been made in improving JSDF combat power and readiness, as reflected in
the series of policy developments and upgrades of JSDF capabilities and force
structure, it will be some time before these can be translated into actual ability
to achieve air and maritime supremacy, particularly given the nascent nature of
many operational and tactical doctrines, as well as continuing readiness challenges. And even if air and maritime supremacy is achieved, this is only part of
the solution to the full range of Japan’s defense challenges. Importantly, while
Japan will need to refine further its operational and tactical doctrines to enhance
the JSDF’s future readiness, it also will need to harmonize its defense developments with constructive political processes and diplomatic measures if it is truly
to ensure the country’s national security.
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LIF TING THE FOG OF TARGETING
“Autonomous Weapons” and Human Control through the Lens of
Military Targeting
Merel A. C. Ekelhof

A

utonomous weapon systems (AWSs) have generated one of the most heated
recent debates about the laws of war and military ethics. The issue of autonomous weapons flows from the concern that human beings will lose control
over the weapons they use, and hence no longer will be deciding matters of life
and death. Consequently, most states, participants (e.g., elements of civil society),
and commentators agree that autonomous weapons require some level of human
control. Different terms are introduced to reflect the premise that humans should
control or interact with the autonomous system; meaningful human control, appropriate levels of human judgment, and intelligent partnership are examples of
this general concept. But there is no agreement on what these concepts mean, or
what exactly should be subject to this control: the weapon itself, its critical functions, or each individual attack.1
This article argues that, to gain a better understanding of what the concept of meaningful human control (by whatever name) means in a context of
increasingly autonomous weapons, we should
Merel A. C. Ekelhof holds an LLM in the law and
focus our attention first and foremost on what
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Affairs—examines the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies on military decision-making.
is essential to determining what human-machine
relationship we require, now and potentially
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autonomous weapons through the lens of military targeting—more specifically,
the targeting process.
There seems to be a considerable lack of knowledge and understanding about
targeting among individual members of the public, as well as many groups that
represent the public in some way, such as lawyers, nongovernmental organizations, political leaders, industry, scientists, and the press. This lack of knowledge
about targeting is reflected in the discourse on autonomous weapons—which
is where it becomes particularly precarious, because of repeated calls to regulate and limit military practices.2 Although not all individuals engaging in the
discourse on autonomous weapons need to understand targeting to the degree
that military professionals should, the discourse would benefit profoundly from
a more informed discussion regarding targeting practices, as this would provide
insight into how the implementation of autonomous technologies will impact
targeting decisions and human control.
This article will demonstrate that negotiating and exercising control occurs
throughout the entire targeting process, and that introducing autonomous technologies into the process could lead to a loss of human control but does not inevitably do so. The manner in which a concept such as meaningful human control is
interpreted depends on the context within which it is or ought to be applied; thus,
how does the targeting process inform our discussion about control?
Answering that question requires first gaining a better understanding of what
targeting is and what it is not. The first section of the article discusses the sixphase decision-making cycle that has developed over the course of history and
has become embedded in the training for and execution of NATO (i.e., mostly
Western) military operations; Western militaries refer to this as the targeting
process.3
The second section of the article discusses one phase of the targeting process—
phase 2: target development—in more detail. This detailed analysis serves two
purposes: (1) It demonstrates the complexity of the targeting process, including
the different layers of decision-making involved; while target selection may seem
to be a straightforward task, it requires much more deliberate planning than a
game of Whac-A-Mole, in which one simply attacks anything one considers a
target. (2) It reconsiders what qualifies as a critical function of targeting. In the
discourse on AWSs, critical functions are related to the weapon itself, and mostly
are described as those that require human control in their execution, owing to
their importance for targeting (i.e., their causal relationship to kinetic effects,
and thus to potential death and destruction). Yet I argue that a critical function
such as target selection is considered during multiple phases of the targeting
process and need not have any direct connection to weapons use or kinetic action.4 Therefore, instead of focusing discussions on autonomous weapons—the
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dominant approach of the past decade or so—we ought to be focusing on autonomous targeting.
Thus, the third section of the article addresses the development of autonomous technologies—not weapons (although practically any technology can be
weaponized)—in the targeting process. There already are many ongoing military
projects in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, autonomy,
and automation that can provide case studies on how these technologies affect
the processes in which they operate and how that relates to human control.5
These developments appear to arise, first and foremost, within the intelligence
branches of militaries, because of the massive increase in (and demand for) intelligence, in both quantity and quality, and because rapidly changing battle spaces
demand accelerated decision-making. Although intelligence often is considered
targeting support, it arguably can be said that intelligence personnel perform approximately 85 to 90 percent of targeting.6 Thus, the role of intelligence and the
development and use of autonomous technologies for targeting will be discussed
together in the third part of the article to determine how these technologies affect
human control in the process and what challenges we can identify already.
The article’s final section draws some tentative conclusions about how my approach informs the debate on human control. Autonomous technologies should
not be conceived as replacements for humans; rather, their introduction to the
targeting process changes the tasks and activities of human actors. On the one
hand, humans might be able to increase their control, instead of losing it, owing
to improved situational awareness and a better understanding of the operational
environment. On the other hand, introducing autonomous technologies into the
targeting process presents fundamental challenges, not only to military structures
and the military mind-set, but most importantly to decision-making processes
and the relationships between human actors and technologies in the targeting
process. If these challenges are not considered carefully, the use of autonomous
technologies for targeting could result in an unacceptable loss of control.
The article provides an in-depth analysis of military practices, procedures,
and experiences that goes beyond that available from general, publicly accessible
sources. It can be difficult for a civilian to gain access to materials concerning
military targeting, owing to the obvious sensitivities concerning the subject and
the resultant restrictions placed on related information. Nevertheless, I was able
not only to access those documents but also to conduct field research by participating in conferences, targeting courses, and wargames; observing simulations
and exercises; and conducting formal interviews and informal conversations
with over fifty military practitioners. These practitioners came from different
backgrounds, nationalities, command centers, and offices and represented a
broad variety of experience in targeting; they included targeteers, operators,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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military planners, intelligence officers, weaponeers, commanders, and legal advisers.7 This methodology was necessary to address the matter at hand, since to
comprehend targeting one must go beyond doctrine and include the experience
of military specialists. It is through the prism of their experiences that we can
begin to understand the complexity of targeting, current targeting practices, and
contemporary targeting dilemmas—such as the control issue that autonomous
technologies raise.
The article thus provides an insider’s perspective, yet is suitable for public
release and relevant to both civilians and military practitioners. Its purposes are,
first, to contribute to contemporary debates—primarily the discourse on autonomous weapons—through a critical and honest analysis of military targeting
practices in light of the demand for and development of increasingly autonomous
technologies for targeting; and, second, to provide a more holistic assessment of
the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies on the human role within the
targeting process, and the challenge of safely implementing these technologies
while preserving human control.
TARGETING AS A PROCESS, NOT AN ACTION
Historically, targeting could be described essentially as the practice of destroying enemy forces and equipment. Classic targeting mainly focused on achieving
victory through military kinetic lethal actions that were related directly to an enemy’s military wherewithal. Targeting was primarily a tactical exercise, a process
that was executed predominantly on the battlefield.
Examples of this interpretation of targeting still appear in daily news reports.
Popular news sources such as Al Jazeera, CNN, the BBC, and Reuters regularly
publish headlines such as “Netanyahu: Strikes in Syria Targeted Hezbollah Arms,”
“Air Strike on Mosque near Aleppo in Syria Kills 42: Monitor,” and “U.S.: ‘Jihadi
John’ Targeted in Drone Strike.”8 For many, when confronted with awful images
of bloodshed, the urge to point the finger too frequently triumphs over the need
for a more measured, considered analysis of what actually occurred.9 Although it
is difficult to generalize about the international media, such publications seem to
adopt the historical approach to targeting, which focuses primarily on the effect
of an attack. This tells us very little about contemporary targeting.
Arguably, targeting—in the contemporary meaning of the concept—did not
evolve until the introduction of airpower in World War I.10 Today, targeting—
after a long evolutionary process and enabled by technological developments—
has developed into a practice that aims to achieve specified effects on and beyond
the battlefield by means of not only classic kinetic lethal actions (e.g., employing bombs, guns, torpedoes) but also nonmilitary, nonkinetic, and nonlethal
activities (e.g., financial effects, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and
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information operations; the Russian interference in the American election arguably could fall within this definition).11 No longer did targeting aim to achieve
effects on the battlefield only; it became increasingly important to achieve effects
in all domains and on all levels—the strategic, operational, and tactical. Nowadays, it would be more appropriate to describe targeting as a decision-making
cycle that is deliberate, not ad hoc; iterative; and methodical in planning actions
against adversary targets to achieve the effects needed to meet strategic and operational campaign objectives.12 This effects-based approach, with a particular
focus on linking strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level effects, also is reflected
in military doctrine, some of which is publicly accessible.13
In the following paragraphs this doctrine will be explored further, for two
main reasons. First, if we continue to consider targeting according to the historical interpretation—as an isolated tactical act—rather than as a deliberate process,
we will not be able to address effectively the control issue that technological
innovation raises. Second, this “helicopter view” of the process is necessary to
contextualize the next part of this article, which zooms in on phase 2 of the targeting process to give a detailed analysis of the different considerations, tasks,
and decisions that are made within this phase. It should provide well-grounded
knowledge on how Western militaries currently exercise human control in the
process within which, ultimately, increasingly autonomous technologies already
are or will be employed.
One of the most significant documents on targeting—a cornerstone in NATO
targeting operations—is the NATO publication Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, AJP-3.9. It provides a framework of principles, practices, and procedures,
the clear understanding and acceptance of which are a prerequisite for NATO targeting operations.14 The publication aims to guide NATO military forces in their
actions by explaining how targeting is planned, conducted, and assessed through
six phases.15 Although aimed at guiding NATO military forces, this document
also could and should be used to educate laymen, providing them with the (unclassified) information necessary to grasp sufficiently the practice of targeting.
While AJP-3.9 is the authoritative conceptual basis for joint targeting, it clearly
states that “it requires judgment in application.”16 Targeting is contextual, and
hence any document, doctrine, or rule book requires translation into the specific
context. Much like the laws of armed conflict, this doctrine is to be interpreted
by professionals to ensure careful application of its principles and procedures in
the practical world. Hence, reciting the doctrine as part of this article would be
of little use. To understand targeting practices, difficulties, and challenges, one
must include the experience of military specialists. It is through the prism of
their experiences that we can begin to understand current targeting practices—
the complexity of targeting, as well as contemporary targeting dilemmas. I
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will incorporate their voices as well as my own experiences gained in targeting
courses, exercises, and conferences into the analysis of the targeting process in
subsequent parts of this article.
AJP-3.9 defines joint targeting as the process that “links strategic-level direction and guidance with tactical targeting activities through the operational-level
targeting cycle in a focused and systemic manner to create specific physical and
psychological effects to reach military objectives and the desired end state.”17
More specifically, joint targeting can be described by the six phases involved (the
number of phases can vary depending on the doctrine, but the steps are essentially the same). Together, these six phases form a cycle that may seem sequential
but is, in reality, iterative and bidirectional; sometimes phases are achieved simultaneously, and they also can overlap.
Before this targeting process commences with the first phase and formal
military planning is initiated, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), comprising
permanent representatives of the member states, must decide that military intervention is required by issuing a NAC initiating directive.18 Once strategic-level
assessments have been made, the NAC will provide the Military Committee (the
senior military authority in NATO) with political guidance, overarching military
objectives, and the desired end state for a campaign, including any constraints
and restraints it wishes to impose. This guidance is the framework within which
military operations can take place. The political guidance from NAC incorporates diplomatic, economic, and military considerations and is often very broad
and vague.19 These political and strategic objectives and guidance include approved target sets, as well as possible priority targets called time-sensitive targets
(TSTs).20 This guidance is passed down to the joint force commander (JFC), who
is responsible for the execution of the campaign.21 Then the targeting process
commences.
Phase 1: Commander’s Intent, Objectives, and Guidance
The impact of the political and strategic objectives and guidance will be experienced first in phase 1. The JFC must identify clearly, at the operational level, what
is to be accomplished, under what circumstances, and within what parameters,
while following the political and strategic objectives and taking into consideration any constraints and restraints imposed by the NAC and, if provided, the
mandate. Because the JFC derives his or her military campaign objectives from
the mandate of a particular operation, the political objectives should be unambiguously clear and well-defined to facilitate the development of feasible military
objectives.22
Once the military campaign objectives are defined, the first activity of the joint
targeting process is to take these objectives, guidance (including restrictions with
regard to collateral damage), and intent and further translate them into a number
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of discrete operational tasks.23 This is an iterative process conducted between
the JFC and component commanders, one that allows objectives, tasks, and supporting target nominations to be developed on every level (i.e., both joint and
component).24 It ensures that each target can be traced back to clearly defined
and attainable goals for military operations and, perhaps even more important,
that everyone in the targeting process is aware of the objectives and guidance.
But that is not always an easy task. As stated realistically in U.S. Air Force targeting doctrine, “It is easy for those caught up in the daily battle rhythm to become
too focused on tactical-level details, losing sight of objectives, desired effects, or
other aspects of commander’s intent. When this happens, execution can devolve
into blind target servicing, unguided by strategy, with little or no anticipation of
enemy actions.”25
Hence, objectives and guidance are the cornerstone of the targeting process at
each level. They should be clear, concise, measurable, and attainable, driving the
targeting process effectively; but they may turn out to be vague and uninformed,
presenting challenges throughout the targeting process.
Phase 2: Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization
Phase 2 covers a range of separate but related activities that go into selecting and
characterizing targets, as well as building the database of knowledge about those
targets. Target development can be described most accurately as having roughly
five functions: target analysis, target vetting, target validation, target nomination,
and target prioritization.
As mentioned previously, the NAC passes down political-strategic guidance
and approved target sets to the JFC. Even though these target sets are relatively
broad, it is clear that the selection of targets is controlled top down and begins
even prior to the commencement of the targeting process.26 The essence and
functions of target development will be explained in more detail in the next part
of this article; for now, suffice it to say that the second phase identifies eligible
targets that can be influenced to achieve the JFC’s objectives, and that the principal output is a joint prioritized target list.27
Phase 3: Capabilities Analysis
Once the actual list of targets that can be engaged has been developed, the next
step is to determine the right asset with which to engage each target.28 Capabilities
analysis is the process of analyzing the prioritized targets and matching to them
the most appropriate capabilities, lethal and nonlethal, to generate the desired
physical or psychological effects.29
This phase has two elements that deserve further deliberation. First, capabilities analyses are sometimes referred to as weaponeering. Weaponeering is
the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 67

73

5/1/18 11:10 AM

68

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1

means required to generate the desired effect on a given target.30 What is the right
asset (e.g., manned asset, remotely piloted asset, or standoff attack munitions)
or weapon (e.g., Hellfire missiles, two-thousand-pound bombs, or nonlethal
means) for engaging this target? Do we have enough of that capability? If not, is
there perhaps another capability that can be substituted for it that still generates
the desired effects?31 The output of weaponeering is a recommendation of the
quantity, type, and mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons needed to achieve the desired effects while avoiding unacceptable collateral damage.32 It also can include
precautions that must be taken to avoid, or at least minimize, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects. This is the second
element of phase 3, called a collateral damage estimation (CDE).
Issues related to collateral damage already may become apparent during target
development, but they are considered more prominently during the capabilities
analysis. CDE often is confused with weaponeering (and weaponeering with
CDE). Collateral damage is the unintentional or incidental physical damage
to noncombatants, nonmilitary objects, or the environment resulting from an
attack.33 It is estimated as part of the planning process so as to provide the commander with an estimation—not a certainty—of collateral damage to inform his
or her decision prior to target engagement.34 CDE plays a role in the proportionality assessment, as the commander will analyze whether the expected incidental
civilian harm is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.35
Phase 4: Commander’s Decision, Force Planning, and Assignment
During this phase, targeting instructions are communicated from the operational
level to the tactical level. The JFC issues a final approval of the prioritized targets
and decides on matching capabilities against these targets. Consequently, the
JFC assigns these targets to the different components for further planning and
execution.36
Any relevant constraints and restraints, whether strict or lenient, that emerged
during these four phases are passed on to the assigned unit.37 Although execution
is assigned to different components (referred to as “decentralized execution”), the
desired objective of the campaign remains centrally controlled.
Phase 5: Mission Planning and Execution
This phase deals directly with the planning and execution of tactical activities.
Now that the prioritized targets have been assigned to the various components,
the detailed mission planning will be performed for the execution of operations.
Tactical-level planners will take similar steps to those described for phases 1–4,
but on a more detailed level. Assessments in this phase take into account operational and legal standards, including the obligation to take feasible precautions
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in attack.38 The component commander receives the prioritized targets on which
he or she will be conducting further mission planning and, eventually, execution.
Once the mission planning has been completed, execution can commence.
Mission execution follows a number of logical steps. This process is referred
to most commonly as the F2T2EA cycle, which stands for “find, fix, track, target,
engage, and assess.”39 It is during this phase that the selected lethal or nonlethal
means will be used. Hence, when debating autonomous weapon systems and the
critical functions of these weapons, this is the phase focused on most. Before the
mission-execution phase, weapons use has been contemplated, but no weapon
yet has been launched, fired, released, or used in any manner.
In the historical approach—which perceives targeting as the achievement of
kinetic effects on the battlefield—focusing on this part of the process would make
perfect sense. However, in contemporary targeting procedures, weapons use is far
from the only critical function of targeting. Other decisions and tasks within the
targeting process are particularly relevant to the discourse on autonomous weapons, and therefore warrant even more attention. Hence, after brief consideration
of the final phase of the process, the next part of this article illustrates this by
providing a detailed analysis of phase 2, during which target development takes
place—arguably the actual critical function of target selection.
Phase 6: Combat Assessment
The assessment seeks to evaluate the effectiveness and lawfulness of executed
operations and aims to guide future operations. If targeting was no more than
dropping munitions on targets, then a battle damage assessment would entail
little more than taking a closer look at the target to see whether the munitions
exploded on the correct coordinates.
However, most of the time effects are not easy to observe; for example, the
destruction of a plane as a direct effect of an attack on an airfield—as part of simultaneous attacks on all the assets of an adversary’s air-defense system, aiming
to, over time, degrade the legitimacy of the regime by portraying it as incapable
of protecting the populace—would offer no easy assessment.40 Although the
munitions’ effect can be assessed relatively easily, the change of popular attitude
is unlikely to be measurable until it is reflected in the target’s behavior, and even
then it is extremely difficult to conduct measurements of effectiveness.41
For similar reasons, it also may be difficult to assess the lawfulness of the
operation. Collateral damage may not always be apparent, particularly in air
campaigns; it might require ground-based assessments to acquire the necessary
information about the weapon’s effects on the target and its surroundings.42
Either way, the results of these assessments feed back into phase 1 so that goals
and tasks can be adjusted accordingly.
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A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF PHASE 2 OF THE TARGETING
PROCESS: TARGET DEVELOPMENT
Considering all six phases of the targeting cycle, phase 2 (target development,
validation, nomination, and prioritization) is one of the more extensive phases,
particularly in terms of time and resources and the involvement of different command levels. Target selection is controlled top down as the NAC passes down
(from the political-strategic level to the operational level) approved target sets;
targets might include ground forces and facilities, air defenses, ballistic missiles,
military supplies and storage facilities, and military or political leadership.43
Target sets even can include civilian installations, but these may be targeted only
if they qualify as legitimate military targets in accordance with the law of armed
conflict and relevant international law.44
Clearly, these target sets are still very broad; hence they require further development in phase 2 of the targeting process. As mentioned previously, phase 2
covers a range of separate but related activities that go into selecting and characterizing targets, as well as building the database of knowledge about those targets.
The five functions of this phase listed earlier—target analysis, vetting, validation,
nomination, and prioritization—will be discussed individually in the paragraphs
below. However, the reader should keep in mind that they are closely related and
in practice not easily separable.
Target Analysis
During target analysis, the most relevant targets linked to strategic and operational objectives are identified together.45 Once the commander’s guidance is
received, the target system analysis (TSA) process begins.46 The TSA is a foundational part of the target-development process, as it enables additional, more
detailed stages of target development; potential targets are derived from the TSA
process.47
TSA products are intended to provide a comprehensive and holistic assessment of an entire target system so that, ultimately, they enable planners to
comprehend a target system’s functions, capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities so they can provide recommended targeting strategies.48 The TSA thus
yields understanding of how components of the enemy system interact and how
the system functions as a whole. This includes physical, logical, and complex social systems, as well as the interactions among them. The TSA approaches targets
and target sets as systems (in keeping with what is known as a system-of-systems
approach) to look at interdependencies and determine vulnerabilities between
systems and exploitable weaknesses that, if disrupted or affected in a specific
manner, will create effects that achieve the commander’s objectives.49 It, thus,
looks beyond the characteristics of a single target; a target’s real importance may
lie in its relationship to other targets within a particular operational system.50
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This is an incredibly challenging task that can take up many months and may
require expertise that goes beyond that normally available.
Consider the task of conducting a TSA for an oil refinery. If you strike the
wrong point, the effects may be devastating. For instance, kinetically attacking
an oil refinery might ignite a large fire, causing additional risks to the population and damaging the refinery beyond repair. Even aside from the high risk
of collateral damage, the costs of striking the refinery itself may be extensive
since, essentially, “you buy what you break.”51 An alternative approach might be
to strike the oil refinery using nonlethal means. Now you need not only experienced targeteers plus someone with extensive knowledge of the oil refinery you
intend to strike, but also experts on nonlethal targeting (an expertise that is still
relatively rare in NATO).
In short, certain targets require more time and expertise to plan for than others. But in any case, TSA is a lengthy process that can take many months, and
hence should begin well in advance of operations—preferably in peacetime.52
Therefore, strictly speaking, TSA might not be considered part of the targeting
process, since the targeting process (within NATO, at least) does not commence
until the NAC determines that military intervention is required and issues its
guidance and objectives. According to a senior defense analyst at the Pentagon,
this is far too late for a true NATO emergency such as a surprise invasion of the
Baltics or Poland; as a result, NATO always will be behind the power curve unless planning can be done earlier, with approved, clear draft objectives already
developed well in advance for particular scenarios.53
However, it is politically sensitive to conduct target system analysis on nations
with which you are not currently in conflict.54 This restricts the ability to conduct TSAs on a national—but mostly a NATO—level, impairing the preparation
process from an intelligence perspective. This could mean that at the start of an
operation there would be no, or very few, prepared targets to strike. As a result,
forces might run out of prepared targets within the first few days or weeks after
the initiation of hostilities and be forced into a mode of primarily reacting to
unanticipated events. At that point, targeting could turn into a game of WhacA-Mole. Fortunately, there are ways to conduct TSAs on an individual national
level so that, once a NATO operation begins and the coalition commences the
planning process, nations can contribute their information to an integrated database, although often with strict limitations. Other opportunities to enhance the
planning process lie in the technological domain, which will be addressed later.
Target Vetting
Target vetting assesses whether the intelligence used to develop the target is correct and ensures that the target performs the specified function for adversaries
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or other actors.55 Consequently, intelligence for target development needs to be
updated and refined continually, making target development an ongoing process
rather than a discrete task.56 Although this may seem a relatively easy task—a
mere “checking” of the target intelligence—the importance of this task must not
be underestimated. As previously explained, target analysis can take a long time.
It is therefore important to vet all the targets before they can be nominated for
engagement. Not doing so could lead to inadvertent engagements and violations
of the laws of armed conflict.
Target Validation
Target validation ensures that the vetted targets are in line with the JFC’s objectives and desired effects, that they are in compliance with relevant international
law and policy, and that the all-source analysis used to develop the targets is accurate and credible.57 During the process of target validation, certain questions
are asked. Does the target meet the JFC’s objectives, guidance, and intent? Is the
target consistent with the laws of armed conflict and the rules of engagement? Is
the desired effect on the target consistent with the desired end state? Is the target
politically or culturally sensitive? What are the risks and likely consequences of
collateral damage? What are the consequences of not attacking the target?58
Finally, during target validation targets also are coordinated and deconflicted
with other operations. Coordination with many other agencies and activities may
be necessary to prevent friendly-fire accidents, collateral damage, or propaganda
leverage for the enemy.59 Coordinating operations, integrating joint fires, and
ensuring deconfliction are all parts of a complex process, especially in a coalition in which national caveats, rules of engagement, a low tolerance for collateral
damage, political constraints, and various legal issues must be taken into consideration on a multinational level. This is not even to mention the challenges that
arise out of the collaboration among and organization of numerous actors from
different military branches and services, and in joint operations from different
nations, resulting in a conglomeration of cultural, organizational, educational,
and linguistic differences.
Target Nomination
Once potential targets are validated, they are nominated by components (air,
land, maritime, and special ops) for approval via the joint coordination process
and identified to be included and prioritized within the joint target list (JTL).60
The JTL is the master list from which all other lists are produced; the joint prioritized target list (JPTL), restricted target list, and no-strike list are all subsets
of the JTL. The JTL provides all known targets within the NAC-approved target
sets considered for engagement. That does not mean, however, that all targets on
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the JTL are already selected for engagement; they still need to be cleared against
the rules of engagement, NATO caveats, and relevant international law.61 For
example, the principle of distinction plays a vital role in this phase, to ensure that
offensive action is directed only against military objectives and combatants, making a clear distinction between them and civilian objects and civilians.62
Target Prioritization
The final clearances discussed above take place during target prioritization, of
which the principal output is the JPTL. Targets on this list have been legally scrutinized, risk assessed, and validated and prioritized in line with the JFC’s desired
effects and guidance. Before targets are placed on the JPTL, they are presented
and discussed in target working groups and boards.
The short version of this process is as follows: Targets are developed and
reviewed multiple times by many different staff and different commands in the
Joint Targeting Working Group. Once fully developed, these targets are presented
to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board, which typically consists of functional
advisers (e.g., legal, political, information-operations, and electronic-warfare
advisers, as required), representatives of the different components (land, maritime, air, and special operations), national representatives, and the commander.63
Different military representatives (e.g., the chief targeteer, legal adviser, director
of operations) will provide the commander with the relevant information. In the
end, the commander will decide whether to approve the presented targets and
place them on the JPTL, or disapprove or suspend them (e.g., owing to a lack
of intelligence). The JPTL includes the proposed means of prosecution (lethal
or nonlethal) and the components responsible for engaging the targets (including recommendations covering intelligence collection and additional weapons
restrictions relating to collateral damage estimation analysis).64
Because targets and the environment within which they are located change
continually and because military planners never will know everything there is to
know about a target or a target solution, target development is an ongoing process. The process takes time: to enable proper planning and to perform course
checks, legal reviews, proper target vetting, and more.65 An experienced targeting
professional comments, “More time has not always equated to greater success,
but nearly any U.S. or NATO targeting planner would see it as a significant plus.”66
As important as time, or perhaps even more important, is the intelligence
that supports target planning; the indispensable role of intelligence and the importance of time deserve separate attention. As part of that discussion, the paragraphs below elaborate on autonomous technologies for targeting, with a specific
focus on the intelligence branch and its role in target development.
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AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES FOR TARGETING
Although autonomous weapons have sparked serious debates about human control over the past five to ten years, autonomous technologies—some of which are
even weaponized—have been part of military processes for much longer. They
range from simple algorithms that support calculations to complex autonomous
technology that is used in modern unmanned combat aircraft (not to be confused
with “regular” remotely piloted aircraft systems, commonly known as drones).
An illustration of the former is the Capability Analysis Tool, an automated
weaponeering system that provides the standard automated methodology for
estimating the employment effectiveness of most nonnuclear, kinetic weapons.67
Another example is the software program called DCiDE, which is used for estimating collateral damage.68 Examples of an application of complex autonomous
technology in military systems are the American X47-B and the comparable
British system called Taranis, the Russian MiG Skat, the European nEUROn, and
the Chinese Anjian. These are unmanned combat air systems that can autonomously perform complex tasks, such as taking off from and landing on an aircraft
carrier, conducting midflight refueling, and taking evasive maneuvers. Some of
these systems are said to be capable of automatically identifying and targeting a
threat as well, after which the system will send the data back to a human operator to be verified and to (dis)approve the engagement.69 Autonomous behavior
is inherent in many defensive responses, such as defensive cyber autonomy and
defensive countermeasures in airplanes. Examples include aviation electronic
systems that respond immediately to jamming indications, up to and including
the deployment of defensive countermeasures, such as releasing chaff and flares,
with the aircrew only flicking a “consent” switch at the beginning of the mission.70
Additionally, defensive systems that can operate in a fully automated mode to
engage preprogrammed threats such as incoming missiles already have existed
for decades. Examples include the American Phalanx close-in weapon system
and well-known defensive ground systems, such as the surface-to-air Patriot missile battery and the Israeli Iron Dome; all can autonomously perform their own
search, detect, evaluation, track, engage, and kill assessment functions to defend
ships or ground areas against fast-moving and highly maneuverable threats.71
However, in circumstances of self-defense, no elaborate targeting process
is used to engage the target. There is reduced planning time and fewer policy
constraints. Therefore, situations of self-defense are not an adequate reflection
of targeting, and hence autonomous systems that are used for self-defense are
not included in this analysis. The scope of this article is limited to the tasks and
decisions that are made within the targeting process and are or could be considered critical functions of targeting. Consequently, the previously mentioned unmanned combat air vehicles that can autonomously perform tasks that generally
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are considered less critical (e.g., those that relate to flight or navigation) also will
not feature in the analysis that follows.72
Examples exist of both complex and relatively simple technologies that play a
role in the targeting process. Sometimes these technologies are called automated
or autonomous; sometimes they are described as learning, or as representing
some other form of artificial intelligence. Interpretational issues are at the heart
of this debate. The meanings of these technological and sometimes even philosophical terms are far from settled; they can have diverging meanings within
different disciplines and in different contexts, and most of them are just inherently complex.73 I am under no impression that this semantic dispute can and
should be solved here and now. Therefore, I will refer to all these technologies
(irrespective of whether they are considered automated, learning, autonomous,
or some other form of AI) as autonomous technologies. Regardless of what type
of technologies are already existent or under development, the principal concern
should be to consider these technologies within the decision-making processes
within which they will be used; how we as humans decide to deal with these
technologies is more important than debates about the technologies themselves.
In the paragraphs that follow, for each technological development discussed, the
relevant context of targeting will be clarified so the impact of the technology can
be assessed within an analysis of the process by which it will be used.
The Indispensable Role of Intelligence
Intelligence plays a role in each phase of the targeting process. In some, intelligence takes the lead (e.g., target development); some phases involve a mix of intelligence and operations (e.g., weaponeering); and in others the intelligence role
is one of true support (e.g., force planning and assignment or monitoring tasks).74
Most often, intelligence is described as providing targeting support. This is a
correct statement; however, it does not do justice to the real value that intelligence
provides to the targeting process. Generally, the most important role of intelligence in targeting is to provide commanders and their staffs with analysis of key
aspects of the operational environment to assist them in their decision-making
process.75 As mentioned above, although this role may seem merely “supportive,”
some estimate that targeting is 85 to 90 percent an intelligence job.76 Irrespective
of whether these percentages accurately reflect the actual role of the intelligence
branch, it is clear that intelligence plays a vital, continuous, and often decisive role
in the targeting process.
The value of intelligence has been an ever-present subject in military discussions. Sun Tzu wrote that if you know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred
battles you will never be defeated.77 George Washington agreed: “The necessity
of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further argued.”78
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Throughout history, no one indeed has seemed to argue the point, although
Clausewitz was somewhat critical, writing, “Many intelligence reports in war are
contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.”79 From these observations it can be concluded that intelligence is of great importance, but goodquality intelligence can be hard to come by. In addition, having more intelligence
at one’s disposal does not guarantee strategic success. The quality of intelligence
matters at least as much as the quantity.80
About fifteen years ago “[w]e moved from ‘Industrial age’ to ‘Information age’
targeting . . . as the combination of new aircraft that could carry large numbers
of smaller precision-guided weapons, better and more multi-source intelligence,
and the ability to pass dynamic target updates from multiple sensors to airborne
aircraft in minutes vastly increased the number of targets that could be struck
on a given mission,” says Lieutenant General John N. T. “Jack” Shanahan, Director for Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support) at the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.81 The transformation to the information
age implied, and became manifested in, information becoming the driving factor
in warfare.82 The advent of unmanned vehicles carrying improved sensors not
only increased transparency on the battlefield but also enhanced the precision of
weapons systems and the speed of command by compressing the time to complete decision-making loops.83
This capability increased the demand for intelligence for targeting, while concurrently the use of these unmanned platforms vastly increased the amount of
data produced. When this was combined with increases in other types of data—
most significantly, the data from open sources such as the Internet—analysts
began to be overwhelmed by the constant flow of vast amounts of data, which
made it impossible for them to analyze it all and convert it into information and
intelligence.84 Simultaneously, battle spaces are changing rapidly and contested
areas demand accelerated decision-making—now, and likely even more so in the
future.
Practice has taught us that, whether referring to NATO as a whole or to
individual member states, current targeting enterprises are not prepared to
handle the demands of future conflicts, beyond perhaps a counterterrorism or
contingency operation that is limited in both scope and scale. NATO member
states learned in the Balkans in the late 1990s, in Libya in 2011, and again at the
beginning of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE that it is far too easy to overestimate
targeting capacity, and as a result to run out of prepared targets to hit within days
or at most weeks of commencing an operation. To bring NATO’s targeting capacity up to speed and solve the multiple challenges the organization is facing today,
nations cannot simply throw more people at the problem. Although having more
and more-experienced personnel would definitely improve targeting, it will not
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be nearly sufficient. As General Shanahan explains, “The reality is that the supply
will never equal the demand. Not now. And definitely not five years from now.”85
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff also acknowledged this in Joint Vision 2010, which
explained that “instead of relying on massed forces . . . , we will achieve massed
effects in other ways. Information superiority and advances in technology will
enable us to achieve the desired effects.”86
So if human personnel—even assuming they have the requisite expertise—
are not expected to be sufficient to solve the problem, autonomous technology
becomes a major driver. This has caused militaries worldwide to invest in these
technologies for military purposes.87
Artificial Intelligence for Intelligence
Militaries recognize that, among other benefits in both the intelligence and
operations fields, technology enables commanders and their staffs to access—
sometimes in near-real time—large amounts of intelligence about the operational
environment, which can assist them in planning, deciding on, and executing
an attack effectively and in accordance with the relevant law and policy. The
technology also enables analysts to convert raw data into actionable intelligence
that can be used for targeting. Hence, intelligence is of the greatest value when
humans and technology join forces. In this information age, the intelligence
branch seems to be one of the first military disciplines to experience the effects
of this technology on both the quantity and quality of its work—both positively
and negatively.
Although the massive increase in data available might seem a positive development, the positive results remain limited if the data cannot be processed for use.
With over 1.8 billion images captured on mobile phones daily, we can speak of a
real data explosion.88 Last year, Cisco (a company that provides Internet traffic
forecasts) presented a white paper claiming that “[i]t would take an individual
more than 5 million years to watch the amount of video that will cross global IP
[Internet protocol] networks each month in 2020. Every second, nearly a million
minutes of video content will cross the network by 2020.”89 This estimate covers all IP traffic, not just the data relevant to military operations; even so, open
sources are becoming an increasingly relevant data source in modern operations.
Furthermore, information overload is also experienced through other intelligence sources that are strictly military. For example, the amount of full-motion
video (FMV) produced by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has risen sharply
over the past ten to fifteen years. The amount of footage from 2008 already would
take a single human being—who never slept or blinked—twenty-four years to
watch.90 Analysis of all this material is performed by hundreds of young military
personnel, mostly Air Force airmen at present, but increasingly soldiers, sailors,
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and Marines who view each video as it comes in.91 Yet even then only a small
amount of the data (10–15 percent) can be processed.92 The estimate of footage
from 2008 already made people wonder: How long will humans be used to review
these videos? Today, almost a decade later, very little about this manual process
has changed, even though technology has continued to evolve, thereby amassing more and more data—without assisting in the processing, exploiting, and
disseminating thereof. Presently, monitoring, messaging, and reporting on one
FMV feed from a single UAV takes a minimum of three military technicians (not
counting additional personnel for supervision, maintenance, and the like).93 This
is a strenuous, labor-intensive effort that would be more effective if supported by
technology.
This is one of the reasons the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) established
the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team (AWCFT), also known as Project Maven. The overall aim of this team is to accelerate DoD’s integration of AI,
big data, and machine learning across operations to maintain advantages over
increasingly capable adversaries.94 Its first task is to field technology to automate
processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) for theater- and tactical-level
UAVs collecting FMV in support of the Defeat-ISIS campaign.95 Currently, analysts spend 80 percent of their time doing mundane administrative tasks associated with staring at FMV (e.g., look, count, characterize) and typing data manually
into a spreadsheet.96 Although it is necessary to conduct such tasks, commanders
and Pentagon leaders do not consider them a good use of their analysts’ time.97 So
instead, they are introducing autonomous intelligence processing to help reduce
the burden on the human analysts, augment actionable intelligence, and enhance
military decision-making.98 An example would be technology that can identify
relevant activity and then label the data. It is a small portion of what General
Shanahan—the man tasked with finding the new technology—expects the project will be able to accomplish in the future, but it is a first step that is necessary to
demonstrate the utility of AI for targeting.99 “You have to go after a manageable
problem, solve it, show early wins and then start to open Pandora’s box and go
after all of these other challenges across the department,” says Shanahan.100
One of the main challenges that could be tackled next is the automation of
TSAs.101 As mentioned previously, conducting TSAs is a very critical task—
potential targets are derived from them—but it is also very complex and timeconsuming. Target systems such as air-defense forces, lines of communication,
enemy leadership, and ideology exist and operate within a complex system-ofsystems context having numerous interrelationships and dependencies that may
not be readily apparent, may require analysis of large amounts of data, and may
not conform to preconceived notions and biases.102 TSA therefore requires thorough analysis of a broad variety of intelligence sources and rigorous objectivity
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to reveal vulnerabilities in one seemingly unrelated system.103 In addition, this
needs to be a continuous process to enable adjustment to dynamic circumstances.
This is even more difficult when combating insurgents; for example, a hospital
may be used as a command center, but a week later the command center may
have moved and the local population may have begun to reinhabit the facility.104
Thus, TSA constitutes a substantial task—and with the limited number of
targeteers that Western armed forces, particularly NATO, have now, it is almost
impossible to perform. This would be even more problematic in a scenario in
which NATO was at war against a near-peer opponent. As stated previously,
states cannot bring NATO’s targeting capacity up to speed and solve the multiple
challenges the organization faces today simply by throwing more people at the
problem. Autonomous technology, however, could speed up the process, processing large amounts of data so as to discern interrelationships and dependencies
that human beings would fail to recognize. Additionally, AI is expected to play
a vital role in planning; it would make it possible to run hundreds, or even millions, of simulation exercises to understand the potential effects of actions against
targets across a given network.105
Because the TSA process not only entails the objective assessment of data for
generic target system analysis but also recommends targeting strategies tied to
the commander’s objectives and guidance, any autonomous technology conducting this process would have to be capable of performing complex assessments or
assisting a targeteer in doing so. So far, no such military technology is in use, but
the importance of TSA for target development, and targeting more broadly, and
the many ways in which autonomous technologies could support the process
mean that TSA is an area that soon could see demands for, or even application
of, autonomous technologies.
A different, but similar, project of the U.S. Intelligence Community focuses
on finding mobile missile launchers, then flagging them for analysts anytime
they transition from a benign to a threatening posture. Basically, this means
that the program must be taught what “normal” looks like to be able to flag the
difference. According to former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work,
this type of automation could prove most beneficial at the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA), which gathers images from America’s satellites,
analyzes them, and feeds the information to the military and the Intelligence
Community for targeting and other purposes.106 The NGA also deals with data
sets so large and complex that they are difficult to process using traditional dataprocessing applications (so-called big data). To conduct tasks such as making
maps, knowing the environment, and navigating the planet, as well as understanding activity, threats, and changes, the NGA too is exploring technological
solutions. For example, the NGA is developing a software program that can
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determine a geolocation from a picture that was taken of the area of interest.
This technology would enable faster searches of the data to determine a subject’s
location.107 In practice, this could mean that a social-media picture of an area in
which, say, a missile launcher is identified could be used to search through massive amounts of data to determine the location of the launcher within minutes
(depending on the search box).
These types of technologies are often neglected in the discourse on autonomous weapons owing to the fact that they are not weaponized.108 However, to disregard such technologies would be to ignore their potential. These technologies
will be vital for target development; in particular, they will be closely connected
to target selection, since the actionable intelligence produced by the humanmachine collaboration very well could result in targets being selected for engagement on the battlefield. These technologies are designed to give the military a
better understanding of what is happening on the battlefield, helping humans to
react more quickly than their adversaries, thus giving them a better chance to win
a war—or, better yet, to deter an enemy from attacking at all.109 Automating decisions that have a direct causal link to weapons release might be most sensitive—
authorizing machines to kill humans is “a bridge too far” for most political and
military leaders—but technologies that can have a substantial effect on which
specific targets end up on the approved target list or technologies that determine
what data humans see and how they should conceive the battlefield can be just as
influential, potentially even more so.
Consider the effect of autonomous technologies that decide, out of large
amounts of data, what specific data to show to their operators and what data to
ignore, thereby influencing or shaping situational awareness. Another consideration relevant to assessing human control in the targeting process would be the
effect of data labeling on target selection. What labels are being applied (e.g.,
weapon, attack, combatant, hostile intent)? And how is this information presented
to the human; is there a risk of either automation bias toward or mistrust of the
system? One step further would be for target-support systems to suggest specific targets for engagement. Although a human being still would make the final
decision to approve or disapprove a proposed attack, the role that autonomous
technologies would have in target selection no longer can be ignored.
More importantly, if we fail to consider these types of technologies for intelligence tasks and the manner in which they are implemented within the military
architecture, we risk losing a valuable opportunity to examine potential ways to
manage them. A lot is being said about what the fight looks like now and what it
will look like in the future, but too little time is being spent on the middle piece—
the actual steps necessary to get there.110 The aforementioned projects constitute
such steps; they are the first attempts at integrating autonomous technologies
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into existing military architectures and processes—specifically the targeting
process. It is vital that we learn from these first attempts, understand the challenges they raise, and anticipate the ramifications thereof, because the next steps
certainly will seek ways to expand the use of such technology into areas beyond
intelligence.111
THE CONTROL ISSUE—NOW AND IN FUTURE TARGETING
In view of the targeting process and surveying current developments in the field
of autonomous technologies for targeting, a few main tentative conclusions about
the control issue can be drawn. These conclusions relate to implementing and
incorporating autonomous technologies in (1) the military mind-set, (2) military structures, and (3) decision-making processes. These areas of concern are
expected to be collectively relevant to solving the control issue.
However, as this article focuses on the targeting process, the next part of this
analysis will focus primarily on the effect of implementing autonomous technologies into that process. But before beginning this concluding analysis, let me
briefly address the challenges that arise out of implementing autonomous technologies into the military mind-set and the military structure.
Changing the Military Mind-Set
The military is well-known for its focus on hardware such as aircraft, satellites,
missiles, and other platforms and munitions. But advanced software technologies
are becoming more and more crucial to the success of today’s military. As a U.S.
Air Force general explains it, “The B-52 lived and died on the quality of its sheet
metal. Today our aircraft will live or die on the quality of our software.”112
Currently, there is a wealth of potential innovation in the commercial sector
that the military (at least Western, particularly U.S., armed forces) finds difficult
to identify and introduce into the defense system.113 If military services want to
take advantage of technological developments in the commercial field, they will
need to be fast and agile in identifying and incorporating emerging technologies,
as these commercial developments will be equally exploitable by many other states
and nonstate actors. This is a challenge for an institution that takes a slow and
deliberate approach to the acquisition and fielding of technologies.114 Furthermore, there is a need for militaries to change from having a hardware mind-set—
a platform-centric innovation and acquisition process—to being software-minded
and understanding the potential contributions and risks that autonomy and AI
can bring to military missions.115
This will require a fundamental change in mind-set, one that will be most
difficult to achieve; military historian Basil H. Liddell Hart famously observed
that “the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to
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get an old one out.”116 Even though the military’s mission likely will never be fully
compatible with the commercial culture—which defense analyst Peter Singer
describes as “fast, flat in structure, and happy to fail and fail rapidly”—the ability
of militaries to take risks and adapt will prove critical to retaining a military edge
in this new environment.117
Dealing with the Military Structure
Transitioning from a hardware mind-set to a software mind-set will require some
significant changes to the military structure, as any step in the process would need
to be implemented across military branches to promote interoperability and effectiveness. However, military organizations often are very “stovepiped” and disjointed in structure. By way of illustration, a Pentagon official from the Joint Staff
Targeting Division explained that when DoD acquires new software it generally is
not compatible with the existing system.118 Continuing, he noted that every geographical combatant command (known as CENTCOM, EUCOM, AFRICOM,
etc.) has different architectures and can be developing tools to improve these
architectures independently.119 Thus, different developments are occurring at
different commands and within different services because they use different base
systems that are not compatible with another service’s or command’s systems.120
According to Dr. Bernadette Johnson of the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, “Part of our problem is a legacy problem of the historical foundation of
our independent services, and if we were a fresh brand-new country standing up
today then we wouldn’t design the military in the way that we currently have it.”121
Clearly, this existing military structure makes implementing new technologies
across the board and achieving interoperability difficult.122
The Effect on Human Control in the Targeting Process
The third area of concern—but the primary one of this article—that should be
considered when implementing autonomous technologies is the process within
which these technologies operate. Current discussions focus on autonomous
weapons and ignore the type of autonomous technologies that this article discusses. One of the reasons for this exclusive and narrow focus on weapons and
the platforms that carry them seems to be that, like intelligence, these autonomous technologies are considered to have “supporting” functions, implying that
they support but do not replace a human decision. As a result, it is expected that a
human being remains accountable for any violations of the applicable law, policy,
or military ethics.123 Also, the level of risk in the event that the technology makes
a mistake is considered to be lower because the human will act as the ultimate
decision maker.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that even if these technologies are playing
a supporting role, and even if a human being ultimately makes the decisions,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 82

88

5/1/18 11:10 AM

Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue

EKELHOF

83

the technologies can influence critical targeting decisions—which could be
both positive and negative. On the one hand, autonomous technologies could
be beneficial, for example, in terms of speeding up the process and processing
large amounts of data to discern interrelationships and dependencies that human beings would fail to recognize. Western armed forces are struggling to keep
their targeting capacity up to speed, and the complexity, scope, and scale of the
targeting process mean that mistakes happen. Autonomous technologies provide
opportunities to improve this process and its results. On the other hand, implementing these technologies in the targeting process gives rise to additional and
new challenges with regard to human-machine interfaces, (incompatible) ethical
frameworks, trust issues, training, and more. These are all fundamental discussions that influence the manner in which the control issue is perceived. Although
solving all of them is beyond the scope of this article, some operational effects can
be identified that are relevant from a human-control perspective.
With the targeting process as the reference framework, one could conclude
that an effect of using increasingly autonomous technologies for targeting is that
human actors and technologies are becoming part of a long chain within which
decisions made by one link in the chain almost definitely will affect the control or
limit the decisions of others in the chain.124 In short, implementing autonomous
technologies will affect the control that human actors further down the chain
(i.e., within the targeting process) can exercise. This could result in a shift of
responsibilities that, for example, might generate an increase in responsibilities
for certain superiors or the developers of systems, but also could result in a lack
of accountability if the effects of implementing these technologies are not considered adequately before the technologies are introduced into the process. (This
issue is also closely related to the military structure.)
Even without autonomous technologies, the targeting process is an inherently complex process within which many individuals make numerous decisions
on a daily basis. Hence, responsibility for critical decisions typically is spread
across the entire process. On the one hand, this provides multiple opportunities
to exercise control and apply checks and balances. On the other hand, it should
be no surprise that such complex processes—within which a conglomeration of
cultural, organizational, educational, and linguistic differences are at play—are
prone to human errors. Mistakes are made; the question is whether autonomous
technologies can reduce these mistakes or ultimately will cause more, or perhaps
different, mistakes.125
Furthermore, it should be noted that the use of autonomous technologies
changes the activities of human actors; such technologies do not simply supplant
the human beings, who simultaneously relinquish all the responsibilities and
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control they exercised previously.126 To the contrary, the proper use of autonomous technologies may lead to improved situational awareness and a better understanding of the operational environment that may even enable human beings
to enhance their control. Nevertheless, this is not without risk; the redistribution
of existing tasks and the creation of new ones change the relationship between
human actors and technologies, which can give rise to a transformation in
decision-making processes.127 If these transformations are not considered thoroughly, the use of autonomous technologies could ultimately result in an unacceptable loss of human control. Whether humans remain in control of critical
targeting decisions depends on how well they succeed at creating a framework
within which this control can continue to be exercised alongside the use of increasingly autonomous technologies.
So far, no state has addressed these concerns comprehensively and effectively.
However, some first attempts at creating a framework can be observed on the current political landscape, where a significant number of states seem to be open to
prescribing self-imposed restrictions on the development and use of autonomous
weapons, with specific reference to human control.128 In fact, some states already
have gone one step further and implemented certain requirements in their national policies. The U.S. DoD, for instance, published a policy that directs that
“autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow
commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment
over the use of force.”129 And according to the Netherlands, “meaningful human
control is required in the deployment of autonomous weapon systems.”130 Even
though the number of such government policies currently is small—most governments merely commit to official statements or working papers presented in
expert meetings held under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)—the majority of these policies or statements include a reference to
the relevance of human control.
Hence, nations seem committed to keeping human beings in the decisionmaking loop for important targeting decisions—at least for now. However, it
could very well be that, if a major conflict arises, all bets will be off, with states
feeling forced into more reliance on autonomous systems because their adversaries are willing to take more risk.131 Considering warfare’s historical actionreaction cycle, algorithm-versus-algorithm warfare between two adversaries may
not be too far off.132
However, this is not an inevitable result of these technologies; rather, it is a
choice that human beings make if they decide to introduce these technologies into
the targeting process without considering—or after deliberately accepting—the
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consequences. In the current situation and for Western armed forces, this is not
likely to be a deliberate choice, but it very well could be the result of a misunderstanding of the issue that leads to an erroneous method of dealing with these
new technologies. For example, by focusing merely on weaponized technologies,
states, participants, and commentators fail to take into account other significant
phases of the targeting process and the technologies that affect critical targeting
decisions in other ways. What they do not seem to realize is that focusing solely
on weapons employment is like assembling a jigsaw puzzle while staring only at
one corner—through a soda straw.
Therefore, this article advises taking an expansive view, considering the targeting process as a reference framework under which to examine holistically the
effect of autonomous technologies on human control. While doing so, governments could learn from current projects that aim to implement autonomous
technologies in targeting, such as Project Maven.
They also should consider learning from previous experiences with implementing new technologies in the targeting process. For example, the Center for
Naval Analyses (CNA) concluded in its report on mitigating civilian casualties
resulting from the use of drones that “[f]ailure to recognize and mitigate factors
besides the platform in the targeting process resulted in an increased risk to
civilians from the use of drones, despite some desirable characteristics of those
systems.”133 Research into operational data from U.S. drone missions in Pakistan
and Afghanistan confirmed that “reducing civilian casualties depends on the
entire engagement process, including planning and training considerations, not
simply on characteristics of the weapon platform.”134 Although the platforms
under discussion in this article are not the same, much of the decision-making
process is. Hence, these assessments could help states understand the changing
dynamics in the targeting process caused or exacerbated by the introduction of
new technologies.
To conclude, the reality is that autonomous technologies already are and will
continue to be important for targeting. Therefore, safely incorporating these
technologies into targeting is not a concern for the future but a challenge that
should be addressed today rather than tomorrow. States that claim that human
control or judgment is essential to making proper targeting decisions often
simultaneously pursue autonomous technologies, claiming that these technologies represent the future of targeting. It could be concluded from this article that
one approach does not need to preclude the other, but we ought to be mindful
of the effects that autonomous technologies will have on our decision-making
processes.
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The development and use of autonomous weapons have created a host of legal,
political, and ethical questions and concerns that continue to be scrutinized, primarily within the CCW process. However, the annual deliberations that are held
under this framework convention have resulted in little progress over the past
four years. Nonetheless, so far over two dozen states have endorsed the notion of
“meaningful human control” or a similar concept that ought to prevent humans
from losing control over autonomous weapons. Yet how the concept should be
interpreted and applied remains vague and disputed.
This article has argued that the principal concern should be to consider these
autonomous technologies within the decision-making processes in which they
will be used, because that is the primary context within which their effects can
be assessed properly. The reference framework that I propose is the targeting
process. Yet there appears to be a considerable lack of knowledge about targeting among many groups and individuals, many considering it to be merely the
practice of destroying enemy forces and equipment. This historical approach is
no longer suitable for describing contemporary targeting.
Today, targeting should be perceived as a deliberate, analytical, and iterative
process, rather than an isolated tactical action. It aims to achieve specified effects
on and beyond the battlefield by means of not only classic kinetic lethal actions
but also nonmilitary, nonkinetic, and nonlethal activities.
This process begins on a political-strategic level, at which military intervention is decided on and political guidance and overarching military objectives are
formulated. This guidance is passed down to the operational level, at which time
the targeting process commences. Through the six phases that follow, military
forces formulate operational objectives, select and prioritize targets, match them
with the appropriate response, consider operational requirements and capabilities, execute the mission, and assess whether the desired effects were achieved.
The targeting process provides an appropriate and holistic framework to
consider concepts such as “meaningful human control” or “appropriate levels
of human judgment.” Human control and judgment are exercised within this
process, and hence the targeting process should be considered in its entirety to
determine the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies on human control.
Also, inquiry should not be limited to weapons deployment but expanded to
the entire targeting process; such an expansive view demonstrates that critical
targeting decisions are made throughout the process, so the scope of the control
issue exceeds the mere use of autonomous weapons. In this context, the detailed
analysis of phase 2, target development, not only demonstrates the complexity of
the targeting process; it moreover confirms that critical targeting functions need
have no direct relation to weapons or kinetic action. It also redirects attention
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to the targeting role of a military branch—intelligence—that largely has been
ignored in the debate on autonomous weapons.
With the advent of the information age, the intelligence branch appears to
be one of the first military disciplines to experience the effects of technology on
both the quantity and quality of its work, both positively and negatively. Western
armed forces cannot deal with the targeting challenges they face simply by throwing more people at them, so states are driven to invest in technological solutions.
The U.S. DoD’s AWCFT—tasked with integrating AI, big data, and machine
learning across operations—provides an example. One of its first efforts has been
to automate intelligence processing to reduce the burden on human analysts,
augment actionable intelligence, and enhance military decision-making. This
is only one of many ongoing research and development projects that Western
states—and most certainly many others—are pursuing.135
Nevertheless, these types of technologies often are neglected in the discourse
on autonomous weapons because they are not weaponized. This article establishes that disregarding these technologies is a mistake. First, these autonomous
technologies used for target development have an effect on which specific targets
end up on the approved target list by determining what data humans see and
how they should conceive the battlefield. The fact that these technologies are
not weaponized is irrelevant, as their tasks are potentially even more critical for
targeting than those of their weaponized cousins. Second, these projects provide
an opportunity to examine challenges and potential ways of dealing with the implementation of increasingly autonomous technologies in the targeting process.
A closer look identifies three main challenges. First, as advanced software
technologies become more and more crucial to the success of today’s military—
assuming the various services want to take advantage of these technological
developments—militaries need to change from a hardware to a software mindset, since the ability of militaries to take risks and adapt will prove critical for
retaining an edge in this new environment. Second, the military structure is very
stovepiped and disjointed, making it difficult to implement new technologies
across the board. Third, implementing autonomous technologies in the military
targeting process will be a task of significant difficulty. Even without autonomous
technologies, the targeting process is an inherently complex process within which
many individuals make numerous decisions on a daily basis, inescapably resulting in mistakes.
Although imperfect, the targeting process serves as a reliable basis on which to
analyze the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies, work toward better
protection of civilians, and preserve military effectiveness. Autonomous technologies could improve this process, while, at the same time, there is a risk that
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the use of autonomous technologies could ultimately still result in an unacceptable loss of human control because we were not sufficiently mindful of the consequences of these technologies with regard to our decision-making processes.
One effect of using increasingly autonomous technologies for targeting is that
human actors and technologies are becoming part of a joint chain in which the
decision of one almost certainly will affect the control or limit the decisions of
others involved in the chain. Also, autonomous technologies change the activities
of human actors; they do not supplant those actors while simultaneously relieving them of all the responsibilities and control they exercised previously. The
use of autonomous technologies prompts a change in the relationship between
human actors and technologies that will require a transformation in decisionmaking processes. If these changes and transitions are not considered properly
or are ignored altogether, the use of autonomous technologies for targeting could
ultimately result in a loss of human control.
So far, no state has addressed these concerns comprehensively and effectively,
but some states have made initial, minor attempts at creating a framework. Such
states seem to be open to prescribing informal and formal self-imposed restrictions on the development and use of autonomous weapons, with specific reference to human control. However, if a major conflict arises all such self-imposed
restrictions—such as the need for meaningful human control—very well may be
discarded, potentially resulting in an unacceptable loss of human control over
critical targeting decisions in the targeting process.
This concern may turn out to be justified, but, as I argue in this article, this is
not an inevitable result of the development and use of these technologies. Instead,
whether humans remain in control of critical targeting decisions will depend on
how well they succeed at creating a framework within which this control can
continue to be exercised alongside the use of increasingly autonomous technologies. Even though the targeting process creates a structure that provides a basis
for negotiating, exercising, and maintaining this control, we also should be honest about our targeting capacity—and the limitations thereof—and about the
complexity of organizing and executing military operations—and the mistakes
that result from that. Using the targeting process as a reference framework thus
creates opportunities for human beings to remain in control of increasingly autonomous technologies, as long as we assess it holistically and do not ignore the
complexities and challenges inherent in these complex enterprises.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 88

94

5/1/18 11:10 AM

Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue

EKELHOF

89

NOTES

The author is very grateful to all the parties
who contributed to this article, whether by
commenting on drafts; allowing me to take
part in courses, exercises, simulations, and
conferences; or welcoming me to their offices to hear their firsthand experiences and
collect the data that was indispensable to its
completion.
1.	The pluralistic terms and inconsistent use of
terminology in the discourse on autonomous
weapons often result in lengthy semantic
disputes. What is meant by terms such as
autonomous, targeting, human control, or even
weapon? The meanings of most such terms
can diverge between and within different
disciplines; they often have different labels
that are used interchangeably; some terms
represent parts of broader concepts; and some
of the concepts in question are just inherently
complex. This significantly complicates the
debate. Read more about the complications of
a common language in Merel A. C. Ekelhof,
“Complications of a Common Language:
Why It Is So Hard to Talk about Autonomous
Weapons,” Journal of Conflict and Security
Law 22, no. 2 (July 2017), pp. 311–31.
2.	Ibid., pp. 316–17. In international discourse,
most references to targeting are actually to
target recognition, focusing on the ability
of the autonomous weapon to differentiate
combatants from noncombatants. Commonly, functions considered critical to target
selection and attack relate to the weapon
itself, not the more deliberate planning phases
of the targeting process.
3.	There are two types of targeting: deliberate
targeting and dynamic targeting. This article
focuses primarily on deliberate targeting, but
in large part also applies to dynamic targeting. Dynamic targeting consists of the same
steps, but is more responsive than deliberate targeting, since the process is used to
prosecute targets that are identified too late to
go through the deliberate targeting process.
The dynamic targeting process is compressed
in time. North Atlantic Treaty Organization
[hereafter NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for
Joint Targeting, AJP-3.9 (n.p.: NATO Standardization Office, 2015), p. 2-4. With regard
to autonomous technologies, dynamic targeting raises some distinct issues that fall outside
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		the scope of this article but may be addressed
in a later piece.
4.	In 2016, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) introduced critical functions as a concept to describe the challenges
that autonomous weapons raise, and states,
participants, and commentators have used
the concept since then. The ICRC refers to
critical functions in relation to the weapon
itself. ICRC, Autonomous Weapon Systems:
Implication of Increasing Autonomy in the
Critical Functions of Weapons (Versoix, Switz.:
Expert Meeting, 2016).
5.	Examples include the Algorithmic Warfare
Cross-Functional Team (Project Maven);
research into military autonomy at the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific
Research (TNO); scouting by the Defense
Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) for
emerging technologies; many commercial
projects that are relevant to the military, such
as learning algorithms used by Facebook and
Google; and National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency research into geolocation software.
Earlier investigations into fratricide with
automated weapon systems, such as the U.S.
Army and Navy investigations into the Patriot
shoot-down of a Navy F-18 in Iraq in 2003,
continue to be relevant. Larry Lewis, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Ground-to-Air Fratricide,
CNA Research Memorandum D0008910.A4
(CNA, July 2004).
6.	Intelligence operations specialist in the office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence at the Pentagon, interview by author,
May 18, 2017.
7.	The information in this article was cleared for
public release by the Netherlands Ministry
of Defense. The personal information of the
interviewees remains confidential; however,
an overview of the different command centers
and offices that were consulted during this
research can be provided on request.
8.	“Netanyahu: Strikes in Syria Targeted Hezbollah Arms,” Al Jazeera, March 18, 2017, www
.aljazeera.com/; Angus McDowall and Idrees
Ali, “Air Strike on Mosque near Aleppo in
Syria Kills 42: Monitor,” Reuters, March 16,
2017, www.reuters.com/; Jim Sciutto, “U.S.:
‘Jihadi John’ Targeted in Drone Strike,” CNN,
November 13, 2015, edition.cnn.com/.
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9.	William H. Boothby, preface to The Law of
Targeting (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press,
2012).
10. Frans P. B. Osinga and Mark P. Roorda,
“From Douhet to Drones, Air Warfare, and
the Evolution of Targeting,” in Targeting: The
Challenges of Modern Warfare, ed. Paul A. L.
Ducheine, Michael N. Schmitt, and Frans P.
B. Osinga (The Hague, Neth.: T. M. C. Asser,
2016), p. 29.
11. Paul A. L. Ducheine, Michael M. Schmitt, and
Frans P. B. Osinga, introduction to Targeting,
ed. Ducheine, Schmitt, and Osinga, p. 1.
12. U.S. Air Force, “Dynamic Targeting,” in Annex 3-60 Targeting (Montgomery, AL: Curtis
E. LeMay Center, 2017), p. 7. As explained in
note 3, this article focuses on deliberate targeting and does not discuss dynamic targeting specifically. There are strong similarities
between the two types of targeting, although
dynamic targeting often is considered more
ad hoc in nature because the targets in question are identified too late to be included in
the deliberate targeting cycle.
13. See, for example, U.S. Air Force, Annex 3-0
Operations and Planning (Montgomery, AL:
Curtis E. LeMay Center, 2016), p. 13.
14. NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, p. 2-4.

such high priority that their effective engagement can make or break the campaign, so the
JFC is willing to divert assets away from other
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assess them. NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for
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THE ROLE OF THE HUMAN OPER ATOR IN THE
THIRD OFFSET STR ATEGY
Adam Biggs and Rees Lee

T

he Third Offset Strategy has become a common topic of discussion in Department of Defense (DoD) circles. In these debates, people regularly throw
around new ideas about research and development (R&D) priorities, as well as
about the often-desired deliverables, the shiny new toys—people love widgets
they can hold or capabilities they can see in the form of new equipment. But these
research initiatives are about more than the technology. Like its predecessors, the
Third Offset Strategy is truly about maintaining American military superiority—
a critical point sometimes lost amid fascinating debates about artificial intelligence (AI) and swarms of learning machines on the battlefield. Specifically, the
Third Offset Strategy is not about securing future battlefield capabilities in the
twenty-second or twenty-third century; it is about securing our advantage for the
next ten or twenty years. Today’s active-duty personnel need to see these benefits
for battles they will fight but that have not yet begun.
This defined timeline is not a simple discussion point; it is the linchpin that
keeps the conversation focused. Third Offset discussions regularly are given a
wide berth when it comes to potential technologies, so a second point becomes
critical to maintaining good order and discipline in the debate: that military R&D
does not begin or end with the Third Offset Strategy. The initiative is a guidepost
that will point to a series of research priorities for the near future. Not all R&D
projects will fall under this initiative, nor should we ignore futuristic science that
falls completely beyond its current scope. Instead, we can use the Third Offset
Strategy to define a series of plausible research priorities to guide resource allocation, funding, and desired deliverables or outcomes. A related consideration
is that the goals cannot be research-only deliverables. It is not enough to deliver
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a buggy prototype or to push the science forward; these initiatives must yield
tangible battlespace advantages for our personnel.
Already we have not started this article in the way that most Third Offset
Strategy discussions begin. We did not lead by outlining technology objectives or
descriptions of the previous offset strategies—and there are several good reasons
why. First, lists of technological objectives split off in many different directions
more quickly than a company of young sailors or Marines on their first special
liberty. Second, this offset is not actually about the technology. The new gadgets
will prove useful, but our focus should be on the human operators—our personnel are the most critical component to continued operational success. Moreover,
we have a near-unique opportunity to leap forward in optimizing human performance. Third, the current offset strategy is not like its predecessors. It will
become necessary later in this discussion to contrast and compare the different
offset strategy examples, but right now—at the onset of this offset—the purpose
of discussion must be to establish priorities, tangible deliverables, and a timeline.
• Our priorities are determined by the resources we have and the adversaries
we face.
• Our tangible deliverables are determined by the realistic improvements and
advancements that are possible within the relevant time frame.
• Our timeline covers the first half of the twenty-first century.
Now we can get started; we can move on to the question that must be answered
before the Third Offset can move forward—the multibillion-dollar question:
What should our Third Offset Strategy actually be?
ENHANCED HUMAN PERFORMANCE:
THE GOAL OF THE THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY
We propose that enhancing human performance should be the ultimate goal of
the Third Offset Strategy. To clarify this point: we are not suggesting a minimal
or irrelevant role for technology within this agenda; technology will prove just
as critical as in the previous offset strategies. Instead we are saying that the technologies developed should provide new operational capabilities or enhancement
opportunities for the human operator.
This approach builds on a theme that we will mention again and again, because it should be a critical underlying philosophy of the Third Offset Strategy:
let the computers do what they do best, and let the humans do what they do
best. Computers are much better than humans at processing raw information, so
let the computers crunch the numbers and feed that information to the human
operators. However, computers cannot clear rooms or steer ships. Human operators remain the backbone of our operational capabilities, so human performance
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remains crucial to our tactical success. Let the computers give better information
to our human operators and improve the human operators’ capabilities, and the
combined effect will be increased operational effectiveness.
Although the human performance element has been the one constant in five
thousand years of warfare on this planet, what has changed is the capabilities
and opportunities that are emerging or newly available—i.e., just at our fingertips—today. We divide these opportunities into three overlapping areas: (1) cyber
initiatives, (2) human-machine integration, and (3) precision selection/training.
We suggest—somewhat counterintuitively—that consideration of cyber initiatives, although they represent the most technological thrust of the Third Offset,
can remain within the scope of human performance considerations. These aspects remain amenable to the theme of “let the computers do what they do best.”
The various initiatives can create better information-processing systems so the
most useful, most accurate, and most reliable information is delivered to the human operator who makes the critical decision.
Human-machine teaming represents a subject often considered within the
scope of Third Offset Strategy projects. This category involves a wide array of
opportunities to enhance human performance by integrating machine products
and programs directly into critical tasks. For example, augmented-reality (AR)
systems can improve performance by delivering updated information directly
into a heads-up display (HUD). We now have the ability to integrate humans
and machines in complex ways that result in true interdependence and yield
superior performance attributes that neither the machine nor the human alone
could achieve.
This article is set apart from most other Third Offset Strategy discussions by
its consideration of the third opportunity: precision selection/training. Together
with improving the machines (cyber initiatives) and improving the integration of
machines into human performance (human-machine teaming), this aspect completes our triad of enhanced human performance by directly improving the way
we select and train the humans in the loop (precision selection/training). In this
area, we recommend using various initiatives such as so-called big data to inform
our selection procedures, thereby taking advantage of the wealth of information
that modern technology makes available.
Additionally, we recommend some large “cultural” changes in training procedures. Recent scientific advancements have opened new training opportunities,
enabling us to begin training individuals on the basis of their individual needs.
Rather than every Marine receiving the same training, individualized training
protocols can address specific performance deficiencies or help an individual
reach a particular goal or acquire a particular skill set required for a specific duty.
This approach would make some training assessments more akin to medical
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PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT TRIAD

Achieving the human-performance goals articulated by the Third Offset Strategy will require R&D initiatives on
three fronts: (1) information-technology and cyber initiatives, especially in the areas of effective use of multiple, big
datasets and assisted decision-making; (2) precision selection and training of human operators to ensure that the
right operator is assigned the right task and receives task-specific training individualized to his or her needs; and (3)
optimized human-machine integration, including simulated environments such as virtual and augmented realities.

assessments, with their related individualized treatment plans. There is already a
model in place on which we can build: special operations. Our proposed precision selection/training ideas would use individual assessments and special operations forces (SOFs) training as the models for applying these techniques more
widely, to the military at large.
These three components (cyber initiatives, human-machine teaming, and
precision selection/training) represent our Performance Enhancement Triad, the
overall model we recommend to guide Third Offset Strategy R&D. The article
will now delve more deeply into each aspect of the triad.
Cyber Initiatives
Modern warfare no longer is limited to the physical battlefields of the sea, sky,
and land. The ability to use global communication and data networks to disrupt
directly the energy, financial, political, and military sectors of a nation is a reality.
The most effective warrior of the future battlefield may not be the Marine with
the rifle but the sailor or airman at a computer in Colorado. The conception of
enhanced human performance needs to broaden enough to include these cyber
warriors.
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One illustration of enhancing human performance in the sphere of cyber
warfare involves deep-learning systems. Machines can be used for cyber defense
and electronic warfare; this may involve analyzing, for example, tens of thousands of social-media posts to identify critical data patterns that might be of
use. Other technologies may sense unknown radar signals and help pilots sort
tremendous amounts of information in real time without needing to return to
base to conduct the analysis.1 Either example represents a cyber initiative that
attempts to circumvent the traditional limits of human performance. However,
both systems actually are providing valuable information to the human operator to enable an eventual decision and reaction. Third Offset technologies, even
seemingly cyber-only investments, fundamentally enhance human performance
by creating new capabilities for the operator. The deep-learning systems remain
a good example of a single “machine” that quickly can perform an operation that
otherwise might take a single human operator weeks, thereby allowing real-time
decision-making based on the most complete data analysis ever delivered to a
combat environment.
Another emerging cyber initiative centers on antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD)
capabilities, or operations in denied and degraded environments. Any major
operation depends on the ability to move forces rapidly in theater. Some analysts
have even referred to operational warfare as an empty concept if forces are unable
to conduct large-scale movements on land, at sea, and in the air.2 Classic A2/AD
methods have been aimed at denying a human operator access to some location;
scenarios ranged from medieval caltrops stopping a cavalry charge to the use
of various forms of land mines. In any such case, the goal involves protecting
friendly forces, blocking enemy forces by denying them access, or both. AntiA2/AD initiatives attempt to overcome these area-denial strategies. They can
take one of two approaches: breaching the enemy’s A2/AD systems or enhancing
friendly A2/AD capabilities. Third Offset substrategies could focus on enhancing the human operator’s ability to breach an area’s defenses. For example, new
exoskeletons could reduce the danger to a human operator while he or she physically breaks through the enemy’s front lines.3 In the cyber arena, Third Offset
technologies could extend the ability of the human operator to analyze quickly
the status of global networks, then develop strategies to deny enemy forces access
to the networks controlling energy, communications, navigation, and other critical infrastructures vital to waging war. On the flip side of the cyber coin, other
Third Offset initiatives could pursue new technologies to ensure unimpeded
cyber access by friendly forces. New A2/AD systems will need to survive cyber
attacks and other enhanced defensive capabilities if our human operators and
Second Offset technologies are going to continue to have the same impact on
future operations.
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Human-Machine Integration
Augmented performance through human-machine integration represents perhaps the most commonly cited component of the Third Offset Strategy. Augmented performance would enhance the human operator by providing more
information, increasing functional capability, or maximizing performance and
endurance in austere environments. The goal is to enhance situational awareness
and operational performance by giving the operator directly everything he or she
needs in the most convenient and expedient manner possible.
The foremost example of this idea is already well into development. Specifically, helmets can be equipped with AR aspects to create better HUDs than any
prior system. The best-known example at present is the F-35 helmet, which can
allow the pilot to “see” through the aircraft.4 This capability was made possible by
advances in AR, which differs in several ways from virtual reality (VR) systems.
With VR, the technology creates a self-contained world; all stimuli are created
within that visual system, with no reliance on the physical world around the
operator. In comparison, an AR environment does not create a self-contained
world, but merely augments the world around the user by introducing computergenerated elements. Pilots wearing AR helmets still can see their cockpits, but
other information will appear on their visors, such as current heading and
altitude. The F-35 helmet uses this technology and cameras embedded in the
skin of the plane to create a view for pilots that is unobstructed by the physical
aircraft—they can “see” through the floor because they actually are looking at
the camera images integrated into their visors. In a similar manner, Navy engineers are developing futuristic HUDs capable of embedding information on the
inside of a diving helmet.5 The underlying concept is the same: to provide an
operator—particularly an operator in a harsh environment or wearing protective
gear—critical information that otherwise might be difficult to access or track.
Use of AR technology is not limited to the operational environment. In
the training field, the Fleet Integrated Synthetic Training/Testing Facility
(known as FIST2FAC) blends live action with virtual assets and adversaries.6
Thanks to this unique blend of live action and AR capabilities, sailors can stand
aboard actual ships and simulate using machine guns to engage multiple fastattack craft. The combination yields new training capabilities that otherwise
would be possible only via an untenable financial investment. In other words, the
blended training yields maximum training efficiency at minimal cost. This capability certainly falls under the general umbrella of an offset strategy, by creating
a new and economically viable military advantage, while also fulfilling the Third
Offset Strategy intention of enhancing human performance.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of human-machine teaming beyond merely
providing information to the operator, we will draw on a now-classic example
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drawn from the game of chess. It once was assumed that machines never would
be able to outthink humans in this field, but a computer system named Deep
Blue shattered this assumption when it beat world champion Garry Kasparov in
1997.7 Now computer systems regularly beat human players—which has spawned
another evolution. The new format has different names (including three-play
chess, freestyle chess, centaur chess, and so forth), but the premise is that during game play a computer aids the human.8 The human player can ask questions
of the computer, which then compares various scenarios faster than the human
could. The human player still makes the decision, but the computer provides
invaluable aid during the process. The combination is not as simple as a HUD,
because it involves comparing strategic moves and their consequences before the
operator actually has to make the move. It is quite possible that future commandand-control equipment will integrate such technology platforms further into our
operations. This is in keeping with the theme of “let the computers do what they
do best, and let the humans do what they do best.”
The development of combined human-machine efforts faces other challenges,
though, especially as the outcome performance can depend entirely on the specific machine involved and the specific human in the loop. Thus, the greatest
challenge in human-machine teaming is trust. Although this phenomenon is not
new, it remains a pervasive issue. Everyone is enamored of the capabilities of the
newest computer—until it unexpectedly crashes and you get the “blue screen of
death.” The driverless car currently is careening toward a wall of passenger mistrust that will have to be overcome.9 Third Offset technologies will face similar
trust issues. Human operators must trust the accuracy and validity of the equipment they are using, or the entire synthesis becomes untenable. For example, the
U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center cites spatial disorientation as the number one
human causal factor of Class A mishaps—the worst category of aviation mishaps,
those involving more than two million dollars in damage and loss of aircraft, life,
or both.10 Spatial disorientation can occur in a number of ways, with visual illusions often listed as a primary factor. In a visual-illusion scenario, operating in
dark environments (or without visual reference points for some other reason) can
disorient pilots. Despite instrument indications to the contrary, pilots continue to
trust their eyes over their machine to fly safely—even when their eyes could be
lying. Unfortunately, this is merely one example; human-machine trust issues are
all too common. As new technologies are introduced to aid the warfighter, the
issue has the potential to become much more significant.
Precision Selection and Training
While cyber initiatives will provide superior “machines,” selection and training
initiatives will be pivotal in ensuring that those machines are integrated with the
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best possible human operators. The key to success for these selection and training initiatives will be precision. Traditional military selection and training have
been a matter of mass production, in which sailors and Marines are treated as
identical cogs in a giant machine. Current screening tools, such as the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (known as ASVAB), are notoriously blunt
instruments that ignore the developing science of incorporating physiological,
neurological, and cognitive components. Furthermore, the military has a long,
proud tradition of being able to take any motivated man or woman, regardless of
background or aptitudes, and train him or her to be an effective soldier, sailor,
Marine, or airman. While this approach may have worked in the era of mass
armies and large-unit tactics, the fluid battlefield that is characteristic of fourthgeneration warfare and cyber warfare makes this selection and training approach
obsolete—and risky.
It will not be sufficient to have just any sailor pushed through a training pipeline; for the Third Offset Strategy to succeed, the military must push the right
sailor through the pipeline. In other words, decisions regarding selection and
training must be made with a precision never seen before in the U.S. military.
In the world of the Third Offset Strategy, selection and training decisions would
be more similar to those a doctor makes in treating a patient, involving creating
an individualized plan designed to achieve the optimal outcome. In fact, the research techniques designed to discover the biomarkers to be used in this new era
of precision medicine also may help usher in the precision selection and training
approaches necessary for the success of the Third Offset Strategy.
The difference in warfare environments between current and future operations further makes this “precision challenge” both timely and apropos. A large,
blunt training procedure cannot deal with the nuances that the conduct of multigeneration warfare creates.11 Fortunately, a model already exists for conducting
this style of military training. The SOFs template is the ideal base on which to
build. SOFs already embody several aspects that are essential to meeting current
operational-flexibility demands, including the need to conduct smaller, dispersed
engagements and perform expedited responses. SOF operators are among our
best-trained and most capable military personnel. If we are going to build a mold
from which to cast future operators, SOFs offer an ideal subset to consider in
determining how to select and train human operators.
The template begins by adopting some of the basic truths applied to special
warfare for application across a wider segment of the military. The U.S. Army
Special Operations Command dictates five truths about SOFs, which can serve
as a philosophical guide for selection and training. The first truth states that
“[h]umans are more important than hardware.” The fourth truth states that
“[c]ompetent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies
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occur.”12 Preparation during peacetime aligns well with the spirit and general
purpose of an offset strategy. So, from a philosophical perspective, SOFs already
apply the template for human operators that will be needed to carry out a Third
Offset Strategy.
Of course, the general purpose of personnel selection and screening is nothing new. For especially important duties, the different service branches long have
sought better means of selecting and screening personnel, ranging from combatreadiness evaluations to special-operations training. The question remains the
same—How will we achieve this end goal?—but the difference now is the tools
we have at our disposal to make these evaluations. For example, deep-learning
systems take advantage of “big data” analytics, which can crunch numbers far
more quickly than human analysts. These advanced analytical approaches can be
used to enhance our existing selection procedures by using as a starting point the
personnel we have already, along with the requirements of the duty in question.
This idea sounds rather vague until one considers a specific application. One
example is that big-data analytics and new research could be used to develop
a combat-readiness profile (CRP).13 The CRP would identify numerous physiological, cognitive, and neurological components to predict which individuals
will have the highest likelihood of performing well under particular combat
conditions. Physiological variables to be measured might include heart-rate variability, cognitive factors, and response inhibition; neurological variables might
include event-related potentials in the brain.14 These rich sources of information
provide an insight deeper than does outward behavior alone, because they literally identify activity going on in the hearts and minds of our personnel. Recent
technological developments have continued to make sensors of these various factors smaller, more durable, and more practical to employ in otherwise difficultto-access environments. By taking advantage of this available yet underused data
source and big-data analytics, we could evaluate combat readiness in a manner
never attempted before in military history. The ability to quantify combat readiness on the basis of objective factors could supplement training officer decisions
by identifying precisely those individuals who are and are not ready for combat—
no matter how they appear to behave under pressure during training.
The potential to select personnel precisely represents an interesting new way
to enhance operator performance in the Third Offset Strategy: by matching
the right operator to the right duty at the right time. There is an opportunity
to take these selection mechanisms one step further by developing new training methods that are based on human abilities that current military training
underemphasizes—specifically, cognitive abilities. The idea stems from a concept called “Sharper Minds, Sharper Sailors.”15 Essentially, we currently train
the bodies of our personnel through physical training and we give them new
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procedures to execute and new technology to operate. However, the thing that
operates that body, executes the procedures, and uses the technology—the
mind—receives no directed training. But if we enhance the mental capabilities
of our personnel, we could expect to improve operational effectiveness. Thus,
the Third Offset Strategy takes a rather direct approach to enhancing human
performance of military duties: by enhancing the human who will be performing the duty.
The challenge is in identifying how to enhance the individual operator. Socalled brain-training initiatives have purported to cure everything up to and
including Alzheimer’s disease by having subjects perform a few minutes of
directed cognitive-training tasks each day. However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) slapped key elements of the brain-training industry with fines for
making such grandiose claims with no empirical evidence.16 Even the scientific
community is somewhat split over the issue, with many lining up to denounce
the entire brain-training industry, while others proffer the simpler criticism that
so far the industry has overstepped any reasonable conclusions.17 Scientists still
are learning which cognitive training platforms can be used as interventions for
which problems, and how the training methods should be applied. Nonetheless,
the field holds substantial potential, with promising preliminary results being
replicated in new studies. For example, alcohol-consumption behaviors can be
altered by increasing response inhibition for alcohol-related stimuli (e.g., pictures
of beer).18 This example demonstrates how sound science paired with specific
intent can achieve a worthwhile goal. The success comes from careful application of validated scientific methods. In comparison, the brain-training industry
rushed an idea forward for immediate profit without generating any supportive
evidence for its claims.
Military research cannot make the same mistake. Developing new training
techniques must be an evidence-based endeavor. As noted above, response inhibition appears to be a trainable cognitive function, and this cognitive ability has
direct relevance to combat operations.19 Classic response-inhibition experiments
often use a “go/no-go” task, in which one stimulus is paired with making a response and another stimulus is paired with withholding a response. For example,
participants in these experiments might hit a key (i.e., a “go” response) whenever
they see a green square, but withhold a response (i.e., a “no-go” response) whenever they see a red square. The transition to a military operational environment
can be very direct—shoot a hostile in a combat zone (i.e., a “go” response), but
do not shoot an ally in a combat zone (i.e., a “no-go” response). Such a link
between inhibitory control and either friendly-fire incidents or civilian casualties already has been demonstrated in the psychology literature and, in a more
direct application to the training issue, there is at least one demonstration that
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response-inhibition training could reduce the likelihood of inflicting a civilian
casualty.20
These examples demonstrate how the Third Offset Strategy should pursue
new training methods to maximize human performance. Specifically, any novel
approaches should be (1) based on sound science, (2) demonstrated in a context
relevant to military operations, and (3) replicated in different experiments before the proof of concept is turned into a concept of operations. For example, we
should not hesitate to explore novel technologies, such as transcranial stimulation, to enhance human cognitive performance, as well as to leverage our understanding of the neurobiology of fatigue to mitigate its adverse cognitive effects.
A REALISTIC BALANCE BETWEEN HUMAN OPERATORS AND
TECHNOLOGICAL GOALS
Our argument is that an agenda that addresses enhanced human performance
would satisfy best the timeline, priorities, and deliverables that our current operators face. Still, any Third Offset Strategy argument should not address simply
satisfying these criteria; rather, the discussion should hinge on these criteria
themselves. Anything discussed should focus on realistic R&D goals that achieve
some measure of increased operational readiness or expanded force capabilities.
For example, consider two novel technologies currently under discussion for
fulfilling future naval purposes: AR and AI. The question then becomes whether
AR or AI systems meet our three needs of priorities, tangible deliverables, and a
timeline (i.e., which technology should be our focus?).
AR technology exists today in an ever-growing commercial market, and it
would be easy to program the scenarios to fulfill military requirements. But how
well does AR match up against our three needs—does it match our priorities?
Yes. One of our greatest challenges at the moment is that our new strategies must
be flexible and must adapt to a wide array of adversaries, including the “4+1”
concept that identifies four potential adversary states (Russia, China, Iran, and
North Korea) and various nonstate actors (e.g., terrorist organizations).21 Each
possible adversary presents different challenges, so our training and operational
activities must be flexible enough to adapt to and overcome those challenges. AR
training can be programmed to mimic a wide array of situations, from operating a gunner platform firing at fast-attack craft to planning high-volume troop
movements. AR also can provide advanced operational capabilities, such as the
various information displays within the F-35 helmet. Does AR provide tangible
deliverables? Yes. In the near future new technological capabilities could be
demonstrated that would provide the needed equipment, and we can measure
human-performance differences to determine their operational impact. Can AR
meet a realistic timeline? Yes, the technology as it exists today can be adapted to
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fit any of these suggested purposes. AR systems represent an ideal technological
template for Third Offset improvements and investments.
AI systems could alter the battle space dramatically, with thinking machines
adapting to overcome new problems faster than communication signals could be
relayed to an operator. An entire army of thinking machines could overwhelm an
enemy battalion without ever losing a human life. The idea already is swimming
about in the conceptual seas of both allies and adversaries; Russian general Valery
Gerasimov recently predicted a future battlefield populated by learning machines
rather than humans.22
But as interesting as these possibilities may be, would drones or some other
form of AI meet our three needs? Is overwhelming our enemies a priority? Absolutely. Does AI offer tangible deliverables? Yes—but in enough different forms
that an acquisitions officer could go from butter bar (O-1) to full bird (O-6)
before seeing a final, delivered product. Is such a timeline acceptable? Definitely not. We should continue to invest in these capabilities—their potential is
nearly endless and the technology could revolutionize warfare. But will swarms
of drones dominate the battlefield by 2030, or even 2040? Given the challenges of
technology development, infrastructure, manufacture, and acquisition, the safe
answer is no.
Typically from this point, Third Offset Strategy writings would continue down
the road of discussing technological opportunities, but we are focusing on enhancing human opportunities. However, confusion can arise when discussing the
source of these enhancements. We are not suggesting that human performance
should be enhanced separate from advancing technology; we are suggesting that
human performance should be enhanced through technology. Advanced technological capabilities will provide new opportunities to achieve optimal human
performance. This approach adheres to the theme of “let the computers do what
they do best, and let the humans do what they do best.” Computers can process
information faster than human operators, so let the computers crunch the numbers; human operators can make decisions that incorporate a level of context and
consequence that computers cannot, so let the humans make the decisions.
A CULTURAL CHANGE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PURSUING
HUMAN-PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT
The ideas introduced thus far largely are novel in and of themselves, and integrating them into our ongoing operations—making them a reality—will require
changes in the areas of personnel, equipment, and funding. But several suggestions would require more: major cultural changes.
One important issue deriving from the advancements in cyber capabilities was
referred to earlier: that the most effective warriors may be the sailors, airmen,
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or others who remotely pilot vehicles that have a direct battlefield impact. This
idea seems to conflict with our advocacy of a SOF-type approach to personnel
selection and training, but the two elements actually dovetail quite well. Precision selection procedures can be applied to both realms; the difference is in the
abilities assessed to select operators to fill various roles. Some selection procedures will focus more on the overtly physical (e.g., physical fitness evaluations,
long-distance swims, etc.), whereas others will focus more on response speed
and fine-motor control (e.g., hitting buttons quickly, making microadjustments
with joysticks). However, this differentiation merely reflects variations in specific
procedures; the greater challenge will require effecting cultural changes in how
we view certain training and procedures.
The first cultural change involves an emerging trend regarding the battle
space, not the battlefield. Battle space quickly is coming to be defined by multiple
entities operating in multiple locations across multiple platforms. Whereas we
once fought the battle of Saratoga in upper New York State, a future “battle of
Saratoga” may involve airmen in Saratoga operating remotely piloted vehicles
to survey a land area in Iran, causing fighter jets (or maybe even other drone
aircraft) to launch from an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf to strike a location
in Syria. This is battle space, not a battlefield—multiple domains coordinated in
real time to conduct operations across the world.
This aspect is actually the cultural change that most in the military will accept
readily. The real cultural change will be to take those same procedures and ideas
that we have applied only to special operators and apply them to our larger force.
If drone pilots may be launching aircraft from Colorado to aid special operators
in the Middle East, we must hold those operators to the same standards as our
special operators in theater—perhaps not in the number of push-ups performed
or the marksmanship exhibited, but in remaining in the top 1 percent for reaction
time or fine-motor control.
More than that, the same principles applied to special operators could apply
elsewhere. For example, consider the special operations truth cited earlier that
“[h]umans are more important than hardware.” Our best and most advanced tactical aircraft—manned or unmanned—are nothing but expensive paperweights
without their operators. As noted earlier, “[c]ompetent Special Operations Forces
cannot be created after emergencies occur.” If we need a flexible force operating
aircraft from stateside to fight overseas, then its personnel must be ready before
the emergency occurs. Those operators may not have to sleep in camp tents
or fend off desert bugs at night, but they still have to be ready when the alarm
sounds. We still train for the top 1 percent of operators; why should the underlying selection and training principles for our special drone operators be different
from those applied to our special operators in the field?
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To employ a common metaphor, we are talking about changing how we view
the “tip of the spear.” The spear no longer is hurled at the enemy by one person.
Many highly trained operators from many different locations are coordinating
to throw “spears” that are far more sophisticated. However, if the tip of the spear
is no longer isolated to one physical location—the battlefield as we knew it—
then sharpening that spear means keeping it sharp everywhere it will be lifted.
Personnel-wise, this includes the special operator on the ground, the drone operator conducting reconnaissance, and others. Sharpening the spear in this sense
means identifying the best human operators and enhancing their performance to
peak levels. SOF truths are the perfect model to guide us in applying these ideas
to human operators outside of SOFs.
Another big cultural change involves how we go about making these ideas a
reality. As mentioned earlier—and proudly reaffirmed here—the military has a
long tradition of being able to take any motivated man or woman, regardless of
background, and train him or her to be an effective soldier, sailor, Marine, or airman. The current operational model is akin to that of a factory machine. The goal
is to take raw material and conduct training until all aspects of that raw material
perform and function in the same way. For more-specialized operations, we select people for the necessary roles on the basis of existing capabilities: Can they
pass the test, or survive the experience?
Our take on precision selection directly contradicts this process. We do not
provide the same training to everyone; rather, we identify individual strengths
and weaknesses and train individuals to reach a given standard. Identifying
training opportunities that address individual weaknesses enhances the training
process. We help the individual achieve the necessary standard faster by identifying his or her current individual capabilities and focusing on those areas that are
not yet up to standard. Sailor Smith and Sailor Jones no longer get all the same
procedures—some, to be sure, but not all. Sailor Smith receives the training he
needs, and Sailor Jones receives the training she needs.
This process can be focused all the way down to a cognitive level because performance problems can occur for many reasons, such as insufficient sleep or low
morale or poor cognitive functioning. The roadblock that must be negotiated is
the identification of the criteria on which we would make these precision selection and training assessments. We need new procedures that identify cognitive
skills and capabilities that current training does not address directly.
This approach can achieve optimal human performance, and it represents the
greatest opportunity for the Third Offset Strategy to have a real and long-lasting
impact on U.S. military operations. However, it will require a basic shift in how
we consider and pursue selection and training—a shift that can begin by adapting
SOF principles and truths to a wider array of military activities.
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COMPARING OFFSET STRATEGIES:
WHAT SHOULD WE LEARN FROM PREVIOUS INSTANCES?
As its name makes obvious, the Third Offset Strategy is not the first of its kind.
We have been down this road and used this approach to great effect throughout
the latter half of the twentieth century. The previous examples can provide more
than just historical context. Lessons learned from the previous strategies can be
applied to the Third Offset Strategy to ensure its greatest possible effect.
The discussion that follows of the First and Second Offset Strategies will address the following questions:
1.	 What constitutes an offset strategy?
2.	 In the previous offset strategies, what considerations were given to the
human operator?
3.	 What factors created the longest-lasting benefits?
4.	 What factors created the most-volatile situations?
Defining an Offset Strategy
While the term offset strategy has entered military jargon fully, there does not
appear to be a consensus on what qualifies an approach as an offset strategy.
Recent communications from senior DoD officials have called for a Third Offset
Strategy, but these mostly provided a general direction and a common language
for discussions about military R&D priorities in the early twenty-first century.23
Other writings have described a variety of technologies that the Third Offset
Strategy should pursue.24 Perhaps the only universally agreed-upon point with
regard to the Third Offset Strategy is that we are reaching an era in which American dominance on multiple fronts—sea, sky, space, and cyberspace—no longer
can be taken for granted.25 But what is an offset strategy, and why would having
one help us now?
One definition of an offset strategy as a military tactic relies on the following
three criteria:
1.	 Asymmetrical advantage: A nation seeks to compensate for a military
disadvantage or force disequilibrium by attaining an advantage the
adversary cannot match.
2.	 Unconventional approach: Simply increasing the size of existing forces
to achieve the desired military advantage is not an option owing to fiscal,
political, or practical constraints. Instead, a nation pursues some novel
approach—through tactics, technology, or some combination thereof—to
achieve the advantage.
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3.	 Long-term sustainability: The novel solution must be sustainable over the
long term, without an excessive drain on the national economy or military
budgets.26
An interesting note is that, when taken together, the latter two criteria produce
a maxim for an offset strategy: maximum deterrence at minimal cost. An offset
strategy gives a military an advantage that an opposing country cannot match; it
accomplishes this goal by using unconventional means, primarily aimed at deterrence; and the military maintains this advantage for a long period. This maxim
also indicates why a nation might pursue a particular course of action. Generally
speaking, practicing deterrence is an economically efficient approach that does
not require a nation to relinquish its military advantage.
Historical Context of the Previous Offset Strategies
Two previous cases in U.S. history often are held up as examples of offset strategies. The First Offset Strategy originally was called the New Look. The most
narrow sense of the term merely described the DoD budget for fiscal year 1955.27
During the Cold War, the United States faced a monolithic adversary in the Soviet
Union. Matching Soviet conventional resources would have cost the United States
more than three times its entire defense budget, which would have led to an “unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster.”28 President Eisenhower
and his administration decided to shift tactics. They found a military advantage
that would deter the Soviets without needing to match conventional forces—the
First Offset Strategy.29 In short, they offset a conventional weapons disadvantage with a nuclear weapons advantage. The United States thus opted to pursue
nuclear deterrence via a policy of massive retaliation rather than by matching
conventional forces.30 The First Offset Strategy appears to have been successful
for a time—military expenditures, as a percentage of the total budget, declined,
without sacrificing overall U.S. military strength.31
The Second Offset Strategy began to emerge once the Soviet Union neutralized the U.S. nuclear advantage. With mutually assured destruction a reality, both
nations could rely on conventional forces only, and in that area the Soviet Union
still held a mammoth advantage over the United States.32 Again, matching those
conventional forces would have bankrupted the United States and NATO. (Thus,
economic concerns emerge yet again as a critical factor in determining why a nation would pursue an offset strategy instead of conventional superiority.) The solution came not in nuclear yield but through precision. The trick was to take human error—the inaccuracy of human operation of the targeting systems—out of
the equation, so as to guarantee mission accomplishment. The role of the human
operator changed in the Second Offset Strategy; precision accuracy was achieved
through technology, not via human aim. The result exceeded all expectations. By
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 112

118

5/1/18 11:11 AM

Naval War College: Summer 2018 Full Issue

BIGGS & LEE

113

1984, a top Soviet official called one Second Offset program, Assault Breaker, a
“military-technical revolution,” a formulation that morphed into the American
axiom “a revolution in military affairs.”33 American precision capabilities could
destroy two thousand Soviet tanks, from miles from the front lines, in less than
a day.34 Second Offset advantages put American capabilities ahead of Soviet conventional forces—yet again without having to attempt the unsustainable investment necessary to match forces soldier for soldier.
Ultimately, the United States managed to maintain a military advantage without experiencing economic collapse, whereas the Soviet Union did not fare so
well. Many different factors contributed to the eventual dissolution of the Soviet
Union—which factor was most influential is debatable—but economic issues
certainly contributed.35
Second Offset Strategy advantages proved durable over decades, leading to
continued U.S. military successes. Both Gulf Wars demonstrated the advantage
of Second Offset technologies over adversaries unable to match that technology.
Lessons Learned: The Role of the Human Operator in Previous Offset Strategies
With regard to the First Offset Strategy, human operators armed with conventional weapons represented an unsustainable economic weakness—the United
States could not attempt to match its forces against Soviet-led capabilities. It also
could be argued that large armies represented a tactical vulnerability; after all, in
the nuclear world, large standing armies became optimal targets that could be
eliminated with a few nuclear bombs. Another consideration of the First Offset
Strategy was a secondary, but no less important, liability: the dependence on
error-prone, sometimes unpredictable, human operators.
The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated this issue, although the specific incident in question is not widely known. Typically, Soviet submarines could launch
nuclear weapons if the captain and political officer agreed to the action. Aboard
B-59, however, nuclear launch required the approval of a third officer: Vasili
Arkhipov. He was second in command of B-59, yet also commander of the submarine flotilla. This authority made him equal in rank to the captain and gave
him a say in whether nuclear weapons could be launched. When several practice
signaling depth charges dropped by USS Beale (DD 471) struck the boat’s hull
on October 27, 1962, the captain and political officer wanted to launch a nuclear
torpedo against the U.S. fleet.36 Only Arkhipov disagreed—thereby preventing an
action that likely would have escalated the confrontation into full-scale nuclear
war.37
Because of the tactics involved in the application of the First Offset Strategy,
tens of millions of American lives came down to the actions of a single man—
and not even a member of the American military. He easily could have acted
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differently; in fact, two of the three men in his situation, on the same submarine,
did act differently. While we are all thankful for Arkhipov’s discretion, the events
on B-59 reveal the potential danger of trusting so many individual human operators to execute reliably a First Offset Strategy that relied on a consistent willingness to use the apocalyptic power of nuclear weapons when necessary. Thus,
the human operator represented a multifaceted liability within the First Offset
Strategy.
For the Second Offset Strategy, the human operator shifted from being a liability to a cog in the machine—a button pusher. Precision guidance required
taking the human out of the targeting systems as much as possible and letting
computer systems guide our birds to their targets. While the extent to which precision guidance relegated human operators to being mere button pushers could
be argued, it is clear that the role of the human operator changed significantly. In
many cases, once a decision to engage the enemy was made the human operator
was consigned to being a bystander.
Beyond considering the role of the human operator in each strategy, we can
learn from what each strategy did effectively. The First Offset Strategy did succeed, although its advantages were volatile and short-lived. Its continuing contribution is the concept of mutually assured destruction; however, today this reality
affects our immediate and practical operations very little. A weakness of the First
Offset Strategy was that its tactical contributions were eliminated almost entirely
once other countries achieved nuclear parity. The Second Offset Strategy fared
much better in that regard. Specifically, precision weapons are as useful today
as they were in the 1980s. We have not discarded these capabilities, and they
continue to impact our ongoing operations. The Second Offset Strategy had to
start fresh because it could not build on the advantages the First Offset Strategy
had achieved. The Third Offset Strategy can build on Second Offset Strategy
advantages, and that aspect should be considered as we plan for the new strategy.
Our long-term goals should be to develop capabilities that future developments
cannot simply eliminate or overwhelm. This idea further confirms enhanced
human performance as an ideal focus for the Third Offset Strategy, because the
performance procedures we develop now will continue to be useful long after the
Third Offset Strategy itself enters the history books.
Another important difference between the emerging offset strategy and its
predecessors involves how we will pursue these technologies. Unlike the earlier
approaches, we are well aware that a new strategy is emerging; whereas the previous strategies scrambled to address existing challenges, this time we have the
opportunity to be proactive. This awareness allows us to design our approach
in a more deliberate fashion than with the previous methodologies. This point
becomes more important given that the Third Offset Strategy is really a series
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/1
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THE HUMAN IMPACT ON OFFSET STRATEGIES
Offset Strategy

U.S. Personnel

Adversary Personnel

First Offset: nuclear
deterrence

Liability: The economic and logistical
challenges of fielding U.S. personnel in the
numbers necessary to win a conventional
war made them a liability.

Tyranny of numbers: The Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact could field an army
in Europe substantially larger than NATO
was willing to support.

Second Offset: precision
conventional weapons

Source of error: The complexity of the
modern battle space exceeded the capabilities of the human being to engage the
enemy effectively and rapidly without unacceptable errors, requiring development
of strategies to remove the human element
to the extent possible.

Remote and hidden: Nonstate actors strike
from locations hidden in urban environments, while more-traditional state enemy
forces hide behind a shield of overwhelming numbers of conventional weapons.
Both scenarios create a tremendously
complex battle space.

Third Offset: enhanced
human performance

Strategy focus: Astonishing advances in
information technologies allow presentation of an overwhelming array of data to
human operators and their commanders.
Enhancing the physical, cognitive, and
decision-making capabilities of the human
operator becomes central to successful
military operations.

Flexible: Advances in cyber (Internet,
mobile communications, etc.) and other
technologies allow enemy personnel to
operate without the limitation of state
borders. Management and synthesis of
complex data from multiple sources are
required to track and target enemy personnel effectively.

of smaller strategies all working toward the eventual overall goal of enhanced
human performance. To that end, we can construct a more theoretical guide to
identify, describe, and structure concurrent efforts.
The United States employed two offset strategies during the twentieth century
as means of creating viable and sustainable military deterrents. The First Offset
Strategy developed principles of nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation that,
while effective at the time, were flawed in that they treated the human being as a
necessary liability. Both offset strategies were employed to great effect and maintained a military advantage throughout the latter twentieth century at a minimal
cost. This fiscal component proved vitally important, as the continual buildup of
conventional military forces contributed to the collapse of the Soviet economy,
while the U.S. economy endured.
Unfortunately, the significance of precision weapons in maintaining a military
advantage is dwindling as other nations develop similar technologies. The revolution in communication and information technologies as well as the involvement
of nonstate actors has created challenges never before seen. Additionally, the
advent of fourth-generation warfare and cyber warfare threatens to make Second
Offset technologies less relevant.38 A new offset strategy is required. Although the
Third Offset Strategy remains in its earliest stages of development, central to its
success will be the human operator. Current and future battle spaces will be global and multidimensional, with the only common element across the dimensions
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being the human being. By emphasizing the human element, the Third Offset
Strategy can create an asymmetrical advantage that potential adversaries will be
unable to match. Previous offset strategies limited the human element; the First
Offset Strategy viewed the human operator as a fiscal liability (i.e., maintaining
conventional strength could be considered too expensive compared with maintaining nuclear weapons), and the Second Offset Strategy tried to minimize human error by removing the human from the equation as much as possible.
Now we propose the opposite: to maximize human performance through
emerging technology and new systems, from human-machine combat teaming to
assisted human operations.39 This new offset strategy incorporates distinct roles
for both technological innovation and the human operator, as well as leveraging
the capabilities of both to create an advantage greater than either could achieve
alone.40 To provide platforms for these new capabilities, we propose efforts in
three key areas.
• Cyber initiatives and “big data” can sustain operations in previously denied
environments, process information more quickly than human operators
could, and ensure that the most-reliable and most-accurate information is
delivered to the operator.
• Human-machine teaming will become essential for both operations and
training, but this integration presents a host of new challenges for which
Third Offset Strategy initiatives must prepare.
• Precision selection and training can produce the individual enhancement
and flexibility our future forces will require, and we should build this precision model on the truths embraced by SOFs and using all available tools,
including those being pioneered as part of the precision medicine revolution.
Ultimately, the Third Offset Strategy should take a new tack, one that seeks
to maximize human performance by using new evidence-based technologies to
provide task-specific personnel selection; create individualized, competencydriven training; optimize the operator’s physical, cognitive, emotional, and
decision-making abilities; and augment warfighter capabilities in the field
through well-researched and proven human-machine integration. In short, as
the fundamental framework for a successful Third Offset Strategy, we propose a
Performance Enhancement Triad consisting of cyber initiatives, human-machine
integration, and precision selection/training. Constructing each component of
the triad will require a broad strategic investment in an equally broad array of
technologies. Working across these three domains, the ultimate goal will be the
enhancement of human performance. Although constituting a dramatically different philosophical approach and practical application from the previous offset
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strategies, a focus on human performance may represent a viable, economically
sound method of creating new military advantages over potential adversaries for
the twenty-first century.
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The Knox-Pye-King Board and Naval Professional Education,
1919–23
David Kohnen

E

ducation occurs in many forms within the context of military organizations,
whether during peace or war. Training often reflects the prevailing doctrines,
as prescribed within the hierarchical context of rank-oriented organizations. The
nexus between education and training remains an uncharted area of historical
interest among contemporary military thinkers. As we look beyond the present
to the unexplored frontier of the future, the past may offer some perspective on
the question of professional military education.
Given these broad assertions, this article focuses on the problem of education within the U.S. Navy of the First World War era. In considering the efforts
of Captains Dudley W. Knox and Ernest J. King of a century ago, contemporary
practitioners may recognize familiar trends concerning the future of professional
military education. Throughout their careers of
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particularly at the higher levels of command, as having been fundamentally
unequipped, from an educational perspective, to perform within the context
of the First World War. Broadly, USN officers suffered from ignorance after
being educated by the Naval Academy “only in preparation for the lowest commissioned grade.”1 In making this provocative assertion, Knox and King drew
inspiration from their personal interactions with a variety of ranking officers. In
particular, King and Knox recalled the “salt horse” culture that had prevailed in
their First World War dealings with such figures as Royal Navy (RN) admiral Sir
David Beatty and USN admirals Henry B. Wilson and Hugh Rodman. Reputations centered on questions of seamanship and years of practical experience;
King railed against this in his characterizations of Beatty and with his observation that “Wilson, like Rodman and some other senior officers, distrusted ‘book
learning.’”2 Acting on their assertions, Knox and King collaborated with Pye to
stage an educational revolution from within the middle ranks of the Navy after
the First World War.
Admirals Henry T. Mayo and William S. Sims provided inspiration and bureaucratic “top cover” for their protégés Knox and King. In keeping with the
tribal culture that defined the American naval service at that time, the individuals in question all maintained strong professional connections with each other.
Transcending their initial Naval Academy education, they adopted the prevailing Navy-wide culture that viewed the service more as a fraternal society than a
lifelong vocation.3 During the first fifty years of the twentieth century, American
naval officers demonstrated such commitment that Henry L. Stimson characterized them as being almost religious about their profession. Having served in a
number of presidential administrations (twice as Secretary of War and once as
Secretary of State), Stimson grew to respect the “peculiar psychology of the Navy
Department, which frequently retired from the realm of logic into a dim religious
world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States
Navy the only true church.”4
JUST BELOW THE SURFACE OF NAVAL HISTORY
The problem of education and its underlying strategic importance to the U.S.
Navy was reflected in efforts to define the naval profession. The unresolved fight
over professional education in the Navy of the nineteenth century also defined
the early twentieth-century perspectives of Knox, Pye, and King.5 To place their
perspectives into a historical context: Navies traditionally had required personnel with technical expertise in the sciences, rather than the humanities, for the
practical purposes of operating and maintaining ships. Drawing from the ideas of
British historians such as Sir John Knox Laughton and Spenser Wilkinson, Rear
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Admiral Stephen B. Luce, USN, stirred debate after he established the Naval War
College in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1884.6 His protégé Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan also considered the problem in one of his earliest writings, in 1879. In an
article entitled “Naval Education,” Mahan challenged the prevailing attitude of
the Navy Department bureaucracy, arguing that the historical functions of the sea
services should be considered a national investment.7 He encouraged Americans
to seize a future economic stake in the international context. To this end, Mahan
pressed for the development of a strong merchant marine and a credible navy to
participate in the global maritime arena.8
Historically, navies comprised seagoing practitioners of multiple social backgrounds and cultural identities. In considering the historical and social dimensions of maritime strategy, Mahan warned the U.S. Navy to avoid overemphasizing the “necessarily materialistic character of mechanical science,” which “tends
rather to narrowness and low ideals.”9 He also considered the historical nexus of
peace and war to be an uncharted area of consistent strategic interest for future
historical discussion. By comparison with other navies in the global maritime
arena, the U.S. Navy was among the least remarkable from a technical perspective
in 1890, when Mahan gained international fame with the publication of his The
Influence of Sea Power upon History. Mahan acknowledged technologies as a variable, but he encouraged fellow naval professionals to seek a deeper understanding of the maritime arena. “Nevertheless,” Mahan lamented, his fellow American
naval professionals tended to suffer from a “vague feeling of contempt for the
past, supposed to be obsolete, [that] combine[d] with natural indolence to blind
men even to those permanent strategic lessons which lie close to the surface of
naval history.”10
The culture of the American naval service reflected the scientifically oriented
curriculum of the U.S. Naval Academy. Naval Academy training conditioned
midshipmen to follow the rules, adopt a mathematical approach to solving problems through a “concentration on fractions,” and accept rote doctrinal solutions.
The Naval Academy engineered the development of practitioners to become tactically minded masters of seamanship. Before the First World War, the formulaic
approach of the Naval Academy curriculum fueled a counterproductive culture
within the Navy, beginning when the “average midshipman, reluctant to admit
his ignorance, would stand at the blackboard chewing chalk rather than ask a
question.”11 On graduation, junior practitioners sought to earn reputations for
competence by offering scientifically framed empirical answers in their interactions with the more seasoned, seagoing salt horses among the senior ranks of the
Navy.12 Junior officers refuted their senior-ranking counterparts at their peril,
which tended to stratify further the ranks of the Navy.
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Thus, the Naval Academy indoctrinated graduates to take a mathematical approach to solving abstract problems, and the hierarchical system of bureaucracy
and ranking by lineal seniority governed the culture of the service; however, these
tendencies only somewhat overshadowed the underlying nuances and informality that operated among individual personalities. These group dynamics among
associated individuals that characterized the underlying culture of the service
also influenced the development of professional education in the Navy. William
S. Sims served as one nexus for such informal but important associations.
Having spent thirteen years in Canada in his youth, Sims returned to the United States shortly after the Civil War. In his youth he constantly sought adventure,
avoided working for grades in school, and assumed the nickname “Bloody Bill.”13
He considered pursuing a career as an artist. But as the U.S. Navy went through
a technological transformation from the era of wooden ships and sail to that of
steel and steam, Sims also found inspiration in the progressive vision of the Navy,
which provided opportunities to operate on the cutting edge of technology, and
he successfully sought an appointment to the Naval Academy. He performed
well as a student but poorly as a midshipman, earning a reputation for collecting
demerits. Sims proudly remembered running afoul of one instructor: Lieutenant
Commander Alfred Thayer Mahan. Standing watch on campus, Mahan sternly
punished Sims for being “disorderly on the quarterdeck and disrespectful to the
officer of the deck.”14 Sims nearly failed to meet the requirements for graduation
from the academy, but long before he graduated in 1880 he had earned a reputation within the ranks.
Sims directly participated in a period of revolutionary changes in both technology and American strategy. For him, rank held no great significance in the
pursuit of a shared vision of a U.S. Navy “second to none.”15 Combat experiences
further solidified the unique connections among individuals that characterized
the culture of the American sea services. During the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in
Asiatic waters, Sims became a close mentor to Knox and friendly with King. Beyond their shared interests in naval gunnery and battleship design, Sims enjoyed
discussing esoteric subjects in naval history with Knox and King. Later, as naval
aide to President Theodore Roosevelt, Sims continued nurturing ties with Knox
and King. In particular, Sims frequently traveled from Washington to Annapolis, where he called on King while the latter served as an instructor at the Naval
Academy.
With Sims acting as a common mentor, Knox and King developed a lifelong
friendship that originated in their shared fascination with maritime history. Both
served with Lieutenants Harry E. Yarnell and William S. Pye under Rear Admiral
Hugo W. Osterhaus in the Second Battleship Division of the Atlantic Fleet after
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1909. Knox and King collaborated with Yarnell and Pye in planning gunnery
exercises with the Royal Navy during a cruise to European waters in 1910. At
that time, Commander Sims reported into the Second Battleship Division in
command of the predreadnought USS Minnesota (BB 22).
Junior-ranking personnel frequently gained insight into the higher-ranking
politics of the Navy when they served on fleet staffs. Assignment under Osterhaus in the Atlantic Fleet provided such a perspective for Knox, King, and Pye.
Among other matters, they observed higher-ranking officers discussing the
controversial appointment of Sims to command Minnesota. In 1910, Sims stood
seventieth on a list of 120 officers in the rank of commander; such an assignment
usually was reserved for officers of a higher lineal seniority or of lower seniority in the rank of captain.16 Captain William S. Benson warned Sims to tread
carefully as skipper in Minnesota, as Sims’s connections to Roosevelt clearly had
influenced his assignment. Benson warned Sims that many naval officers thought
that the appointment “established a dangerous precedent of giving battleships to
Commanders.”17 On reporting for duty in Minnesota, Sims met with Osterhaus
and his relief, Rear Admiral Joseph B. Murdock. As the higher commanders set
all the details for the forthcoming cruise to European waters, they gossiped; and
observing from the corners were Knox, King, and Pye.18
Sims nurtured his reputation and carried himself with a cosmopolitan demeanor to attain celebrity status within the service. Beyond his close association
with Roosevelt, Sims had significant political influence through his wife, Anne,
and his father-in-law, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, the American ambassador to the
tsarist court of the Russian Empire. In addition, Sims boasted close friendships
with famous RN personalities, including the First Sea Lord, Sir John A. “Jackie”
Fisher; Captains Sir Percy M. Scott and Sir John R. Jellicoe also counted Sims
among their closest friends.19 The American officer anticipated the development
of a transatlantic relationship between the British Empire and the United States.
In celebrating the unique connection between the two maritime powers during a celebratory dinner at the Guildhall in London in December 1910, Sims
muddled his way into an international controversy. The scope of his remarks went
beyond official American policy, extending to a prospective Anglo-American
alliance. The New York Times characterized the Anglo-American celebrations at
the Guildhall as a “Love Feast.” “Had that speech been made by any other officer
below the rank of Captain in the Atlantic Fleet, except Sims,” one USN officer
suggested to the New York Times, “it’s dollars to doughnuts that no attention
would have been paid to it, but coming from Sims, who despite his rank and
youth is one of the best-known officers in the service, made it different.”20 For
his indiscretion, rivals within the service ensured that Sims was removed from
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command of Minnesota, which resulted in his extended exile away from the fast
track to higher command—as a student at the Naval War College in 1911.21
Sims recognized the assignment to the College as a punitive setback, which
likely carried personal consequences in the fierce competition for higher command among the seagoing ranks of the Navy. But Sims accepted his fate and committed himself to his studies. He soon recognized the broader value of historical
studies, informed debates in a classroom setting, and provocative argument in
written form.
The issue of professional education within the U.S. Navy remained unresolved
by the time Mahan died in 1914 and Luce in 1917. Sims took up their cause, as the
future of the Naval War College seemed bleak—particularly under the administration of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.
“REMAIN CHEERFUL”
Sims’s dashing reputation, coupled with his unique willingness to
buck the system, automatically inspired great respect from many junior officers within the ranks. In particular, Knox considered Sims
to be the “model of an American naval officer.”22 Personal correspondence between Sims and King also reflected a close friendship,
although King disingenuously recalled in his memoirs that he “was
never one of the group of Sims’s devoted disciples and followers.”23
As the First World War raged in Europe and Asia, Sims secured
orders to command the then-named Atlantic Fleet Destroyer and
Captain Dudley W. Knox, USN.
Torpedo Boat Flotilla in 1914. In this role, Sims employed Naval War
U.S. Navy photograph, courtesy North
College methods to inspire subordinate protégés to carry forward
Sturtevant
the cause of educating other seagoing practitioners of the Navy.
Pulling every bureaucratic string, Sims circumvented the Navy Department’s
detailing processes to arrange orders for a very select team of junior officers to
serve under his command in the flotilla. In particular, he pulled Knox from service in the tender USS Dixie (AD 1) and King from his assignment as skipper of
USS Terry (DD 25). In this role, King fell under the immediate operational command of Commodore Henry T. Mayo during the conduct of convoy-escort duties
in support of operations against the Mexican insurgency off Veracruz. Sims asked
King to leave command of Terry, with the enticement of “coming to the flotilla
to lend us a hand in the schemes we are trying to develop.”24 Sims sweetened the
proposal by offering King command of USS Cassin (DD 43). With Sims assuming
the Nelsonian role of senior mentor among equals, Knox and King assumed their
roles in the flotilla—the “band of brothers.”25
Service in the “Sims flotilla” inspired strategic connections among key personalities as the U.S. Navy carried out the transformation of its fleet from one
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dominated by coal-burning battleships to one of oil-powered warships of various
types and specialized capabilities. Among others on Sims’s flotilla staff, Commanders William V. Pratt, Joel R. P. Pringle, and Harry Yarnell helped foster
close bonds among the individual destroyer skippers, including Lieutenant Commanders Harold R. Stark, William F. “Bill” Halsey Jr., and Joseph K. Taussig.26 In
their personal correspondence, veterans of the Sims destroyer flotilla tended to
use the phrase “remain cheerful” as their parting salutation, denoting their mutual membership in a unique fraternity within the ranks of the Navy.27
Sims inspired subordinates to focus on a common vision and work together
as a team. He issued mandatory reading lists for his skippers to enable them to
participate in open wardroom discussions, whether on topics in naval history,
including reconstructions of past battles, or the testing of their current theories
during tabletop wargames. Sims referred to the atmosphere established among
the officers in the flotilla as a “War College afloat.”28 Through such open discussions, Sims and his staff developed totally new tactics for maneuvering destroyers in unison, using a wireless communications system of fewer than thirty-one
words.29 The cost savings resulting from conducting the developmental tests with
destroyers rather than the larger battleships enabled Sims and his men to pioneer
new tactics that could be applied to larger
fleet operations.
In the process, Sims himself transformed
from being a seagoing salt horse into a zealot
for the Naval War College brand of professional education. Such commitment to this
cause put him out of step with the political
agenda of Navy Secretary Daniels; Sims’s
relationship and dealings with Admiral
William S. Benson as the first Chief of Naval
Operations also remained tenuous. Given
the costs involved with maintaining a separate Naval War College, Daniels and Benson
judged the institution’s curriculum to be sufficiently analogous to that of the Army War
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Given the
pressures of balancing budgets and political
horse trading within Congress, Daniels and
Benson endorsed the idea of a unified Army
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy (left), and Admiral William S. Benson,
and Navy war college, which could be estabChief of Naval Operations (right).
lished closer to the capital.30
Naval History and Heritage Command
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For Sims the idea of closing the Naval War College seemed outrageous, as
the U.S. Navy stood on the brink of potential involvement in the global conflict
already raging among the empires of Europe and Asia. He considered the fundamental differences between armies and navies so profound that the “Naval War
College should be made one of the principal assets of the Naval Service.”31 Against
the overarching emphasis that Daniels and Benson placed on the maintenance
of seagoing forces, Sims argued for the potential necessity of placing warships
“out of commission in order to avoid decreasing the efficiency of the education
of our officers.”32 Sims challenged fellow naval professionals to recognize the
strategic advantages to be derived from supporting the educational mission of
the Naval War College. With a clear purpose in mind, Sims articulated his points
in an article published in the Naval Institute Proceedings in mid-1916 under the
provocative title “Cheer Up!! There Is No Naval War College.”
In the article, Sims cited complaints from some within the seagoing ranks that
many of their colleagues needed a “dictionary to tell them the meaning of the
commonest terms.” Sims chastised critics of the Naval War College, suggesting
that they suffered from “wholly unpardonable ignorance,” then broadened his
charge: “When I went to the college . . . the service was very generally ignorant
of its purposes and the practical value of its teachings.” He deplored the failure
of many officers to understand “its vital importance to the efficient conduct of
our fleet.”33
Sims stated that he wished to “make plain that he [was] a thorough and enthusiastic advocate of the college.” The article characterized the Naval War College as
an educational forum wherein practitioners enjoyed freedom of discussion. Sims
offered the seemingly counterintuitive argument that there was
no War College, as the term “college” is usually understood. There is no president or
corps of professors who remain during life and good behavior and whose duty it is to
impose their conclusions upon the pupils. . . . [The] assemblage of officers is practically a board convened each year for the purpose of determining the best manner of
conducting naval warfare with vessels and weapons of ever-changing characteristics.
The staff of the college, generally fresh from the fleet and a course at the college,
presents the accepted principles of war, and the accepted manner of writing orders,
issues the rules of the war games to be played, and helps the pupils play them.34

After their interactions with officers of higher rank, Knox and King frequently
compared notes about their discussions of organizational and naval leadership.
Reflecting on his personal experiences, King noted that “Captain Sims himself
was an officer of extraordinary energy, but given to speaking with exaggeration”;
he observed that, for Sims, “all matters were clear white or dead black.” Although
King claimed to be less committed, Knox remained cheerfully associated with
Sims throughout the First World War and beyond. As head of the Planning
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Admiral Henry T. Mayo with Atlantic Fleet staff. Mayo’s chief of staff, Captain Ernest J. King, is at far left; his fleet intelligence officer, Commander William
S. Pye, is third from left, on the steps behind Mayo.
U.S. Navy photograph

Section in USN Headquarters in Europe, Knox frequently collaborated with
King and Pye, both of whom served on the seagoing staff of Admiral Henry T.
Mayo, the wartime commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. Characterizing his
mentors, King thought that “Sims was flighty, Osterhaus steady, and Mayo was
the man for me.”35
Debates surrounding the practical functions of the Naval War College and
the role of higher education raged in the seagoing wardrooms and officers clubs
ashore, even as the U.S. Navy sailed over the horizon to participate in the first war
requiring American forces to operate within a strategic context of multinational
operations in foreign waters. Having assumed the presidency of the Naval War
College in the rank of captain in February 1917, Sims within weeks became commander of USN forces in Europe—largely by accident.36 By June, he was serving
in the temporary wartime rank of vice admiral (three stars). Yet Sims lacked a
clear prerogative to assert control over the warships now participating in ongoing
operations; instead they fell under the immediate command of his lineal senior
in rank, Mayo of the Atlantic Fleet.37
Nonetheless, Mayo and Sims collaborated in developing American naval
strategy by pioneering organizational means to harness the advantages of wireless
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communications and to enable naval
headquarters ashore to orchestrate the
interactions of operations and intelligence. To their great credit, Mayo and
Sims unified their collective strategic
efforts, empowering their immediate
subordinates to act with their authority
in planning multinational strategy, making recommendations governing USN
tactical forces in European waters, and
executing operational decisions. Relying
on their previous associations with those
who were now their subordinates, Mayo
and Sims empowered them to overcome
problems of command organization.
From within the “London Flagship”
headquarters, Sims authorized Knox
to work with King and Pye in mobilizing the forces of Mayo and the Atlantic
Vice Admiral William S. Sims, USN, as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe
during World War I.
Fleet. However, while Mayo and Sims
U.S. Navy photograph, courtesy Dr. Nathaniel Sims
established a great rapport, subordinate
Atlantic Fleet commanders such as Wilson and Rodman frequently challenged
Sims’s authority, which just as frequently required Mayo to promulgate directives
to enforce those of Sims.38
In dealings with foreign allies, the U.S. Navy suffered from intramural fighting
among its various disjointed commands. The parochialism and patriarchalism
within USN culture ultimately convinced Mayo to sign a memorandum concerning the Atlantic Fleet staff that had been drafted by Captains King and Donald
C. Bingham, with assistance from Commander Pye, under the title “Education
and Training of Officers for Staff Duty.”39 On February 20, 1919, in one of his last
acts as Atlantic Fleet commander, Mayo submitted the recommendations to the
Bureau of Navigation in Washington.
“Officers assigned to ‘staff duty’ should,” Mayo argued, have the “same viewpoint and perspective as that to which flag officers . . . have attained by reason of
their study, training, and long experience throughout their careers in the service.”
Mayo criticized the prevailing system of educating officers to master tactical
doctrines and technical functions governing shipboard routines rather than
subjects focused on higher strategic levels. He observed that the Navy suffered
from the “present lack of arrangements for the education and training of officers
for ‘staff duty.’” Mayo endorsed the Naval War College approach, arguing that the
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curriculum represented a prerequisite for
practitioners to succeed at higher levels
of command. He noted that the College’s
curriculum was “generally reserved for
the instruction of higher ranking officers”; as a result, the Naval War College
lacked “facilities of sufficient general
scope for the education and training of
officers for ‘staff duty.’”40
Mayo returned from the First World
War determined to address the fundamental problem of education within the
U.S. Navy. In 1919, he accepted reduction
from four- to two-star rank and a sunset advisory assignment to the General
Board of the Navy. He also arranged orders for his protégé King to assume command of the Naval Postgraduate School
at the Naval Academy in Annapolis.
After reporting for duty on May 1, King
Admiral William S. Sims with Admiral Henry T. Mayo in 1918.
U.S. Navy photograph
immediately lobbied the Navy Department for an expanded budget and additional personnel for the school.41
EDUCATION BEFORE THE MAST
The special bond among American naval practitioners influenced the development of professional identity within the Navy. Within the structured culture
of the naval service, sailors all stood essentially equal in the unique context of
shipboard life at sea. Skippers traditionally took responsibility for nurturing their
subordinates so that eventually they would earn commands of their own.
Seagoing experience prevailed in establishing reputations for higher command within the ranks of the Navy. Mayo and Sims stood out as advocates for
professional education among the salt-horse culture that persisted after the
First World War among the members of the elder generation of practitioners.
By contrast, their contemporaries in rank—particularly Benson, Rodman, and
Wilson—resisted challenges to the status quo. “The opinion has been generally
held in the Navy,” King noted, that the “only way to learn things is to do them,”
whereas “[b]ook learning [and] abstract knowledge is like fertilizer,” he observed;
it “does not of itself produce anything, but it stimulates growth and advance when
the live seed [of] practical experience is instilled into the soil.”42
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Wartime experiences inspired King to enter the fray in efforts to establish
higher professional education standards in the U.S. Navy. He first broadened the
Naval Postgraduate School curriculum, focusing on the mission of preparing
student practitioners for assignment to receive graduate education at civilian
universities. He fostered partnerships between the school and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Harvard, Columbia, Northwestern, the University of
Chicago, and the state universities of Iowa, Wisconsin, and Michigan. King developed the curriculum to focus on transcendent concepts of permanent value
rather than empirically framed staff school solutions. King assumed the function
of teacher, rather than examiner, at the school. His approach contrasted with the
traditional culture of military discipline that prevailed on “the Yard” at the Naval
Academy. In the spring of 1919, King solicited assistance from his mentors Mayo
and Sims.
While peace negotiations dragged on at Versailles, outside Paris, after the
armistice, USN forces demobilized from wartime operations and returned to
American waters. But in wartime propaganda Sims had attained heroic status as
the personality most associated with victory in the First World War and international fame as the widely mythologized personification of the spirit of future
Anglo-American collaboration. With Sims having been promoted from captain
in 1917 to four-star admiral by 1919, it appeared politically inevitable that he
would remain in four-star rank as Chief of Naval Operations.
However, after the American declaration of war Sims had performed his wartime service in a temporary status, so technically he remained in his permanent
assignment as President of the Naval War College. And over drinks with his
friend Knox in Paris in January 1919 Sims learned about the Navy Department’s
plans to proceed with the disestablishment of the separate Army and Navy War
Colleges; Captain William V. Pratt had written to Knox earlier about the plans
of Navy Secretary Daniels and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker to establish a
consolidated war college in Washington, DC. With this most recent news, Sims
requested immediate orders to return to the Naval War College. In the course
of his reassignment, he accepted demotion from his temporary wartime rank of
four stars to a permanent peacetime rank of two stars.43
Sims recruited his protégé Knox and his former intelligence officer in London,
Lieutenant Tracy Barrett Kittredge, to join the faculty of the College. Sharing
similar concerns about the future of professional education within the Navy, Sims
and Knox developed a strategy to save the Naval War College. Sims also worked
through the good offices of King at the Postgraduate School and Mayo on the
General Board in Washington. Together, they drew from the model that Sir Julian
Corbett had designed at the Admiralty in London, wherein historically trained
analysts associated with the Historical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division
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examined issues of contemporary importance to the
RN staff. In June, Sims empowered Knox and Kittredge
to organize at the Naval War College an analogous subdivision known as the Historical Section. The section’s
immediate charter was to synthesize analytical requirements supporting the higher educational mission
to align with those of the Operations Navy (OpNav)
planning staff in Washington.
Rather than proffering overt challenges to the authority of Daniels or the Navy Department, Mayo and
Sims worked outside the General Board and the Naval
War College—through their protégés. Mayo and Sims
empowered these more junior officers to incite a bureaucratic revolution from below. Mayo acted through
King at the Postgraduate School in Annapolis to initiate actions, which provided the pretext for Sims in his
turn to initiate a study of the problem of education.44
Knox, the Naval War College chief of staff, recomLieutenant Tracy Barrett Kittredge, USNR.
mended the establishment of a board to study the critiCourtesy Branden Little
cal issues and offer recommendations for future action.
King subsequently shared Knox’s recommendations with the superintendent of
the Naval Academy, Rear Admiral Archibald H. Scales.45 In turn, Scales endorsed
the idea of organizing a board to examine the issues, offer findings, and provide
a strategy for professional education.46
This methodology granted Mayo and Sims bureaucratic immunity, as it was
Knox and King who influenced Scales to endorse a recommendation to the
Bureau of Navigation to establish a board consisting of Naval War College and
Naval Postgraduate School personnel to study the strategic problem of professional education. Knox worked the ropes with other members of the Naval
War College faculty while King and Pye gathered evidence to substantiate their
arguments.
In particular, King drew inspiration from the works of Professor Edgar James
Swift of Washington University in Saint Louis, Missouri. King would use Swift
and his 1918 book, Psychology and the Day’s Work: A Study in the Application of
Psychology to Daily Life, as tools in the longer battle for educational reform in
the Navy. King invited Swift to lecture at the Postgraduate School and influenced
Sims to sponsor Swift on a regular basis as a visiting lecturer at the Naval War
College. Swift offered a critical argument that not “until facts have been accumulated and ordered are suggestions that are worth while likely to appear.” He
maintained that “[k]nowledge gives the raw material for solving problems, but in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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addition to knowledge there must be a sensitive, open mind anxious to see things
as they are, instead of as we should wish them to be.”47
Meanwhile, the bureaucratic wheels of the Navy Department churned blindly
among the various bureaus. Since the establishment of the Navy Department in
1794, whenever the seagoing forces navigated the uncharted waters in the nexus
between peace and war, the department had followed a sustained administrative course fueled by politics and mediocrity. Having muddled through the First
World War, the Navy Department bureaucracy under Secretary Daniels settled
back into its traditional peacetime routines.
Before the First World War, Daniels had used naval education as a means to
amalgamate immigrants and the lower economic classes, encouraging them to
embrace their identity as American citizens. As part of shaping the future in
general, he considered the U.S. Navy an ideal platform to advance the broader
military policy of the United States. “It is my ambition to make the Navy a great
university,” Daniels reported, “with college extensions afloat and ashore.” He suggested that every warship “should be a school . . . [and] every enlisted man and
petty and warrant officer should receive the opportunity to improve his mind,
better his position, and fit himself for promotion.”48
Although Daniels somewhat shared Sims’s vision about the role of education,
their opinions on civil-military relations proved radically different. Daniels worried that Navy professionals might use education as a means to undermine traditional American civil-military ideals. He wanted the Navy to support education
to create American citizens, rather than merely to satisfy the applied purposes
of military or naval practitioners.49 Given these concerns, Daniels endorsed the
recommendation by the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Thomas
Washington, to organize a board comprising Knox, King, and Pye to examine the
question.
Traveling between Newport and Annapolis during the summer of 1919, Knox,
King, and Pye gathered their evidence. Knox later recalled the moment when
their report came together at King’s hand, explaining that while Knox “was theoretically the senior member . . . and many ideas were contributed by Pye,”
the principal man was King. After much deliberation, King suggested that we write
the report. King sat down at a desk and wrote that report in the course of perhaps a
day. Scarcely any change [was] made from [the] preliminary draft. He wrote it and
followed the details through in his logical way. The report came out of King’s head
primarily. There was a great deal of ground work by Pye, but the stringing together
and the argument that you make in such cases was all King’s. No one without outstanding ability could have done what he did there.50

King attempted to frame the board’s findings in objective, empirical terms
within a thirty-one-page treatise that bore the awkward title “Report and
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Sims with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the Navy Department in 1920.
U.S. Navy photograph

Recommendations of a Board Appointed by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding
the Instruction and Training of Line Officers.” The authors formally submitted
their findings to the Bureau of Navigation on October 16, 1919.
The original, typewritten report circulated among the various bureaus of the
Navy Department. While Admiral Washington acknowledged receipt of the report with thanks to Knox, King, and Pye, he considered their recommendations
impractical because they would have required the Navy Department to sustain
a forty-year strategy for educating individual naval practitioners throughout
their careers. He declared that inadequate bureaucratic and budgetary resources
to maintain educational programs ashore, amplified by the shortage of officer
personnel for service afloat, prevented the Bureau of Navigation from acting on
the board’s recommendations. Washington effectively suppressed the report; the
original vanished into the black hole of the Navy Department bureaucracy after
its last reported sighting in April 1920.51
Undeterred by the report’s purported loss, Knox and King conspired to force
the Navy Department to address the strategic problem of education within the
service. Acting with the confidence of their convictions, Knox and King launched
a bureaucratic revolution from below, within the ranks of the service. Six years
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Original signatures from K-P-K Report of 1919.
Library of Congress

earlier, on the advice of Sims and Knox, King had accepted the voluntary position
of secretary-treasurer of the Naval Institute. In this role, he edited and reviewed
articles in the institute’s professional journal Proceedings. Thus, King’s position
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was one of significant influence. Following the disappearance of the board’s original report to the Bureau of Navigation, King used a duplicate copy to arrange the
report’s publication in the Proceedings issue of August 1920.52 King later admitted
to “arranging” the publication of the report. In the published version, King added
the caveat “Published by permission of the Navy Department for the information
of the service. The Report of the Board has been approved, but the shortage of officers will not permit the recommendations to be carried into effect at present.”53
With some editorial adjustments, the published version in Proceedings reflected the original narrative of the typewritten original. Even though he was the
report’s primary author, King claimed no immediate responsibility for its publication; the article appeared in Proceedings without any attribution to authors.
Even so, the report would become widely known within the Navy as that of the
Knox-Pye-King Board, or K-P-K Board.54
In the article, the supplemental recommendations to the Navy Department
to take action on the question of education appeared in starkly framed prose.
Between the lines of the article’s narrative, the K-P-K Board railed against the
problems of bureaucracy, the dogmatic deference to doctrine among service
practitioners, and the coercive intent and power of orthodoxy in the education
of USN professionals.55 By its construction in two sections, the article makes the
assertions in the original report resonate more sharply.56 Unlike the published
Proceedings variation, the signed original reads like an indictment against the
bureaucratic culture of the Navy.
Given the timing of the article and Sims’s close association with the authors of
the K-P-K Board report, Secretary Daniels associated such criticisms with Sims.
In effect, Sims was daring Daniels to ignore the findings and recommendations
of the K-P-K Board—and the oily politician Daniels disliked the watery practitioner Sims for challenging the policies of the Navy Department. The ensuing
bureaucratic duels between Daniels and Sims became infamous, inspiring formal
congressional inquiries and embarrassing the Navy Department—but remained
a persistent influence on the development of the U.S. Navy.
The rivalry between Daniels and Sims must be considered when placing the
K-P-K Board report into the broader context of historical discussions concerning the still unresolved historical question of professional education and the U.S.
Navy. Notwithstanding that, the findings of the K-P-K Board defined a progressive vision of professional education. Publication of the report achieved the
K-P-K Board’s design: it sparked heated debate within the tribal culture of the
Navy about that progressive vision. Lines of division became clear as the debate
on naval education stratified relations between policy makers such as Secretary
Daniels and practitioners such as Admirals Mayo and Sims.
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Sims and the Naval War College class of 1923. Future Chiefs of Naval Operations Commander Chester W. Nimitz and Commander Harold R. Stark are at
fourth row, center, no. 54, and third row, fourth from left, no. 36, respectively.
Naval War College photograph

Ultimately, the K-P-K Board offered a coldly honest portrayal of fellow naval
professionals as being insufficiently prepared for the broad spectrum of challenges facing the naval profession. For those serving at the lowest levels to the
highest levels of command, the K-P-K Board provided a lasting warning against
allowing the U.S. Navy to sail under the command of officers who were “‘educated’ only to the lowest commissioned grade.” The solution to this fundamental
problem actually preceded the original setting out of the question, as Mayo and
Sims worked through Knox and King in a roundabout strategy to first acknowledge the problem of ignorance before addressing the transcendent question of
professional education within the Navy.
One emphasis in the report was a requirement for officers to attend the Naval
War College twice in their careers. The authors of the report led that charge;
for example, King completed the College’s correspondence course in 1924, then
graduated from the residence course in 1933. Among others, the K-P-K Board
directly influenced the Naval War College studies of future admirals Thomas
Hart, Harold Stark, Harry Yarnell, Edward C. Kalbfus, and Chester W. Nimitz.
With King orchestrating Anglo-American combined strategy and simulta
neously supervising U.S. naval operations on an unprecedented global scale after
1941, Knox attained one-star rank as a commodore while organizing the Office
of Naval History. In 1943, Knox and King again joined forces with the President
of the Naval War College, Pye, to revisit the question of professional education
in the U.S. Navy. Twenty-five years after the original K-P-K Report, Knox and
King contributed to the recommendations found in the “Pye Board” Report of
1944, which influenced combined and joint professional education into the Cold
War era.57
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By attacking the problem of education openly and without deference to
higher-ranking personalities or bureaucratic protocols, the K-P-K Board helped
place the U.S. Navy on the course that would educate the personnel who would
secure the strategic victories of the Second World War. Pursuant to the vision of
ensuring an American “navy second to none,” the K-P-K Board report remains a
critical foundation to establishing the fundamental role that higher professional
education has played in framing the future strategy of the U.S. Navy into the
twenty-first century and beyond.
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REVIEW ESSAY

in pursuit of a disappearing paradigm

Martin N. Murphy

U.S. Naval Strategy and National Security: The Evolution of
American Maritime Power, by Sebastian Bruns. London: Routledge, 2018. 270 pages. $155.

The past quarter century has not been a happy one for the U.S. Navy. It has been
a period of almost continuous contraction: of budgets, ships, manpower, bases,
influence—at sea and in Washington—and military superiority. The Navy has
been forced to watch the rise of China to a position of near equivalence and the
return of Russia from near death. It has been humiliated by ship collisions that
were brought about by sacrificing operational standards in an attempt to maintain its can-do reputation. It has become the service that must “just say no” if it
is to stay afloat.
The Navy has been through periods before when it was understood poorly
and undervalued: the treaty years in the 1920s, the era of massive retaliation in
the 1950s, and during and after the Vietnam War. In each case it was saved by
national policy changes, first under President Franklin Roosevelt, who viewed
naval construction as part of the New Deal; second, under President Kennedy,
whose turn to flexible response released the surface navy from its deterrence
responsibilities, allowing it to resume its sea-control mission; and third, under
President Reagan, who adopted the Maritime Strategy. Since then the Navy has
been wandering in the strategic wilderness, findMartin N. Murphy is a research fellow at the Corbett
ing it difficult—indeed, almost impossible—to
Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College
London and an associate fellow of the Royal United
rediscover its voice as it searches for the formula
Services Institute.
that will return it to its rightful place in the defense
Naval War College Review, Summer 2018, Vol. 71, No. 3
firmament.
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The story of that search is the subject of this book. Its author, Sebastian Bruns,
serves as head of the Center for Maritime Strategy and Security at the University
of Kiel, Germany; is the coeditor of the recently published Routledge Handbook
of Naval Strategy and Security; and has served his time on Capitol Hill. His book
covers the trials and tribulations of this period with an almost forensic eye, placing each of the numerous relevant capstone documents—starting with the hopefully entitled “The Way Ahead” in 1991—in its political and operational setting
before examining its evolution and resulting strategic concept.
Pointing a finger at what has gone wrong is not difficult. Since the end of the
Cold War, the Navy for the most part has suffered from a lack of leadership at
its most senior level. Admittedly, leading the Navy in an era when the nation’s
leaders stumbled from one misjudgment to the next cannot have been easy. Furthermore, the Cold War–era Goldwater-Nichols measures subordinated each of
the service chiefs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and relieved them of
responsibility for strategy. As Bruns writes, it was the Navy—whose strategy lies
uniquely between the political and operational levels—that was affected most.
Making matters more difficult was that the seemingly interminable and debilitating land wars in Asia placed the focus squarely on the Army and Marine
Corps, and to a considerable degree the Air Force, but not the Navy, save for the
thousands of bluejackets who were sent to serve in the dusty wastes of Afghanistan and Iraq. Not that service ashore for sailors is unusual; it was the regular fate
of their Royal Navy predecessors in the nineteenth century to fight and die beside
their army colleagues in defense of the empire. What the Royal Navy of that era
did not suffer, however, was seeing its capacities and capabilities worn down by
the need to pay for these wars, as the U.S. Navy’s were worn down to pay for the
war in Vietnam, and as they have been more recently as well.
Can the Navy rebuild itself now as it did after the Vietnam conflict and the
hostile interlude of the Carter years? On its current course, and given the prevailing bureaucratic realities of the defense establishment, this appears unlikely. The
Maritime Strategy came about thanks to an unusually fortuitous alignment of
factors: first, a sympathetic national policy, in this case the determination of the
Reagan administration not merely to contain Communism but to defeat it; and
second, an exploitable enemy weakness, in this case the surprise discovery that
the Soviet navy prioritized protection of its High North submarine bastions over
attacks on Atlantic convoys. The combination meant that the U.S. Navy could
build on a range of thought lines—of which Admiral Thomas B. Hayward’s earlier
Sea Strike initiative was probably the most influential—to go on the offensive,
pursuing a carrier-based plan of attack that accorded with the Navy’s own view
of itself as a warrior community built for the big—and global—fight. As Bruns
recounts, the Navy was willing to accept enormous strategic and operational risks
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to make that happen; in particular, its conviction that global conventional war
would not turn nuclear, although based on intelligence of Soviet nuclear policy,
must be open to question.
Bruns describes the outpouring of purposeful naval thinking that accompanied the Maritime Strategy as a “renaissance.” With it, the Navy achieved its
Cold War “zenith.” It was certainly close to a revival. The Maritime Strategy was,
Bruns writes, “a product of its 1970s context,” embracing the missions, concepts,
and practices that were already on the shelf and matching them with the Reagan
administration’s newly assertive national security strategy and with the plans and
operational requirements of regional commanders. It succeeded not because it
was innovative but because it fitted with what the Navy wanted to do. It reached
back to Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman’s immediate post–World War II plan
for “at source” attacks on Soviet naval bases and infrastructure and, beyond that,
to the Navy’s successful Pacific War campaign against Japan. It fitted perfectly
with the American way of warfare, which prefers decisive battle over patient
persistence.
The post–Cold War world proved to be very different from what had gone
before. It may have been a “new world order,” as President George H. W. Bush
put it, but the order to which he referred remained elusive. In this new context,
innovative thinking was required, and the Navy responded—even though, too
often, good ideas that appeared in the formative stages of strategy formulation
never made the final cut.
Bruns’s survey of the strategic vision pieces that have followed the Maritime
Strategy, however, reveals a service divided among competing schools of naval
and maritime thought. The result is that none of the strategic vision pieces the
Navy has published since 1990 have come close to winning support at a level
similar to that achieved by their 1980s predecessor, and most have gained none
at all. The Maritime Strategy may have been disputed, criticized, and disparaged,
but it nonetheless succeeded in uniting the Navy Department, the White House,
and Congress behind a single vision.
When the Navy did advance a radically different exposition of its role, a decade
and a half later, in “A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-First Century Seapower”
(CS21), it failed to gain enough traction within the Navy and on the Hill to survive the political and economic fallout of the 2008 financial crisis. CS21 argued
that in the post–Cold War world it would be by defending the institutional, systemic dimension of sea power that the Navy would be restored to relevance, and it
elevated war prevention to the same level as war winning; in doing so, it sidelined
all the strategic concepts that had been formulated since the Maritime Strategy.
Unfortunately, the message of CS21 failed to inspire a service that viewed the
Maritime Strategy as the zenith of its conceptual accomplishments.
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Bruns’s book demands to be read. It reaches no conclusions about which direction is right for the Navy—that is for readers to decide. What he does make plain
is that only a “strategy addressing political ends in naval warfare can be assured
some impact.” Both the Maritime Strategy and CS21 did that, but from sharply
different perspectives.
The sea’s strategic and economic importance is increasing at a time when the
nations intent on challenging the U.S. Navy are gaining in confidence, competence, and strength. To be able to counter them effectively, it is vital that the Navy
finds again the clear, united, and distinctive voice that has commanded attention
in the past, but one that this time puts past triumphs behind it, reflects the realities of our changing world, and addresses the complex of military and nonmilitary challenges its competitors present. Now is the time for strategic imagination,
for the creation of a strategy that transcends the narrow confines of shipboard life
and engages with the political as well as the military realities that are emerging
in the twenty-first century.
All USN officers, joint commanders, and national policy makers who are conscious of the sea’s continuing importance, genuinely concerned about the decline
of the Navy, and fearful for the service’s future need to read this book and absorb
its lessons.
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BOOK REVIEWS

FAILURES AND SUCCESSES
Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post–Cold War Era, by Michael Mandelbaum. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2016. 485 pages. $29.95.

“You Americans are so naive” is one
of the opening quotes that Michael
Mandelbaum uses to introduce Mission
Failure (p. vi). The quotation does
not come, as one might expect, from
a foreign world leader, but from Steve
Martin on Saturday Night Live. Thus,
one sees from the first Mandelbaum’s
objective: to narrate and explain U.S.
foreign policy from 1991 to 2014
in a way that can be understood by
interested general readers who might
recognize Martin more than they would
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (the
source of another opening quotation).
In the backdrop of this narrative is the
theme of the failure of humanitarian
interventionism—the inclination to
intervene in world affairs to promote
values rather than for direct selfinterests—to achieve meaningful results.
Mandelbaum describes his intent for the
book rather accurately: “Together the
chapters tell the story of good, sometimes noble, and thoroughly American
intentions coming up against the deeply
embedded, often harsh, and profoundly
un-American realities of places far from
the United States. In this encounter
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the realities prevailed” (p. 13). In his
perspective, post–Cold War American
decision makers viewed the world
through a distorted lens that only their
country’s enormous relative power made
possible. This distorted view caused
them to believe that democratic values
and human rights could be exported
by interventions using armed force.
Mandelbaum describes this as “missionary work” transferred from the religious
to the political sphere, and links it to the
same impulse that established the Peace
Corps. He then begins a general historical narrative of American relations with
Russia and China, humanitarian
interventions from Somalia to Kosovo,
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
the Arab-Israeli conflict, all during the
1991–2014 period. In his final chapter,
entitled “Restoration,” he argues that
the rise of Chinese economic power
and the reemergence of Russia have
put an end to the post–Cold War
world; the United States no longer
has the power to attempt to make
changes in other political cultures.
To illustrate the enormous relative power
that America held at the beginning
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of this period, Mandelbaum starts his
introduction with the surrender of the
Iraqi army to General Norman Schwarz
kopf and the other coalition military
leaders on March 3, 1991. The author
maintains that, up to then, America’s
latent desire to educate the world on the
benefits of democracy and human rights
had been held in check only by the existence of powerful rivals—specifically,
one powerful rival: the Soviet Union.
Suddenly, with that entity collapsed,
China apparently quiescent, and the U.S.
armed forces having demonstrated their
absolute military dominance on (what
was considered) the modern battlefield,
American political and social leaders
could indulge themselves in doing what
they perceived to be in the interest of
the collective global good. The United
States “chose to spend some of its vast
reserves of power on the geopolitical
equivalent of luxury items: the remaking
of other countries” (p. 7). The difference from previous eras was that now
the United States became involved in
crises in which it had no direct national
interest—crises that, no matter their
result, would have little if any impact on
American freedom or prosperity. The
outcome, according to Mandelbaum,
has been “mission failure,” given that
much of the world has different cultural
values concerning the “good” and that
the results have been temporary or they
have let loose more destructive forces.
Mandelbaum postulates that the crossover point at which the aim of American
foreign policy changed from achieving
national interests to performing
“missionary work” occurred between the
administrations of George H. W. Bush
and Bill Clinton. He sees the subsequent
actions of Clinton, George W. Bush, and
Barack Obama as a foreign policy of
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continuing humanitarian intervention
(albeit with differing degrees of overt
force), with a shared goal of relieving human suffering and exporting democracy.
Mandelbaum identifies the expansion
of NATO—an action that President
George H. W. Bush promised the
Russians would not occur—as the most
catastrophic of mistakes. Against the
advice of concerned experts, President
Clinton promoted NATO expansion,
believing that it would solidify democratic governance throughout Europe
without alienating a Russia assumed
to have adopted democratic capitalism
permanently. The decision “squandered
. . . much of the windfall that had come
to the United States as the result of the
way the Cold War had ended. . . . It did
this in return for no gain at all, making
NATO expansion one of the greatest
blunders in the history of American
foreign policy” (p. 69). The author identifies other mistaken actions (such as the
Iraq War) and skewers some inept policy
makers along the way (Secretaries of
State Warren Christopher and Madeleine
Albright are particular targets), but the
alienation of Russia—which facilitated
that country’s return to internal
authoritarianism—was the factor that
ultimately ended hopes for a “new world
order.”
Mandelbaum, professor of American
foreign policy at the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins, maintains
a solid and comfortable—if relatively
uninspiring—writing style, making his
argument in measured terms. As in his
other recent books, he aims at a broad
audience. He gives no indications, however, that his previous work—such as his
collaboration with journalist Thomas
L. Friedman, the most successful
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troubadour of globalization—argued for
a spirit of liberal internationalism that
leads logically to efforts at humanitarian
intervention. To Mandelbaum, the
apparent difference between liberal
internationalism and the humanitarianinterventionist approach that some U.S.
presidents have chosen is that the United
States decided to use its resources to rescue people (metaphorically) rather than
to concentrate on defending the global
system of economic liberalism. However,
how one “defends a system” without
intervening in particular crises within
that system remains rather unclear.
Liberal internationalism supposedly is
an antidote to great-power politics, but
ultimately Mandelbaum concludes that
America’s failure at preserving its beneficial role in the international system (and
its interests) was the result of not paying
most of its attention to, and sometimes
accommodating, the reemerging
great powers. The “malign effects” of
an angry Russia and a contemptuous
China, Mandelbaum writes on his final
page, “will be felt long after the failed
missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
Kosovo, and even Afghanistan and Iraq
ha[ve] faded from memory” (p. 381).
SAM J. TANGREDI

The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships
in Counter-Insurgency, by Walter C. Ladwig III.
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017. 360
pages. $34.99 (paperback).

The advent of a new U.S. presidential
administration has resulted in a series
of new defense guidance and strategy
documents—ranging from the National
Security Strategy to the National Defense
Strategy and the Nuclear Posture
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Review—all of which have placed a
clear emphasis on the risks posed
by the recrudescence of great-power
rivalry. The National Defense Strategy,
in particular, garnered praise from the
national security commentariat for
its terse declaration that great-power
competition, rather than terrorism,
now constituted “the primary focus of
U.S. national security.” Indeed, for an
American public increasingly weary of
costly and protracted counterinsurgency
(COIN) campaigns in the Middle East,
there was something inherently appealing about this apparent reordering
of American defense priorities.
Unfortunately, however, events over the
past year have demonstrated repeatedly
that this much-touted focal rearrangement is not something that simply can
be wished into existence. Indeed, despite
running on a platform promising greater
disengagement from the Middle East,
President Trump has found himself
compelled to deploy ever more soldiers
to Afghanistan and the Levant. Meanwhile, cabinet officials have suggested
that Washington may need to maintain
an open-ended military presence in
Syria, partly as a means of countering
growing Iranian influence. Last but not
least, the deadly ambush of a unit of U.S.
special operations forces (SOFs) in the
deserts of Niger revealed to many baffled
American citizens the full extent of their
nation’s global counterterrorism footprint: eight thousand SOFs active on any
given day in more than eighty countries.
All this underscores the need for
U.S. security managers to continue to plan for and debate extended
counterterrorism and stabilization
campaigns—however much they
may pine privately for a post-COIN
era. It also renders Ladwig’s recent
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book—which engages in a thoughtful
and historically informed study of the
patron-client relationship in irregular
warfare and counterinsurgency—all the
more timely. Dr. Ladwig, a professor in
the Department of War Studies at King’s
College London, has provided an erudite
and intellectually stimulating book,
one that does a fine job of shedding
light on some of the shortcomings of
the more recent COIN literature.
Ladwig’s central premise is that one of
the assumptions at the heart of recent
American writings on COIN—that
a security patron and its client will
enjoy a variety of shared goals and
interests—is misplaced. “In fact,” he
notes, “the historical record suggests
that maintaining power is frequently a
competing priority for an incumbent
regime, which means that many of
the standard reform prescriptions
for counterinsurgency—streamlining
the military chain of command,
ending patronage politics, engaging
in economic reform, and embracing
disaffected minority groups—can appear
as threatening to a besieged government
and its supporters as the insurgency
itself.” When dealing with regional
partners—particularly those afflicted
with nepotism, deeply factionalized
internal power structures, and tense
civil-military relations—there always
will be a strong potential for strategic
misalignment or dyssynchrony, or both.
Paying attention to a client’s inner
travails and patterns of dysfunction
is only the first step, however, in
convincing it to conform to U.S.
wishes. Ladwig outlines two archetypal
“influence strategies” that patron states
traditionally have employed as a means
of persuading their junior partners to
enact more-effective and convergent
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policies. The first, inducement, aims to
reassure and win over the client with
generous flows of aid and unqualified
professions of U.S. support. The second
approach, conditionality, takes more
of a “tough love” approach: calibrating and rationing U.S. support in
accordance with the client’s ability or
willingness to cooperate and deliver.
The book contains three detailed
historical case studies of past U.S.
support efforts: one that can be qualified
as a success (the Philippines during the
Hukbalahap Rebellion, from 1946 to
1954); one that is an all-too-well-known
failure (South Vietnam under Ngô Đình
Diệm, from 1955 to 1963); and one that
falls somewhere in between (El Salvador
during the 1979–91 civil war). Each case
study is richly textured, drawing on extensive archival research and declassified
government materials. Given enough
potential material for three books, the
author was wise to select these three
cases to juxtapose; they provide a useful
kaleidoscopic study of the successes and
failures of U.S. foreign internal defense
(FID) policies during the Cold War.
Unsurprisingly, the author notes that
there are no simple solutions to the
issues that traditionally have plagued
patron-client relationships. FID always
winds up being a more complex
and challenging undertaking than
originally planned. That said, policies of
conditionality—which “require making
credible threats to a client and careful
managing of commitments”—are clearly
preferable to policies of pure inducement, which not only are ineffective
but can have pernicious second-order
effects. The challenge is to maintain a
degree of strategic consistency while
devising conditionality-based
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approaches that can survive not
only different administrations and
electoral cycles but interagency differences and bureaucratic turf wars.
One of this reviewer’s only regrets is
that—barring a few segments in the
introduction and conclusion—the
author chooses not to apply his findings
to the study of more-contemporary
COIN campaigns. Dr. Ladwig has
acquired a reputation in the field of
South Asia studies for his careful,
methodical approach to the region’s
security challenges, and it would have
been useful for the reader to get a better
sense of his take on the past, present,
and future of U.S. policy on Afghanistan.
It also might have been interesting to
explore the challenges that come with
more-multidirectional proxy wars,
such as that currently unfolding in
Syria, which involves multiple potential
clients and competing “candidate
patron” states, ranging from Turkey to
Russia and Iran. These are all minor
quibbles, however, and ones that Ladwig
no doubt can address in a follow-on
study, should he wish to do so.
All in all, this is an excellent and
well-timed contribution. Moreover,
despite being an academic work, it
also is an example of the virtues of the
more interdisciplinary, even subtle,
approach to security studies embraced
by European institutions such as King’s
College. Drawing not only on wellresearched history but on other social
sciences such as economic theory, The
Forgotten Front is refreshingly jargonfree and clearly written, thus making it
an ideal study companion for readers
of the Naval War College Review.
ISKANDER REHMAN
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Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Every
War It Starts, by Harlan Ullman. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2017. 272 pages. $29.95.

When former Secretaries of State
General Colin Powell and John Kerry
and former Supreme Allied Commander
Europe Marine general Jim Jones (for
whom I worked when I commanded
the International Security Assistance
Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan when it
expanded across the whole country)
call Harlan Ullman’s Anatomy of Failure
a must-read, people should pay attention. And for those who worry about
policy books being boring, House of
Cards creator Michael, Lord Dobbs
deems Anatomy, in another blurb, a
combination of the works of best-selling
thriller novelist Tom Clancy and Carl
von Clausewitz. All are correct.
In the interests of full disclosure, the
writer and I have been friends and
colleagues since my time at ISAF. As
Britain’s Chief of the General Staff and
then Chief of the Defence Staff, I worked
with Ullman on many issues. Irrespective of this, Anatomy is essential reading
for practitioners and students of foreign,
defense, and national security policy.
The book’s center of gravity is the asking
and answering of the vital question
of why, since World War II, America
arguably has lost all the wars it started
and has failed in military interventions
in which it did not have just cause
to participate. This question alone
directly challenges the accepted view
in Washington that America has the
best and most formidable military in
the world. If that is the case, despite
some stunning tactical successes, why,
at the strategic level, has its record in
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using that military been so apparently
dismal over the past seventy years?
Of course, Ullman records, we won the
big wars: World War II and the Cold
War. And, as he notes, George H. W.
Bush was entirely successful in winning
the First Gulf War in 1991. But in Korea
and especially Vietnam, Iraq the second
time, Afghanistan, and numerous lesser
operations—ranging from Grenada
and Beirut in 1983 to Libya in 2011
and the ongoing campaign in Syria—he
argues persuasively that the results
range from simply bad to catastrophic.
In the first two-thirds of the book,
Ullman examines—in depth and with
personal insights, in what he calls
vignettes—why America’s resort to
using military force has been so poor.
He produces three overarching reasons
that apply not only to the United States
but to many other countries—including,
most certainly, my own. First, America
elected too many presidents who were
inexperienced, unprepared, and
unready to handle what may be the
most difficult job on earth. Through
the lens of the use of military force,
the book analyzes the strengths and
weaknesses of every president since
World War II, noting along the way
John F. Kennedy’s rueful observation
that “there is no school for presidents.”
Second, administrations that failed
applied poor, or simply wrong, strategic
judgment in determining whether to
go to war or to use force. The KennedyJohnson decision makers truly believed
that monolithic Communism had to
be stopped on the Mekong River so it
would not spread to the Mississippi. Bill
Clinton believed a few bombs would
force Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic to stop
killing Kosovars. George W. Bush had
the flawed vision that the geostrategic
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landscape of the Middle East could be
changed forever by democratizing Iraq,
although he justified the decision to
go to war on nonexistent weapons of
mass destruction. Barack Obama drew
“redlines” and demanded that Syrian
president Bashar al-Assad stand down—
to no effect—and he “led from behind”
in bombing Libya, bringing about
Mu‘ammar Gadhafi’s downfall—thereby
provoking a brutal civil war. Who
knows what Donald Trump could do?
Third, the book shows how the lack of
sufficient knowledge or understanding
of the regions and conditions where
force might be used guaranteed failure,
from Vietnam to the current misnamed
“war on terror.” What gives this book an
added and authoritative dimension is the
author’s personal insights that complement the book’s theme. As a Swift boat
skipper in Vietnam, his stories of that
war underscore the folly of America’s
intervention. At times during the Cold
War, whether in discussions with former
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara or
the Pentagon leadership under Ronald
Reagan, or in later years with those
dealing with terrorism, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan, he reveals the damage that
lack of knowledge and understanding
will inflict on any policy and strategy.
The vignette that struck me in particular
was a sensitive mission that Ullman undertook in Vietnam as part of Operation
PHOENIX, an assassination program that
the Central Intelligence Agency and the
South Vietnamese mounted to terminate
with prejudice (i.e., kill) suspected
Vietcong and North Vietnamese agents. It
was a metaphor for why the war was lost.
In the remaining third of the book,
Ullman itemizes a series of recommendations to overcome or reduce the
likelihood of failures in using military
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force that arise from electing unready
presidents and using poor or flawed
strategic judgment, and to ensure that
sufficient knowledge and understanding
of the reasons for using or rejecting
military force are in place. He calls for
a “brains based approach” to strategic
thinking—a term that I, as army and
defense chief, borrowed shamelessly.
He proposes a “Bletchley Park–like
capacity” for using open-source material
available on social media and unclassified avenues such as Google Earth to
enhance knowledge and understanding.
Some of Ullman’s recommendations are
unique to the United States, but in the
main any and all leaders and students
of national security will benefit greatly
from this book. Indeed, to reinforce
the recommendation of Messrs. Powell,
Kerry, and Jones, read this book! And,
as Lord Dobbs adds, this is a very
good and intriguing read as well.
LORD RICHARDS OF HERSTMONCEUX

Fragile Rise: Grand Strategy and the Fate of Imperial Germany, 1871–1914, by Xu Qiyu, trans.
Joshua Hill. Foreword by Graham Allison. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017. 368 pages. $32.

Once in a great while, a book allows the
familiar to be viewed through new eyes.
Fragile Rise is such a volume. On its
surface, it is an account of imperial Germany’s catastrophic grand strategy between the nation’s founding in 1871 and
the onset of the First World War. While
this is well-tilled ground, Fragile Rise
provides a clear and convincing account
of how Otto von Bismarck mitigated the
tensions created by Germany’s newfound
power within the European system, and
how his successors failed at the same
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task. But what makes Fragile Rise unique
is less what it says than who is saying
it. The author, Xu Qiyu, is an activeduty colonel in the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) who serves
as deputy director of the Institute for
Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University in Beijing—the counterpart
to the U.S. National Defense University.
USN readers who harbor cartoonish
images of our PLA counterparts may
be surprised at the depth of research
and insight offered in this volume. Xu
has been a visiting fellow and guest of a
number of prestigious Western institutions, including the Naval War College,
where he is respected as a subtle and
engaging thinker. His research and writing reflect that experience, informed by
international scholarship and primarysource material from across Europe.
Throughout the book, Xu draws no
explicit parallels between the German
and Chinese experiences, although the
book’s translator points out that the
cover of the Chinese edition features the
words “When it is difficult to see clearly
into the future, looking back into history, even the history of other peoples,
might be the right choice.” In China
there is a long tradition of using historical examples to offer implicit criticism
of what may not be criticized officially,
and how Fragile Rise can be viewed in
this light is apparent upon reading.
Xu characterizes the newly unified
Germany as following a “hide and bide”
strategy, recalling Deng Xiaoping’s
guidance that an emerging China
should hide its capabilities and bide its
time, avoiding international leadership
and the complications that come from
displays of power. By 1878, however,
Germany found itself a factor and a
source of concern in the international
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arena, despite its preference for the
low-key. Bismarck’s active management
mitigated the international friction
that this shift in power engendered. If
one seeks a hopeful message, Graham
Allison observes in his foreword that
Xu proposes that skilled leaders can
“reshape unfavorable situations.”
Nonetheless, Xu notes that Bismarck was
managing a “fundamental” conflict, one
woven into the fabric of a possible power
transition. The environment was rife
with suspicion, and the European system
offered little tolerance for strategic error.
Xu assesses that, following Bismarck’s
dismissal, Germany committed two
significant blunders. First, it embarked
on an expensive naval expansion that
was tangential to its core interests. Its
appetite for such an effort was fed by
a consistent insensitivity to the value
Great Britain placed on sea power.
Dismissing arguments that German
overseas trade and colonial possessions
justified the risk of strategic confrontation, Xu notes that Tirpitz’s “luxury
fleet” cost Germany any chance of
accommodation with Britain. By 1907,
as Germany’s primary strategic
adversary—despite significant
economic and cultural ties—Britain
embraced what was effectively
a containment policy.
Second, Xu is similarly critical of the
German army’s failure to subordinate its
military planning to Germany’s wider
political ends. Given that Xu serves a
military controlled by a single political
party, there is perhaps no more pointed
criticism in the PLA vernacular.
Fragile Rise devotes lengthy and
thoughtful attention to the role of
popular opinion in driving Germany
to unwise strategic choices. Germany’s
rapid rise was a source of pride among
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the German people, but it created
pressures that German institutions were
poorly prepared to mitigate. Indeed, Xu
argues that the Weltpolitik policy of the
late Wilhelmine period was primarily
a product of domestic pressures. In a
China in which the ruling Communist
Party makes massive investments in
managing, shaping, and controlling
public opinion, such concern resonates.
At least one American reviewer has been
critical of the tendency for U.S. readers
to view Fragile Rise through the lens of
United States–China power dynamics,
arguing that it should be respected as a
contribution to the historical literature
in its own right. While this is true,
naval professionals naturally—given the
author’s association with China’s senior
military college—will be less interested
in issues of historical interpretation
than of Chinese perceptions of historical
corollary.
It is possible that an American reader
will be left with the impression that a
lively debate over the wisdom of China’s
present course is ongoing. In fact, Fragile
Rise was completed in 2011 during the
closing days of Hu Jintao’s rule, when
the environment in Beijing was more
open and China’s course less certain. Xi
Jinping effectively has ended this debate.
Recent pronouncements of the ruling
Communist Party leave no doubt that
China has embraced its expanding role
in the world and the naval expansion
that supports it. All that remains to see is
whether China can produce a Bismarck
who can navigate around the shoals
along the way. In the meantime, Fragile
Rise presents a small window into a
debate that largely has passed into history already, as well as the thinking that
accompanied the charting of that course.
DALE C. RIELAGE
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historical study—like all history—is, at
its core, a story about people.
Tin Can Titans: The Heroic Men and Ships of
World War II’s Most Decorated Navy Destroyer
Squadron, by John Wukovits. Boston: Da Capo,
2017. 352 pages. $18.99.

In this, his newest work, distinguished
naval historian John Wukovits traces
the history of USN Destroyer Squadron
(DesRon) 21’s Pacific theater operations from 1942 to 1945. According to
Wukovits, DesRon 21 was one of the
most highly acclaimed and decorated
squadrons in the entire U.S. Navy during
World War II. DesRon 21 destroyers are
noted for advancing on the Solomon Islands in the Pacific and holding back the
Japanese navy until U.S. reinforcements
arrived. The squadron also launched
assaults against the Gilbert and Marshall
Islands, into the Philippines, and at
Iwo Jima and Okinawa. During the
squadron’s three years of service, these
exploits and more—including dozens
of minor clashes, countless patrols, and
naval escort missions—earned DesRon
21 “three Presidential Unit Citations,
one Navy Unit Commendation, and
118 battle stars” (p. 5), making it a most
worthy subject of this exceptional book.
However, while Wukovits’s work is a
study of DesRon 21, it is the people,
rather than the ships, who brought about
the unit’s wartime success. Wukovits
states that “[w]hile DesRon 21’s
achievements were impressive, it was
not a squadron of ships that registered
an inspiring resumé, but the people
serving aboard those destroyers” (p. 5).
Subsequently, this particular emphasis
on the men of DesRon 21—Commander
MacDonald, Doc Ransom, Seaman
Chesnutt, Seaman Whisler, and so many
more—is what makes Wukovits’s book
so uniquely engaging for the reader. This
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Wukovits tells the story of DesRon 21
and the sailors who served on its vessels
in their various battles and campaigns
in the Pacific. He introduces the reader
to the squadron and its sailors circa
mid-1942, in the midst of a gloomy
period of operations within the
Pacific theater. The reader is taken
on a journey throughout the entirety
of the squadron’s wartime operations
up to its ultimate triumph, including
having the honor of leading the U.S.
Navy, under the guidance of Admiral
William F. Halsey, into Tokyo Bay to
receive the Japanese surrender in August
1945. This honor was bestowed on
the ships and sailors of DesRon 21 by
Admiral Halsey, who credited victory
in the Pacific to the courage and skill
of DesRon 21 and its personnel.
Wukovits divides his work into three
parts, with each part containing roughly
three chapters, making the reading
of this book quite manageable. Part 1
covers the origins of DesRon 21 and
the beginning of its campaign in the
Solomon Islands, including the battle
of Guadalcanal (Operation WATCHTOWER). Wukovits also does an excellent
job of describing the squadron’s function
and its organization, as well as the
origins of the various vessels. Wukovits’s
attention is well spent here, given the
length and difficulty of USN operations
in this geographical subset of the Pacific
theater during the war. Then, as the
book moves forward through parts 2
and 3, the reader is drawn into DesRon
21’s bloody and hard-fought campaign
that extended all the way from Guadalcanal to Tokyo—and, of course, the
lives of its crewmembers, which perhaps
constitutes the highlight of the book.
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In telling the fascinating story of
DesRon 21 and its crew, Wukovits
demonstrates without a doubt that, as
a scholar and historian, he rivals such
naval historians of the Pacific theater
as James Hornfischer and Samuel
Eliot Morison. The book might have
included more maps to ensure correct
and continued orientation to the
events, places, movements, and battles
it describes. Nonetheless, Wukovits has
compiled an excellent study of DesRon
21, one that is demonstrably the product
of lengthy research into wartime naval
records; academic research; and personal
oral interviews with those DesRon 21
crewmembers still living, which bring
an intimate and personal quality to
this historical study. In sum, Tin Can
Titans unquestionably is a must-have
addition for any armchair World War II
history buff or student of naval history.
BLAKE I. CAMPBELL

The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear
Deterrent, by Matthew Jones. Vol. 1, From the VBomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964.
London: Routledge, 2017. 547 pages. $155.
The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear
Deterrent, by Matthew Jones. Vol. 2, The Labour
Government and the Polaris Programme, 1964–
1970. London: Routledge, 2017. 559 pages. $155.

No inquiry into British nuclear history can be undertaken in isolation
from the presence of an intimate U.S.
involvement. It therefore is worth
taking notice of the publication of the
two-volume Official History of the UK
Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. Matthew
Jones, professor of international history
at the London School of Economics,
was granted unprecedented access
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to hitherto unavailable materials
to produce this official history.
At the beginning of both volumes,
Professor Jones graciously pays tribute to
the pioneers of British nuclear historiography, Professor Margaret Gowing and
her associate Lorna Arnold. Gowing,
official historian of the United Kingdom
(U.K.) Atomic Energy Authority and
professor of the history of science at
Oxford, authored the studies that set the
scholarly standard: Britain and Atomic
Energy, 1939–1945 and, a decade later,
her two-volume Independence and
Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy,
1945–1952. Arnold assisted Gowing,
then in 2001 published her own book,
Britain and the H-bomb. Jones’s two
new volumes are worthy sequels.
America’s initial monopoly over the
atomic bomb fed the British sense of
technological exclusion. Determined
then to “go it alone,” Britain asserted an
initial nuclear doctrine of sovereign and
independent control over its nuclear
weapons. It was only after Britain had
demonstrated a unilateral mastery of
thermonuclear weapons development
in May 1957 that the United Kingdom
was granted access to specific U.S.
nuclear weapons technologies. For
Jones, the ensuing 1958 U.S.-U.K.
mutual-defense agreement remains
“one of the most remarkable examples
of pooling of sensitive national security
information by two sovereign states,
and has rightly been seen as one of the
fundamental pillars of the post-war
Anglo-American relationship.”
The United Kingdom’s capacity to
inflict assured nuclear destruction,
independent of the United States,
allowed it to behave as a “second centre
of decision.” In this position, Britain
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secured the ability not only to “leverage”
the United States politically but also
to command a seat at the geostrategic
“top table.” Jones presents the Skybolt
missile crisis of 1962 as an example of
this nuclear-based political leverage over
the United States. Aiming at updating
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the United
States promised delivery of the Skybolt
system. A nuclear, standoff, air-toground missile, Skybolt was designed to
penetrate Soviet airspace in the face of
an increasing Soviet antiballistic-missile
(ABM) capability. When President
Kennedy abruptly canceled the agreement in November 1962, he did so
ostensibly on technical grounds. In truth,
the United States opposed, on political
grounds, any extension to the life of the
U.K. nuclear deterrent. Seeing through
this ruse, Prime Minister Macmillan
was instrumental in resolving the crisis
at the Nassau conference in December
1962—by hoisting Kennedy’s policy
on its own petard. The United States
was forced to concede the nature of
its opposition to sharing Skybolt, and
instead to offer a replacement—which
paradoxically became Britain’s secondgeneration nuclear deterrent: the Polaris
missile system. Not only had Britain’s
first-generation deterrent not been
curbed, but the United States in fact had
become father to a second generation.
Volume 2 brings with it the advent of
a new ministry in 1964, led by Harold
Wilson and the Labour Party. The
necessity for a Polaris Improvement
Program takes center stage in this
volume, since the Polaris A-3 missile
was becoming obsolescent, just as the
second-generation Polaris system was
coming on line. There is a fascinating
portrayal of the Whitehall bureaucracy
at work in the constant race to maintain
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a semblance of qualitative nuclear
parity with the United States.
In the wake of the U.S. shift to the
Poseidon’s advanced technology of
the multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicle (MIRV), Britain under
Wilson’s aegis set off alone to begin
exploitation of an intermediate technology, Antelope, that the United States had
developed but later abandoned in favor
of MIRVs. The climax of the U.K. Polaris
Improvement Program was reached with
Chevaline, a unique configurational
change to alter the front end of the
Polaris missile, thereby rendering it
all but invulnerable to interception by
deployed Soviet ABMs. But the history
of that program will have to await the
projected third volume in this series.
Meantime, Professor Jones has
written an excellent description of
Britain’s quest for a sovereign and
independent strategic nuclear deterrent.
Completely mastering his sources,
Jones has produced a compelling work
of lasting significance. He has come
full circle, following in the footsteps
of his larger-than-life role models,
Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold.
MYRON A. GREENBERG

Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a
Complex World, by Stanley McChrystal, with
Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris
Fussell. New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015. 290
pages. $29.95.

During the years he spent hunting
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and battling
the forces of Al Qaeda in the streets
and deserts of Iraq, General Stanley
McChrystal turned the Joint Special
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Operations Command into a remarkably
lethal, efficient, and effective killing
machine. To do so he performed an
extraordinary feat of social engineering, one that required modification of
very insulated cultures, delegation of
significant decision-making to very
low levels of the organization, and
widely sharing information in a manner
few would have predicted possible.
Team of Teams makes it clear that this
experience had a profound impact on
McChrystal. In the ensuing years of
reflection and serious study, the onetime
four-star general has concluded that
in a world of ever-increasing complexity, networks offer the best chance for
organizational success. The book both
tells the story of the joint interagency
task force and shows how modern
leaders can achieve similar results.
McChrystal argues that technologically
linked, extraordinarily nimble networks
increasingly will run rings around
organizations built around nineteenthcentury norms of hierarchy and
efficiency. The quest for efficiency must
give way to the pursuit of effectiveness.
Yet speed is still a virtue, and the
network must share vast amounts of
information in short amounts of time.
Accelerating the cycle of assessment,
decision, implementation, and reassessment to a pace not previously considered
possible will enable cutting inside
the decision loops of the competition
and ensure victory. In positing this,
McChrystal does not lack for boldness.
As the title suggests, McChrystal’s
twenty-first-century organizational
model constitutes a “team of teams.” In a
true team, the members fully understand
and deeply trust one another. However,
no small team, however gifted, can
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deliver the expertise and products
that the entire network demands.
McChrystal’s prescription involves crossassigning team members, colocating
previously isolated functions, and greatly
increasing the sharing of information.
Such connections are vital, for they
build trust as well as what are described
as organizational “neural networks.”
To his credit, McChrystal identifies
some potential weaknesses in running such a network. For example,
the risk of massive compromise, as
occurred with Chelsea Manning and
Edward Snowden, is always present. McChrystal takes the bold and
debatable position that the damage a
Manning or a Snowden may cause is
still a price worth paying, considering
the benefits of a modern network.
With sweeping changes in organizational
style come sweeping changes in leadership. In a modern network, decisionmaking is pushed down to a level where
a leader may become uncomfortable
with the degree of delegation. The results
of those decisions flow to the leader,
who, possessed of a more holistic view
of the organization, can push information and context back down to leaders
far lower in the chain of command.
Questions persist about whether
McChrystal’s model will work
universally. A few organizations, such
as NASA (for a time) or the Office of
Naval Reactors, might be able to achieve
and maintain the degree of dedication,
reliability, and intense commitment that
McChrystal expected and got from his
operators, but these are rare examples.
The book does not address other
essential aspects of organizations. How
does a networked organization promote,
reward, recruit, and retain its personnel?
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How does a leader deal with a workforce
that is increasingly transient and for
which organizational loyalty is no longer
a hallmark of professionalism? How are
questions involving public relations,
legality, and political involvement and
interest handled? These problems are
not unique to the military. There is no
discussion of how leaders cope with periods of disruption, challenge, or failure.
Two other issues deserve mention. The
first is the book’s method of citation:
there are no footnotes or traditional endnotes. This aids the casual reader but not
the serious scholar, student, or executive
who needs to delve deeper. Perhaps the
publisher insisted on this methodology;
if so, one hopes it is for the last time.
The other issue is more challenging.
McChrystal goes to significant lengths
to present Team of Teams as a collaborative effort. This is commendable, and
there may be portions of the book that
represent a collective effort that is so
interwoven it defies any assignment of
individual credit. However, McChrystal
is the only author who truly can explain
the senior leader’s perspective and feelings. As such, his voice should dominate
the work, or at least be given clearly
identified and dedicated portions of the
book to provide solely his point of view.
Despite these shortcomings, Team
of Teams belongs on any bookshelf
devoted to modern works on leadership.
It asks important questions, has more
than a few sensible recommendations, and provokes useful follow-on
conversations. Its readability also will
be a plus for business school students,
who increasingly will be likely to find
it on their list of required texts.
RICHARD J. NORTON
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Gear Up, Mishaps Down: The Evolution of Naval
Aviation Safety, 1950–2000, by Robert Dunn.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 224
pages. $29.95.

The average American’s view of
naval aviation likely is informed by
the movie Top Gun or, for those with
some historical knowledge, the carrier
battles of World War II in the Pacific.
Unknown even to most naval aviators
is a larger and equally dramatic story:
the Navy’s struggle to bring its aviation
accident rate under control. The number
of aircraft and aircrews lost to accidents
over the course of naval aviation’s history
is staggering—in the tens of thousands,
far more than ever were lost to combat.
A critical segment of that history
occurred during the period that retired
vice admiral Dunn reviews in his book.
After World War II, tectonic changes
occurred in naval aviation, including
the introduction of jet aircraft and
the advent of nuclear weapons. The
pressure on the Navy to demonstrate
the effectiveness of its aircraft carriers in
the rapidly evolving environment of the
1950s and ’60s was intense. The need to
fight in Korea with new and inadequately understood aircraft technology, as well
as to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent
posture day or night, in almost any
weather, produced horrendous accident
rates. In 1954 alone the Navy and Marine Corps lost 776 aircraft to accidents,
and 536 aircrewmen and passengers
were killed. There was legitimate doubt
that naval aviation would survive if that
rate of mishaps could not be reduced.
But survive it did, through reducing
accident rates—step by painful step. It
is a complex, multifaceted story that
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Dunn, a former commander of the
Naval Safety Center and Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Air Warfare,
is uniquely qualified to tell. This is
a book most easily understood and
appreciated by those who have been a
part of naval aviation. However, while
the book’s second half gets rather
technical, the author does provide both
explanatory endnotes and appendices
that offer background information to
help the lay reader make sense of it.
Dunn appears to be on a mission to
glorify those who made key contributions to the reduction in mishaps. This
is entirely justified, as the efforts of such
luminaries as James Flatley, Dr. Ashton
Graybiel, and Bob Osborne helped to
bring the accident rate down from the
hundreds of planes and crewmen lost
each year in the 1950s to the occasional
mishap that naval aviation experiences
now. Their efforts, and those of many
others, not only saved thousands of
lives and aircraft but ensured that
the nation would be able to maintain
command of the seas. The book is a
mixture of narrative and analysis that
forms a coherent explanation of how
naval aviation shifted from being a
freewheeling, daredevil operation to a
disciplined and professional enterprise.
The book is well organized and the
author’s writing is straightforward
and clear. However, the book contains
some small issues that casual readers
likely would miss but that can nag at an
experienced naval aviator (such as this
reviewer). One is the presence of contradictory statements about the potential
utility of the canceled supercarrier USS
United States; another is what appear to
be typos. The latter subtly change the
meaning of certain paragraphs, such
as the statement on page 22 that the
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helicopter community’s mishap experience was “atypical” for the day, when the
word should have been “typical,” or the
incorrect statement that the Frenchman
Paul Bert’s hypoxia experiments took
place in the twentieth century versus
the nineteenth. There are enough of
these “nits” in the first few chapters
to distract the knowledgeable reader,
although later chapters are cleaner.
The real issue is the book’s laudatory
tone. Dunn is forthright in describing
the various issues that led to the Navy’s
awful accident rates, and correctly identifies the measures that eventually fixed
the problem. Still, he fails to address
what is, in this reviewer’s opinion, a key
issue: the rate at which the Navy reduced
its accident rate in comparison with the
Air Force. In 1950, the Navy’s accident
rate was one and one-half times that
of the Air Force; by 1960 and through
1970, it was four times higher than that
of the Air Force, despite a concurrent
reduction in the overall accident rate
for both services. Even in 1980, the
Navy rate remained three times that
of the Air Force. However, by 1990
the relative accident rates for the Navy
and Air Force were equal—and have
remained so ever since. Any analysis of
naval aviation safety improvement in
the period the book covers should take
on this matter, and the failure to do so
is a key drawback of the book. Had the
Navy adopted the Air Force’s methods
in the 1950s, thousands of additional
lives and aircraft might have been saved.
Why the service did not do so is an
important part of the story, one that
should be told. Dunn does a good job of
describing the various threads that led to
the Navy’s victory over mishaps and the
book is worthwhile reading for anyone
who has ever been involved in naval
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aviation, but in the end it falls short of
delivering more-thorough reporting.
ROBERT C. RUBEL

Navy Football: Return to Glory, by T. C. Cameron.
Charleston, SC: History Press, 2017. 189 pages.
$21.99.

As both a U.S. Military Academy
(USMA) graduate and the father of
a USMA graduate, I jumped at the
chance to read a book about the
success of the U.S. Naval Academy
(USNA) football team. Let’s face it:
Navy has a winning program that has
dominated Army football in recent
years, even though both teams draw
from the same pool of talented high
school athletes. T. C. Cameron traces
the history of USNA’s football team,
including its comeback, or “return to
glory,” over the past fifteen years.
Bill Belichick, the legendary coach of
the New England Patriots, wrote the
foreword, in which he pays tribute to
the Navy coaches and midshipmen
who taught him the game of football.
“When I think of Navy football, my
early role models were some of the
biggest legends in the program’s history”
(p. 7). Belichick grew up in Annapolis
and his father, Steve Belichick, was an
assistant football coach at the Naval
Academy for thirty-four years.
Cameron first traces the history of Navy
football. He describes the period from
1950 to 1963 as its “Camelot” years.
The Navy football team was successful
under Coach Eddie Erdelatz and his
assistant coach Wayne Hardin, who
later succeeded him. During these years,
Navy also built the Navy–Marine
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Corps Memorial Stadium. The Navy
football team was winning consistently,
and legends such as Tom Lynch and
Heisman Trophy winners Joe Bellino
and Roger Staubach were winning
the hearts and minds of football fans
across the country. Even President John
F. Kennedy, himself a Navy veteran,
supported the Navy team. Kennedy’s
assassination in November 1963 was a
tremendous blow to the team, and many
wondered whether the Army-Navy
game would even be played the week
afterward. Ranked number two in the
country, Navy won the game, then went
on to lose to top-ranked Texas in the
Cotton Bowl. After the following season,
as Cameron puts it, “Camelot was over.
Without knowing it, a long cold winter
descended on the Navy program. It
would last almost forty years” (p. 26).
Cameron characterizes the years
between 1995 and 2001 as the “Big
Tease.” Under Coach Charlie Weatherbie, Navy football initially did well,
experiencing winning seasons. However,
as Cameron writes, “[h]is finish was a
disaster, as Navy lost seventeen of the
last eighteen” games he coached, “and
twenty of twenty-one overall” (p. 51).
Navy football’s true renewed success
began when Coach Paul Johnson, the
offensive coordinator in 1995–96,
returned, and Cameron portrays
2002–2007 under the heading “Johnson
Returns.” Johnson’s record at Navy was
43-27, with five bowl appearances in six
seasons. More importantly, Johnson’s
teams crushed both Army and Air
Force, losing only once against another
service academy. The football team
has continued to have winning seasons
under Coach Ken Niumatalolo from
2008 to the present, a period Cameron
characterizes as a “Ball of Fire” because
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of the coach’s dynamic personality on
the field. Cameron makes the point that
“[i]f Ken Niumatalolo is your neighbor,
you think he’s a great guy. But if you
play football for Navy, in an instant, he
can be your worst nightmare” (p. 107).
Cameron does a superb job recounting
the intense rivalries that Navy has with
not only Army and Air Force but Notre
Dame. He describes the 2007 win over
Notre Dame—after forty-three consecutive losses—as follows: “The night ‘the
Streak’ died—the longest streak in
NCAA history—eighty thousand fans at
Notre Dame Stadium watched in stunned
silence as Navy let go of forty-three years
of misery, embarrassment, and frustration” (p. 136). He details the joy—and
other emotions—of football games with
Army and Air Force, with the overall
winner receiving the Commander in
Chief ’s Trophy. Few other writers can
match Cameron’s insights into and appreciation of the distinctive qualities of
the Army-Navy game. “The annual bit of
military theater, greater than any other
game, makes the Army-Navy legacy a little sweeter. The nation’s game” (p. 106).
Nonetheless, I struggled somewhat
with the book. I found it difficult that
Cameron seems to be telling two stories,
in that as he writes about the chronology of Navy football he intersperses
the story of Navy’s fierce rivalries with
Army, Air Force, and Notre Dame.
At times the story was challenging to
follow because I was reading about
things from two different perspectives:
one that portrayed a chronology, and
another that recounted memorable
games with Navy’s leading rivals.
The appendices highlighting Navy’s
unforgettable games, unforgettable
seasons, GOATS (read the book), players, coaches, and a potpourri of other

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 161

B O O K R E V I E WS

161

topics all add value and make this book
a must-read for football fans across the
country. Cameron has shined a spotlight
on Navy’s football program through its
highs and lows, with colorful commentary that makes it an enjoyable read.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS

The Battleship Holiday: The Naval Treaties and
Capital Ship Design, by Robert C. Stern. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 272 pages.
$42.95.

Robert Stern, a writer of more than
twenty books on naval matters over
three decades, opens his latest effort by
admitting that he is tackling a subject on
which much has been written already.
The Battleship Holiday explores the
history and technical design of capital
ships that the five signatories to the
1922 Five-Power Treaty—Great Britain,
the United States, Japan, France, and
Italy—plus Germany built during and
after the “battleship holiday” that the
treaty imposed. His fresh approach
to analyzing capital ship design and
construction during this period
addresses the ships and their innovations chronologically rather than along
national lines. Throughout this chronology, he explores three major threads:
diplomacy, technology, and operational
performance. Stern offers that, while
other treatments address one or two of
these threads, his assessment of all three
provides “more complete insight into
the interplay of factors that led different
nations to build different ships” (p. 10)
to achieve their respective national goals.
Divided into two parts, the book first
explores how capital ships evolved to the
point at which the world’s naval powers
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decided to limit them. Beginning with
the 1862 battle of Hampton Roads, Stern
traces the evolution of capital ships
up to the 1916 battle of Jutland. His
threads run through ship design and
construction as each nation emphasized
characteristics important to its vision
of the battleship’s role. Stern steers
clear of analyzing strategy and tactics
except where necessary to show how
different technical decisions combined
with tactical developments, such as to
produce Jutland’s outcome. The chapter
“The Art and Practice of Main-Battery
Fire Control in 1916” demonstrates
Stern’s in-depth analysis of technological
advancements by the various belligerents. In addition to gunnery and
fire control, each country drew from
Jutland different lessons on armor,
propulsion, and machinery—many of
them incorrect. Stern concludes the
first section by describing the tension
between liberal politicians and naval
leaders as they attempted to curtail the
exorbitant cost of maintaining a fleet
of modern battleships. The resulting
Washington Naval Treaty system placed
specific restrictions on capital ships. The
subsequent battleship building holiday
succeeded in preventing unconstrained
shipbuilding, but it did not inhibit
ambitions to build better battleships.
The second half of the book tracks
capital ship design and construction
from 1922 to 1946. The idea of naval
disarmament began to fray less than five
years after its initiation, slowly at first
and later accelerating to the point of dissolution. During the intervening years,
naval architects fought to design ships
that maximized war-fighting capability
within the treaty’s 35,000-ton restriction.
Stern spends significant time discussing
the technical details of various designs,
including the sacrifices, benefits, and
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political ramifications involved. He gives
equal coverage to all the navies building
capital ships, including their decisions
on whether to follow the constraints the
Washington Treaty system imposed. He
also includes significant discussion of
ships not built, and why. The chronological approach demonstrates how the
different design decisions responded to
or ignored the efforts of other nations.
Stern’s assessment culminates with an
analysis of the effectiveness of these
battleships’ offensive and defensive
capabilities in combat. Direct comparison is nearly impossible, since only
three engagements occurred that pitted
new-generation battleships against each
other. The German battleships Bismarck
and Scharnhorst succumbed to their
peers HMS Prince of Wales and HMS
Duke of York, respectively, in battle at
sea, but those actions included other
vessels or aircraft that prevented a “fair
fight.” The other direct action between
new-generation battleships consisted of
USS Massachusetts (BB 59) battering the
incomplete French battle cruiser Jean
Bart, holed up in Casablanca’s harbor.
Stern assesses other surface actions, including the battleship duel in which the
post-Jutland battleships USS Washington
(BB 56) and USS Alabama (BB 57) sank
the Japanese pretreaty battle cruiser
Kirishima, and the cornering and scuttling of the German Graf Spee by British
cruisers at the Río de la Plata. In almost
every case, whether they resulted in
sinking or survival, battleship-protection
schemes underperformed. Surface action
was no longer the norm—the majority
of battleship damage and losses in the
Second World War resulted from air
attack, especially with aerial torpedoes.
Stern provides a fresh and highly
technical assessment of the pinnacle
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of naval warship design. But in doing
so he demonstrates the futility of this
construction. Bent on applying the
lessons of Jutland to ensure victory in
the next great naval battle, nations built
the ultimate dreadnoughts, only to see
them relegated to convoy protection and
antiaircraft duty, untested in the fleet
actions for which they were designed.
While America, Britain, France, and
Italy continued to operate battleships
after the Second World War, the design
and construction costs of battleships
proved exorbitant in relation to their
utility in the era of the aircraft carrier.
JAMES P. MCGRATH

Turkey and the West: Fault Lines in a Troubled
Alliance, by Kemal Kirişci. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 2018. 309 pages. $34.

Turkey’s oscillation between the West
and East is nothing new, nor is there
a lack of literature on the topic. But
what Kemal Kirişci accomplishes in
his most recent work is an insightful
analysis of Turkey’s history and its
foreign policy by-products through the
lens of the current security quandary.
Most valuably, the book demonstrates
the interaction among the various
currents within Turkey and how they are
creating an increasingly anti-Western
foreign policy. Given the author’s goal
of elucidating Turkey’s history up to the
present day and reducing the confusion
about what is behind its government’s
decision-making, his book offers the
most authoritative work available.
Not long ago the United States was
touting Turkey as a model for countries
seeking to join the international liberal
order, in particular for those trying to
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reconcile Islam and democracy. Early in
his tenure Recep Erdoğan gave a speech
at Harvard in which he quoted Thomas
Jefferson, praised democracy, and
extolled the virtues of Turkey’s eventual
European Union (EU) accession. As recent as 2011, Erdoğan delivered a speech
in Cairo that emphasized democracy
and secularism as qualities intrinsic to
Turkey. Yes, things can change in a hurry
in the Middle East, but why and how
did the esteem in which Turkey was held
around the world recede so quickly?
The author provides an engaging
picture of all the factors at play, many of
which are rooted in domestic politics.
He traces Turkey’s history since World
War II, focusing particularly on the
period since the Gezi Park protests in
2013. Turkey has banned consumption
of alcohol in public spaces, altered
the content of educational materials
in schools to align them more with
Islam, curtailed personal freedoms, and
detained journalists. Nowadays Erdoğan
makes public comments demeaning the
founder of the modern Turkish republic,
Kemal Atatürk. Erdoğan is deploying
an increasingly majoritarian form
of democracy that excludes the 48.6
percent of the country that did not vote
for his increased power in the April 2017
referendum. The situation in Turkey
portends a mutually reinforcing nexus
in which growing authoritarianism
within the country’s borders moves in
parallel with a foreign policy increasingly at odds with that of the West.
In analyzing the international factors at
play in Turkey’s shift, Kirişci gives due
attention to the war in Syria and the
migration crisis. But in addition to these
better-known fault lines, what the author
does exceptionally well is to explain how
Europe and the United States are not
without blame for fostering skepticism
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of Western sincerity among the Turkish
population. The 2003 invasion of Iraq—
in the face of Turkey’s objections and its
perceptive and rather dire predictions—
inflated an already-strong sense of
distrust toward the United States. The
EU’s halfhearted attempts at accomplishing Turkish accession predictably have
come to a standstill, which removes
the pull of Europe and the pressure
for democratic reform. Perceived
insensitivity on the Kurdish question,
and even overt sympathy among some
for increased Kurdish autonomy,
represents another source of contention.
The author also brings context to some
overlooked fault lines, such as the EU’s
acceptance of Cyprus as a member even
though that country refused to support
the UN-backed reunification plan,
on the support of which the Turkish
government had expended significant
political capital. Other examples include
the 2014 failure of Turkey to be reelected
as a nonpermanent member of the UN
Security Council and Western governments’ delayed and lukewarm condemnations of the 2016 coup attempt.
This book is immensely helpful in
understanding Turkey’s foreign policy
and the myriad of factors that influence
it. A major theme of the book is why
Turkey continually shows signs of shifting its orientation away from Europe
and the United States toward China,
Iran, and Russia. The author provides a

strong argument that if this shift were to
culminate in a complete reorientation—
especially at a time when the Middle 
East is more of a flash point than
usual and the aggressiveness of Russia
is trending upward exponentially—the
consequences to the international
liberal order would be grave.
No magic solutions are provided, and
the book’s candid assessment is that
the relationship will get worse before it
gets better. The book’s central argument
is that the United States and the EU
should maintain robust engagement
with Turkey. Kirişci also offers a flexible
framework for analysis and several
recommendations for narrowing the
fault lines. Turkey remains anchored
in the political, military, and market
economy–based institutional structures
of the West—at least for the time being.
Moreover, in the long run, who is
Erdoğan or his eventual successors going
to trust more, the EU and the United
States or China and Russia? The history
of Turkey reveals indicators of orientations in both directions, but more so a
Western bent. The question is whether
that history of Western integration can
survive the rising Islamism in the country and Erdoğan’s seemingly perpetual
authoritarian rule. Reading this book
might not enable one to predict correctly
Turkey’s final direction, but one’s guess
at least would be much better informed.
JEREMY SNELLEN

OUR REVIEWERS
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professor.
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USN ships in Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD. He commanded the 1st Battalion,
10th Aviation Regiment (ATTACK) and served as J1 of the U.S. Pacific Command before coming
to the Naval War College as the Army adviser. He has a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, an
MS from George Washington University, an MA from the Naval War College, and an EdD from
Johnson & Wales University.
Myron A. Greenberg is a contracting officer with the Defense Contract Management Agency in Dayton, Ohio. The Naval War College Press published his Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The
British Approach as Newport Paper 8. He published a review essay in the Autumn 2000 Naval War
College Review. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Cincinnati and an MPIA
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served on active duty as a light attack / strike fighter aviator. At the Naval War College he served
in various positions, including planning and decision-making instructor, joint education adviser,
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Jeremy Snellen currently works at the Center for Law and Military Operations in Charlottesville,
Virginia. In addition to being a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College, he also holds a
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-

I

ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

n early March 2018, the Naval War College responded to direction from the Under Secretary of the Navy to host a workshop entitled “Breaking the Mold: Strategy and War in the 21st Century.” The Honorable Thomas Modly traveled to the
College to deliver a rousing keynote address to over sixty scholars and operators
from across the Navy and the wider defense intellectual community. He challenged each participant to “break the mold” of conventional thinking to develop
new war-fighting concepts in the sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace domains.
Under Secretary Modly said, in part:
In a word, I believe that breaking the mold will require a preeminent focus on the
need for agility. Agility is the term which I believe best describes the overall organizational quality that has determined, and will determine, who and what survives in any
increasingly competitive, rapidly changing, and unpredictable environment. This is
the environment our Navy faces today, so I think we will ultimately be judged by how
well we transition our forces and our supporting organizations to a future in which
agility is their defining characteristic. Therefore, we must advance agility when we
think about, and build, our future force structure. We need more ships and aircraft
and vehicles, but that equipment must provide flexibility, adaptability, faster development cycles, reduced maintenance requirements, greater lethality, and an industrial
strategy that sustains a modern, flexible, and sustainable industrial base.

The Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP)
is replete with books that focus on agility, flexibility, innovation, and “moldbreaking” thinking. The following descriptions, adapted from material provided
by each book’s publisher, explain why the books are of interest to military officers,
government civilian leaders, and others.
• The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant
Technologies, by Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (W. W. Norton,
2014). The authors—two thinkers at the forefront of their field—reveal the
forces driving the reinvention of our lives and our economy. As the full
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impact of digital technologies is felt, we will realize immense bounty in the
form of dazzling personal technology, advanced infrastructure, and nearboundless access to the cultural items that enrich our lives. Drawing on years
of research and up-to-the-minute trends, Brynjolfsson and McAfee identify
the best strategies for survival and offer a new path to prosperity. These
include revamping education so it prepares people for the next economy
instead of the last one, designing new collaborations that pair brute processing power with human ingenuity, and embracing policies that make sense in
a radically transformed landscape.
• The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book That Will Change the Way
You Do Business, by Clayton M. Christensen (HarperBusiness Essentials,
2003). This is a revolutionary business book that has changed corporate
America forever. Based on a truly radical idea—that great companies can fail
precisely because they do everything “right”—this Wall Street Journal, Business Week, and New York Times Business best seller is one of the most provocative and important business books ever written. Entrepreneurs, managers,
and CEOs ignore its wisdom and its warnings at their great peril.
• Thinking, Fast and Slow, by Daniel Kahneman (Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2011).
In this international best seller, Kahneman, a renowned psychologist and
winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, takes us on a groundbreaking tour
of the mind and explains the two systems that drive the way we think. System
1 is fast, intuitive, and emotional; System 2 is slower, more deliberative, and
more logical. The impact of overconfidence on corporate strategies, the difficulties of predicting what will make us happy in the future, the profound
effect of cognitive biases on everything from playing the stock market to
planning our next vacation—each of these can be understood only by knowing how the two systems shape our judgments and decisions. Engaging the
reader in a lively conversation about how we think, Kahneman reveals where
we can and cannot trust our intuitions and how we can tap into the benefits
of slow thinking.
• Inviting Disaster: Lessons from the Edge of Technology; An Inside Look at
Catastrophes and Why They Happen, by James R. Chiles (HarperBusiness,
2002). Weaving a dramatic narrative that explains how breakdowns in
systems result in such disasters as the chain-reaction crash of an Air France
Concorde and the meltdown at the Chernobyl nuclear power station,
Chiles vividly demonstrates how the battle between man and machine may
be escalating beyond manageable limits—and why we all have a stake in
its outcome. Included in this edition is a special introduction providing a

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 167

173

5/1/18 11:11 AM

168

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 1

behind-the-scenes look at the World Trade Center catastrophe. Combining
firsthand accounts of employees’ escapes with an in-depth look at the structural reasons behind the towers’ collapse, Chiles addresses the question, Were
the towers “two tall heroes” or structures with a fatal flaw?
These books, and many others within the CNO-PRP, can help military readers
(and would-be innovators) take a detailed look at the inner workings of minds
facing sometimes overwhelming challenges. They may help you to “break the
mold” of conventional thinking and develop an agile mind, as encouraged by the
Under Secretary of the Navy.

JOHN E. JACKSON
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